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Competition Policy in relation 
to the Central and Eastern 
European Countries -
Achievements and Challenges 
by Karel Van Miert, Commissioner 
for Competition 
1. Introduction 
At the European Council meeting in 
Luxembourg of 12 and 13 December 
1997 an historic decision was taken to 
launch the overall process of 
enlargement of the European Union to 
include the ten Central and East 
European applicant States and 
Cyprus. The enlargement process is 
seen as being comprehensive, 
inclusive and ongoing. Each of the ten 
Associated Countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe will proceed at its 
own rate, depending on its degree of 
preparedness. 
At the European Council in 
Copenhagen in June 1993 it was 
decided that accession would take 
place as soon as a country is able to 
assume the obligations of membership 
by satisfying the economic and 
political conditions. Membership 
requires that the candidate country 
achieve stability of institutions 
guaranteeing democracy, the rule of 
law, human rights and respect for and 
protection of minorities. The 
existence of a functioning market 
economy, as well as the capacity to 
cope with competitive pressure and 
market forces within the Union; and 
the ability to take on the obligations 
of membership, including adherence 
to the aims of political, economic and 
monetary union, constitute further 
requirements for membership. 
Furthermore, the European Council in 
Madrid in December 1995 referred to 
the need, in the context of the pre­
accession strategy, to create the 
conditions for the gradual, 
harmonious integration of the 
applicant countries through the 
development of the market economy, 
the adjustment of administrative 
structures and the creation of a stable 
economic and monetary environment. 
The effective application and 
enforcement of EC Competition 
Policy within the enlargement process 
is crucial to the success of the 
European integration model. The 
completion of the Single Market 
programme cannot be dissociated 
from developments in the competition 
field. Without "the institution of a 
system ensuring that competition in 
the common market is not distorted" 
(Article 3g EC Treaty), the internal 
market would not be workable. 
Indeed, EC Competition Policy is one 
of the pillars of the economic 
constitution established by the EC 
Treaty, and is a fundamental part of 
the acquis communautaire. 
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The Europe Agreements 
therefore stipulate that a major 
precondition for the Associated 
Countries' economic integration 
into the Community is the 
approximation of those 
countries' existing and future 
legislation to that of the 
Community. Also, the 
Commission's White Paper on 
the preparation of the Associated 
Countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe for integration 
into the internal market of the 
Union noted that the introduction 
of competition policy in these 
countries and the effective 
enforcement thereof, must be 
considered as a precondition for 
the opening of the wider internal 
market, and ultimately of 
accession to the Union. 
Moreover, effective enforcement 
requires that the judicial system, 
the public administration and the 
relevant economic operators 
have a sufficient understanding 
of competition law and policy. 
Most of the Central and Eastern 
European Countries (CEECs) 
have taken decisive steps in 
relation to or have started the 
process of approximation of 
legislation, institution building 
and enforcement on the basis of 
the obligations that are contained 
in the Europe Agreement. 
The ongoing efforts to 
incorporate EC law (the "acquis 
communautaire^ into the legal 
orders of the CEECs, in the form 
of national competition laws, 
and to ensure that these laws are 
actually applied, is of paramount 
importance. This will facilitate 




Once the applicant States 
become Members of the 
European Union, the competition 
rules of the EC Treaty and the 
secondary legislation (for 
example block exemption 
regulations), will become 
directly applicable in the new 
member countries. The 
approximation of legislation in 
the pre-accession phase, 
therefore, gradually acquaints 
the CEECs with a Community 
system which ensures that 
competition in the common 
market is not distorted. 
Moreover, the current exercise of 
approximation of the national 
laws of the CEECs to EC law, 
contributes to the creation of a 
European-wide network of 
competition authorities, which 
apply the same basic principles 
of competition law. This should 
allow the effective decentralised 
application of competition law in 
the future enlarged Community. 
2. The introduction of a 
competition regime in the 
CEECs 
Anti-trust policy has long been 
acknowledged to be an effective 
tool for regulating monopoly 
power, and for ensuring that 
markets function properly. That 
there are certain hard-core anti-
competitive practices which the 
European Commission and other 
competition enforcement agen-
cies should seek to halt, is 
internationally accepted. This is 
evidenced by work in progress 
within the WTO and OECD. 
The introduction of a 
competition policy is one of the 
major challenges which the 
CEECs face in their transition to 
fully-fledged market economies. 
Other legal and institutional 
measures are equally important. 
They include the restoration of 
private ownership and property 
rights, the introduction of 
company law and rules on 
bankruptcy and liquidation of 
companies, and the adjustment 
of the judicial system and public 
administration. 
Transition entails certain needs. 
Restructuring is taking place in 
the CEECs, to redress the 
imbalance between industry, 
services and agriculture. The 
concentration on basic outputs, 
rather than high-tech processes 
and on product differentiation, is 
an inheritance of central 
planning to be overcome. The 
existence of large "combinâtes", 
whose size was not determined 
by what the market will bear, is a 
common feature of centrally 
planned economies. 
This raises the question what 
specific role competition policy 
has to play in this process of 
The framework of the WTO Working 
Group on trade and competition is 
currently being used to study issues 
relating to the interaction between trade 
and competition, including anti-
competitive practices. The OECD 
Committee on Competition Law and 
Policy agreed on the Draft OECD 
Recommendation on hard-core cartels 
during its meeting in Paris of 
20.02.1998. 
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transition from centrally planned 
economies to market economies. 
Experience shows that while it is 
true that liberalisation of prices, 
trade and foreign direct 
investment are essential to create 
workable markets and 
competition among firms, they 
are not sufficient to ensure 
effective competition. Trade 
liberalisation has proved to be 
and, in certain cases, still is a 
difficult objective to be 
achieved. Moreover, foreign 
firms have focused their 
investments in the CEECs on 
few firms in certain sectors with 
considerable market power and 
governments have been willing 
to grant these foreign investors 
protection from competition. 
Furthermore, many markets are 
still local (such as distribution 
and retailing) and national 
markets are often segmented 
from world markets due to 
natural, economic or regulatory 
barriers to entry. 
Other deficiencies may further 
inhibit the development of 
competition in the CEECs. For 
example, new firms may have 
limited access to the necessary 
credit facilities or to scarce 
resources, such as land and 
distribution networks, which 
often continue to be allocated in 
a distorted manner, so as to 
favour existing firms. It is clear 
that competition rules and 
enforcement are necessary in 
countering such barriers to entry. 
The development of competition 
may also be hampered by all 
kinds of direct or indirect 
benefits or favours which 
existing monopolists receive 
from the State, such as grants, 
soft loans, state guarantees, tax 
reliefs, debt write-offs, the sale 
of public land below market 
price or preferential tariffs. 
Another area of concern is 
privatisation. Privatisation 
agencies, supported by the 
government, the management 
and the workforce, may wish to 
sell off public monopolies asa 
whole to maintain their dominant 
positions after privatisation, in 
order to increase revenues. This 
obviously conflicts with the 
interest that consumers and new 
competitors may have in the 
breaking-up of monopolist firms 
to foster competition. Where the 
competition authority does not 
have the power to block 
privatisations which would 
merely result in the transfer of a 
public monopoly to the private 
sector, it should have sufficient 
powers to ensure that the 
monopolist firm does not abuse 
its dominance to earn monopoly 
profits. 
There are further arguments for 
asserting that competition policy 
is crucial in the CEECs. Cartels 
in the CEECs may be more 
damaging, given the absence of a 
competitive fringe to affect its 
decisions at the margin. Market 
foreclosure may be more 
pronounced in transition 
economies, given the small 
number of firms on the market. 
The lack of vigorous competition 
and fragile macro-economic 
conditions in some CEECs may 
be further affected by unfettered 
monopoly power in the private 
sector, lack of control of state 
aid, and discriminatory treatment 
by state monopolies of a 
commercial character. 
The experience of the 
Commission's last 40 years' of 
enforcement of competition 
policy provides a useful model 
for competition policy in the 
CEECs. However, it is equally 
important to take into 
consideration the changing 
nature of market structures in the 
CEECs, as transition takes place. 
For example, the logic of 
competition policy in relation to 
high-tech industries and highly 
evolved distribution structures, 
clearly calls for a different 
analysis to that applicable to 
CEECs, which generally lack 
high-tech industries, or which 
have an under-developed 
distribution network. We should 
therefore take a pragmatic 
approach to approximation, 
ensuring that competition policy 
in the CEECs is fully compatible 
with that in the European 
Community, and at the same 
time taking into account the 
needs of transition economies. 
We believe that the current 
institutional, substantive and 
procedural framework governing 
relationships between the EC 
and the CEECs is suited to 
achieving these goals. 
3. The Legal Framework 
The introduction of market 
economies in Central and 
Eastern Europe has led the 
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Community to review its trading 
relations with the CEECs, and to 
conclude free trade agreements 
with them. The principal 
instrument is the Europe 
Agreement, which provides a 
new framework for trade and 
related matters between the 
European Communities and their 
Member States, on the one hand, 
and each CEEC, on the other 
hand, on a bilateral basis. Europe 
Agreements with nine of the ten 
CEECs (Bulgaria, Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Hungary, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, 
Romania, Slovak Republic) are 
in force. The Interim Agreement 
with Slovenia is in force, and the 
Europe Agreement with 
Slovenia is currently passing 
through the Community 
legislative process. 
Restrictive Agreements, Abuses 
of a Dominant Position, and 
State Aids 
The Europe Agreements contain 
the main substantive competition 
rules which apply where trade 
between the EC and a CEEC is 
affected. The competition rules 
found in the Interim Agreement 
with Slovenia are the same in 
substance as those found in the 
Europe Agreements. 
Consequently, the following are 
deemed to be. incompatible with 
the proper functioning of the 
Agreement, in so far as they may 
affect trade between the 
Community and a CEEC: 
(i) all agreements between 
undertakings, decisions by 
associations of undertakings and 
concerted practices between 
undertakings which have as their 
object or effect the prevention, 
restriction or distortion of 
competition; 
(ii) an abuse by one or more 
undertakings of a dominant 
position in the territories of the 
Community of or a CEEC as a 
whole or in a substantial part 
thereof; 
(iii) any public aid which distorts 
or threatens to distort 
competition by favouring certain 
undertakings or the production 
of certain goods. 
The Europe Agreement makes it 
clear that these rules, and the 
prohibited conduct, are to be 
interpreted in accordance with 
the criteria arising from the 
application of Articles 85, 86 
and 92 of the EC Treaty. 
Furthermore, the decision 
practice of the Commission and 
the case-law of the Court of 
Justice will be relevant. The 
principles contained in the block 
exemption regulations in force in 
the EC, and a de minimus 
principle below which the 
agreement will not fall foul of 
the competition rules relating to 
restrictive agreements, also 
apply. 
A number of specific rules apply 
to the general rules set out 
above. One specific rule 
concerns the regime for regional 
aid. The Europe Agreements 
state that, during the first five 
years after the entry into force of 
the Europe Agreement, any 
public aid granted by a CEEC 
shall be assessed taking into 
account the fact that that CEEC 
shall be regarded as an area 
identical to those areas of the 
Community described in Article 
92(3)(a) EC Treaty (i.e. areas 
where the standard of living is 
abnormally low or where there is 
serious under-employment). In 
practical terms, any aid which is 
aimed at the economic 
development of a CEEC is not 
prohibited by the Europe 
Agreement if it is granted in 
conformity with the Community 
rules on regional aid under 
Article 92(3)(a) EC Treaty. 
The five year period for this 
exceptional state aid regime has 
expired for certain CEECs. 
These CEECs have requested 
that the Association Council 
decides on the extension of this 
regime by a further period of 
five years. 
Another special regime applies 
to restructuring aid as regards 
ECSC steel products. According 
to Protocol 2 to the Europe 
Agreements, during the first five 
years after the entry into force of 
the Agreement, and by 
derogation to the existing EC 
rules on state aid to the steel 
sector, the CEECs may 
exceptionally grant public aid for 
restructuring purposes under 
certain conditions. There should 
first be a restructuring 
programme linked to a global 
rationalisation and reduction of 
capacity. This programme 
should lead to the viability of the 
benefiting firms under normal 
market conditions at the end of 
the restructuring period. Finally, 
the amount and intensity of such 
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aid must be strictly limited to 
what is absolutely necessary in 
order to restore such viability 
and must progressively be 
reduced. 
This five year period for coal 
and steel products has also 
expired for certain CEECs, 
which have requested that this 
period be extended by a further 
five years. The Association 
Council has to decide on such an 
extension. The establishment of 
a restructuring plan for the steel 
industries of these individual 
CEECs, including details on the 
adjustment of capacities to 
market demand, the privatisation 
framework and aid matters, are 
essential in this context. 
The Implementing Rules 
According to the Europe 
Agreements, the Association 
Council had to adopt the 
necessary rules for the 
implementation of the 
competition rules outlined above 
within three years of the entry 
into force of the Agreements. 
The Association Council has 
already adopted rules for the 
application of the competition 
rules applicable to undertakings 
(i.e. restrictive agreements and 
abuses of a dominant position) 
for Bulgaria, the Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Poland and 
the Slovak Republic. Identical 
rules in relation to the other 
CEECs are currently passing 
through the legislative process. 
According to these Implementing 
Rules, cases are dealt with by the 
European Commission on the 
EC side, and by the national 
competition authorities of each 
CEEC on the side of each 
CEEC. The competences of the 
European Commission and the 
competition authorities of each 
CEEC to deal with these cases 
are based on the existing rules of 
the respective legislation of the 
EC and each CEEC. Both 
authorities settle the cases in 
accordance with their own 
substantive rules. 
The Implementing Rules for 
undertakings also contain 
procedures for co-operation 
between the Commission and the 
competition authorities of each 
CEEC, procedures for 
notification of cases to the other 
Party, the exchange of 
information, and consultation. 
Also in the field of state aid, 
draft Implementing Rules have 
been prepared and agreed upon 
in principle between the 
European Commission and the 
authorities of the CEECs. The 
process for the final adoption of 
the Implementing Rules by the 
Association Council is 
underway. 
The draft Implementing rules 
follow a two pillar system of 
state aid control. On the EC side, 
the Commission controls the 
compatibility of state aid granted 
by the EU Member States, with 
the Europe Agreement, on the 
basis of the existing EC rules on 
state aid. On the side of each 
CEEC, the national monitoring 
authority is to monitor and 
review existing and new public 
aid granted by the same CEEC, 
on the basis of the same 
substantive rules. The draft 
Implementing Rules for state aid 
provide for procedures for 
consultation and problem 
solving, rules on transparency 
(i.e. each CEEC is to draw up 
and thereafter update an 
inventory of its aid programmes 
and individual aid awards, 
established on the same basis as 
in the Community) and rules on 
mutual exchange of information. 
The Community or a CEEC may 
take appropriate measures after 
consultation within the 
Association Council, where 
either of them considers that a 
particular practice is 
incompatible with the 
competition rules of the Europe 
Agreement, and is not 
adequately dealt with under the 
implementing rules, or in the 
absence of such rules, and if 
such practice causes or threatens 
to cause serious prejudice to the 
interest of the other Party or 
material injury to its domestic 
industry. In the field of state aid, 
such measures must be adopted 
in accordance with the 
procedures and under the 
conditions laid down by the 
GATT. 
The relevant provisions of the 
Europe Agreements and the 
Implementing rules are intended 
to ensure that, already in the pre-
accession phase, state aid control 
is effective, whilst taking into 
account the specific needs of 
transition economies. The 
Implementing Rules for state aid 
provide for the Commission and 
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the state aid monitoring authority 
of each CEEC to work out, in 
addition to the types of aid 
allowed in the Community, a 
Special Guidance on the 
compatibility of aid designed to 
combat the specific problems of 
each CEEC as it completes 
transition to a market economy. 
However, the Special Guidance 
should not serve as a general 
escape clause as regards the 
granting of state aid to ailing 
industries. The Special Guidance 
should only address problems 
inherited from the past business-
economic irrationalities imposed 
by the centrally planned 
economies, i.e. transition 
problems, and will not cover aid 
measures aimed at development. 
The development problem is 
covered by the existing rules on 
state aid. In particular, the 
Article 92(3)(a) EC Treaty 
regime referred to above leaves 
ample room for granting aid for 
new investments and expansions, 
for allowing temporary operating 
aid and for increasing the level 
of aid for various horizontal 
objectives, such as 
environmental protection, R&D, 
SMEs etc. 
Merger Control 
Mergers are not directly referred 
to in the Europe Agreements. 
Neither are there any substantive 
rules on mergers in the 
Implementing Rules for 
undertakings. However, the 
competition authorities of a 
CEEC are entitled to express 
their views in the course of the 
procedure under the EC Merger 
Regulation, where the merger 
will have a significant impact on 
the economy of the CEEC 
concerned. The Commission will 
give due consideration to that 
view. 
Public undertakings and State 
monopolies 
Under the Europe Agreements, 
the Association Council must 
ensure that as from the third year 
following the entry into force of 
each Agreement, the rules 
applicable to public undertakings 
and undertakings to which 
special or exclusive rights have 
been granted, the principles of 
Article 90 EC Treaty are 
respected. 
Under the Europe Agreements, 
State monopolies of a 
commercial character are treated 
in a similar way to the way they 
are treated under Article 37 EC 
Treaty. Consequently, State 
monopolies of a commercial 
character are to be progressively 
adjusted so as to ensure that by a 
specified date, no discrimination 
regarding the conditions under 
which goods are procured and 
marketed exists between 
nationals of the Member States 
and of a CEEC. 
Approximation 
The Europe Agreements also 
provide that a major 
precondition for the CEECs' 
economic integration into the 
Community is the approximation 
of that country's existing and 
future national legislation to that 
of the Community. According to 
the Europe Agreements, the 
CEECs must use their best 
endeavours to ensure that future 
legislation is compatible with 
Community legislation. This 
covers anti-trust, merger control, 
State monopolies and public 
undertakings, and state aid. 
Approximation of legislation in 
the context Europe Agreements 
does not mean that the CEECs 
should adopt all the details of the 
acquis communautaire in the 
field of competition verbatim. 
However, the key elements of 
EC Competition law, as set out 
in the White Paper must be taken 
over and implemented in the 
CEECs. Each country may 
decide that particular forms of 
laws or guidelines are the most 
suitable in its individual 
situation, and which legal 
structure provides the most 
suitable vehicle for its 
monitoring and enforcement 
authorities. 
It is, however, important to 
stress that the exercise is not 
confined to the sole adoption of 
laws and regulations, or the 
establishment of the appropriate 
institutional structures. There 
must be a continued effort to 
ensure the enforcement of 
competition policy and to make 
competition policy widely 
known and accepted by all 
economic agents involved, i.e. 
by governments, companies and 
by the workforce. 
Essentially, the White Paper 
follows the logic that the 
appropriate administrative and 
judicial machinery is required, 
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for there to be effective 
application and enforcement of 
the principles found in European 
Community law. This is 
particularly important when it 
comes to competition and state 
aid policy. Competition 
authorities in the CEECs must be 
endowed with a sufficient degree 
of independence, and sufficient 
investigatory and enforcement 
powers. 
4. Achievements and 
Challenges 
The establishment of 
competition offices has taken 
place relatively quickly and 
without too much controversy in 
the CEECs. Most of the CEECs 
have also adopted basic 
competition laws taking over the 
core elements of Articles 85 and 
86 of the EC Treaty and merger 
control, as well as the necessary 
enforcement powers, and they 
are in the process of completing 
and refining the existing 
legislative framework. This is a 
great achievement. 
However, the establishment of a 
competition authority and a 
competition law is only the first 
step towards an effective 
competition policy. A much 
more difficult task to fulfil is the 
effective enforcement of the law 
and application of the law by all 
economic operators. This 
requires, first of all that the 
competition authority has 
sufficient qualified staff. 
Secondly, the competition 
authority needs to be 
independent from political 
interference. The political will 
must also exist to grant the 
competition authorities of the 
CEECs real powers to enforce 
the law. Competition authorities 
should not only have far-
reaching powers on paper, but 
also the ability to enforce 
decisions against enterprises, 
including public undertakings or 
bodies. 
Another major problem has in 
the past been the lack of 
expertise and knowledge of 
competition law among the staff 
of the competition offices. 
Intensive training of staff is 
therefore essential and the 
Commission has done and still 
does much in the way of training 
and technical assistance. The 
Commission has organised joint 
training programmes for officials 
of the competition offices of the 
CEECs, and it has started with 
similar training sessions for 
judges. This should further the 
general awareness among all 
economic operators about 
competition policy and the 
activities of the competition 
authority, so as to create a true 
competition culture. 
In this context, another 
important aspect of training is 
the Annual Conference of the 
competition authorities of the 
CEECs, responsible for anti-trust 
and state aid control, and the 
Competition Directorate-General 
of the European Commission. 
This Conference, which, this 
year, took place in Bratislava on 
25-26 May, is extremely useful 
for exchanging views and 
experience on approximation of 
legislation and the enforcement 
of competition rules with and 
amongst the CEECs. 
The main challenge for the 
competition authorities of the 
CEECs today is to appropriately 
allocate their resources in 
enforcing competition law, in 
order to focus on the kinds of 
conduct or transactions by firms 
which most seriously obstruct 
the proper working of the 
markets. Due to high barriers to 
entry and the few number of 
firms in the market place, 
collusion between firms or 
market foreclosure is both more 
likely to take place and more 
damaging in the CEECs. Priority 
should therefore be given to such 
cases which restrict entry to or 
expansion of markets. The 
collusive habits of central 
planning make breaking up 
cartels a priority. Finally, 
liberalisation is a necessary 
compliment to enforcement of 
competition policy, as anti-trust 
policy cannot be successful in 
ensuring that markets work 
properly on its own. 
With respect to liberalisation, it 
should be recognised that in 
most CEECs, the competition 
authorities have played an 
important competition advocacy 
role in ensuring that new 
legislation complies with the 
principles underlying the 
competition rules, in particular 
as regards the regulated sectors, 
such as energy, telecommu-
nications and transport. 
However, leaving this aside, it 
would seem that the competition 
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authorities have devoted 
substantial resources to 
complaints from firms or 
consumers in relation to abuses 
of dominance by the other party 
to an agreement due to onerous 
contract terms (typically, 
complaints in relation to 
extensive prices and 
discriminatory behaviour), rather 
than on hard-core restrictions of 
competition, particularly cartels. 
While the submission of 
complaints against exploitative 
behaviour of dominant firms 
shows a certain level of 
awareness of the existence of 
competition law, this type of 
case should not take priority 
over cases such as cartels, 
monopolistic acquisitions, 
exclusionary practices by 
dominant firms, or other cases 
which may have an impact on 
the competitive structure of the 
market. Obviously, the 
competition problems to be 
solved in such cases are not the 
easiest to deal with, and they 
require a certain amount of 
experience. For cartel cases, the 
necessary investigative powers 
to collect evidence, including the 
power to perform dawn raids, 
should be in place and should be 
used. 
Finally, it is equally important 
for competition offices to impose 
sufficiently deterrent fines where 
serious restrictions of 
competition are at stake. 
In addition to the above 
discussion on the anti-trust pillar 
of the competition rules, certain 
points need to be made in 
relation to the state aid pillar of 
the competition rules in order to 
consider where progress has 
been made and where work still 
needs to be done. 
The control of state aid is just as 
important as anti-trust policy in 
ensuring that a level-playing 
field on the market is created and 
maintained. However, from the 
outset, the introduction of state 
aid control in the CEECs has 
proven much more controversial 
and politically sensitive than 
anti-trust policy, the reason 
being that state aid control goes 
to the heart of the role of the 
State, namely how governments 
use public expenditure to support 
their industry. 
Although the state aid rules in 
the Europe Agreements and the 
draft Implementing Rules 
concerning state aid provide 
ample possibilities to develop an 
aid policy consistent with the 
particular problems of a 
transition economy, there has 
been a general fear in the CEECs 
that the introduction of state aid 
control would lead to the closing 
down of companies at a rapid 
pace, resulting in enormous 
socio-economic problems which 
would be politically 
unacceptable and expensive. 
This is even more the case where 
state aid is closely linked to the 
process of transition. 
For example, state aid is often 
granted in connection with 
privatisation. State aid may also 
be involved in the financing of 
the restructuring necessary to 
make companies commercially 
viable. State aid may take the 
form of state guarantees, low 
interest loans, debt write-offs or 
other kinds of operating aid, 
simply to keep companies alive. 
Finally, state aid is often granted 
through tax reliefs, tax arrears, 
social security contribution 
reliefs and other measures which 
find their origin partly in too lax 
a fiscal policy. This partly results 
from a habit of granting favours 
to favourite state-owned 
companies. 
Nevertheless, it is not possible to 
imagine an internal market 
where one Party is controlling 
the granting of state aid to its 
industry, whereas the other does 
not do the same. There are also 
obvious public finance reasons 
for keeping state aids under strict 
control. 
In contrast to the anti-trust pillar, 
progress has been slow in the 
CEECs with respect to the 
control of state aid. A lot of 
work remains to be done. The 
most important objective today 
is to create transparency in the 
granting of state aid. Without 
transparency it is not possible to 
examine whether existing aid in 
the CEECs is compatible with 
the Europe Agreements. 
Moreover, the rules on co­
operation between the EC 
Commission and the CEEC 
authorities in the field of state 
aid, as laid down in the draft 
Implementing rules on State aid, 
cannot be operational if 
transparency is not established. 
Therefore, as a matter of 
urgency, the CEECs need to take 
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the necessary steps to establish 
an aid inventory of all existing 
aid. This inventory must 
encompass existing state aid 
granted by all aid granting 
authorities, not only aid granted 
through the State budget. This 
means, in particular, that aid 
granted by local or regional 
authorities, aid granted through 
privatisation funds, environment 
funds or other funds or bodies 
controlled by the state must be 
included in the inventory. 
Moreover, the aid inventories 
must cover both direct and 
indirect aid measures, and it 
must be updated on a continuous 
basis as new measures are 
introduced and existing aid 
measures are modified or 
abolished. 
In parallel, it will be necessary 
progressively to review the 
identified existing aid measures 
and to modify or abolish those 
measures which are not 
compatible with the Europe 
Agreement. 
A second priority is the setting-
up of a state aid monitoring 
authority and a system ensuring 
that monitoring is carried out in 
an effective manner. Most of the 
CEECs have now established 
such a national monitoring 
authority. Some of them have 
appointed a unit within the 
Ministry of Finance (Bulgaria, 
Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Hungary, Latvia, Slovak 
Republic) or within the Ministry 
of Economy (Poland) as the 
monitoring authority, while 
others have given this 
responsibility to the Competition 
Office (Lithuania, Romania). 
Currently, these monitoring 
authorities do not yet receive, on 
a systematic basis, information 
on all new aid granted in their 
country so as to enable them to 
give an opinion on the 
compatibility of the proposed aid 
with the Europe Agreement prior 
to it being granted. There can be 
many reasons for this. For 
example, the lack of a clear legal 
framework identifying the 
powers and responsibilities of 
the monitoring authority, the 
lack of sufficient and qualified 
staff in the monitoring authority, 
the lack of the necessary 
practical tools and procedures to 
implement the monitoring or a 
combination of these and other 
deficiencies may explain why 
these problems exist. 
It is clear that the establishment 
of a credible state aid control 
cannot be achieved overnight. 
However, in order to fulfil the 
economic criteria for accession 
to the European Union, and to 
maintain confidence in current 
and future trade relations 
between the Community and the 
CEECs, it is important that 
concrete measures are taken to 
ensure a progressive adjustment 
of the system of state aid within 
a reasonable period of time. 
On substance, the existing EC 
rules on state aid, the Europe 
Agreements and the draft 
Implementing rules on State aid 
(including the envisagedSpec/o/ 
Guidance designed to combat 
the specific problems of CEECs 
as they complete transition to a 
market economy) should provide 
a satisfactory framework for 
tackling any particular transition 
problems while maintaining a 
level playing field. At the same 
time, it is clear that certain aid 
measures cannot be accepted 
even in transition economies, 
such as export aid, or can only 
be accepted under very strict and 
transparent conditions, such as 
operating aid and aid to sensitive 
sectors. 
5. Conclusion 
The deficiencies which are 
outlined above should not be 
seen as lessening the progress of 
the competition authorities in the 
CEECs over a time-span of only 
5 to 6 years. Achievements in 
the field of anti-trust policy in 
particular have been remarkable, 
and the competition authorities 
of the CEECs deserve enormous 
credit for their pioneering 
efforts. 
On the other hand, a lot of work 
still needs to be done, especially 
in the field of state aid control. It 
is necessary to ensure that all 
operators are working under the 
same rules, and thus not 
enjoying any unfair advantages 
over competitors operating in the 
same market, as well as to create 
a climate of confidence 
comparable to that which exists 
between EU Member States. 
Enlargement is an historic 
process and has major 
consequences for the future 
application and enforcement of 
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EC Competition Policy. In an 
enlarged EU, the Commission 
will be empowered to apply EC 
Competition law to all the new 
members. This creates enormous 
challenges for anti-trust 
enforcement. 
The screening process has 
already been launched, whereby 
the implementation of theacquis 
communautaire is being 
examined and discussed with the 
CEECs on a multilateral and 
bilateral basis. Enlargement 
negotiations themselves will not 
be easy. However, we believe 
that an effective working 
relationship between the 
Commission and the competition 
authorities of the CEECs will 
help smooth this process. 
The Economics of Verticals 
Luc Peeperkorn, DG IV-A-1 
1. Introduction 
As recognised in the Green Paper 
on Vertical Restraints in EC 
Competition Policy (Green 
Paper), the economic analysis of 
vertical agreements has in the past 
been the subject of heated debate 
between economists! By the early 
1980s the position had swung 
from regarding them as suspect 
for competition, to a generalised 
perception that they were 
innocuous for competition. 
Nowadays there is a new 
emerging consensus and 
economists are becoming more 
cautious in their assessment of 
vertical agreements and less 
willing to make sweeping 
generalisations. 
A first and central element of this 
new consensus is the importance 
of market structure in determining 
Green Paper on Vertical Restraints in EC 
Competition Policy, COM (96) 721 final, 
of 22.01.1997, point 54. 
the impact of vertical agreements 
on competition. Economics tells 
us that in the field of vertical 
restraints competition concerns 
can only arise if there is 
insufficient inter-brand 
competition, i.e. if there exists a 
certain degree of market power. 
On the one hand, the fiercer 
inter-brand competition, the 
more likely it is that vertical 
restraints have no negative effect 
or at least a net positive effect. 
On the other hand, the weaker 
inter-brand competition, the 
more likely it is that vertical 
restraints have a net negative 
effect. This means that the same 
vertical restraint can have 
different effects depending on 
the market structure and on the 
market power of the company 
applying the vertical restraint. 
This of course raises the 
question of what is meant by 
market power? In economics 
market power is usually defined 
as the power to raise price above 
the competitive level (in the 
short run marginal cost, in the 
long run average total cost). In 
other words that a firm by 
changing its output has 
perceptible influence on the 
price at which it can sell and that 
by charging a price above the 
competitive level it is able, at 
least in the short term, to obtain 
supra-normal profits. Most 
economists would agree that 
there already exists market 
power below the level of 
dominance as defined by the 
Court of Justice. This view was 
also expressed in the Green 
Paper, to indicate that vertical 
restraints can harm competition 
below the level of dominance 
and therefore that Article 86 and 
merger control will not suffice 
and Article 85 needs to be 
applied to vertical restraints.2 
A second element of this new 
consensus is that it is generally 
recognised that vertical restraints 
are on average less harmful than 
horizontal competition restraints 
like price fixing or market 
sharing. The main reason for 
treating a vertical restraint more 
Green Paper, point 303. 
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leniently than a horizontal 
restraint lies in the fact that the 
latter may concern an agreement 
between competitors producing 
substitute goods/services while 
the former concerns an 
agreement between a supplier 
and a buyer of a particular 
product/service. In horizontal 
situations the exercise of market 
power by one firm (higher price 
of its product) will benefit its 
competitors. This may provide 
an incentive to competitors to 
induce each other to behave anti-
competitively. In vertical 
situations the product of the one 
is the input for the other. This 
means that the exercise of 
market power by either the up-
stream or down-stream company 
would normally hurt the demand 
for the product of the other. The 
companies involved in the 
agreement may therefore have an 
incentive to prevent the exercise 
of market power by the other (so 
called self policing character of 
vertical restraints). 
However, this self-restraining 
character should not be over-
estimated. When a company has 
no market power it can only try 
to increase its profits by 
optimising its manufacturing and 
distribution processes, with or 
without the help of vertical 
agreements. However, when it 
does have market power it can 
also try to increase its profits at 
the expense of its direct 
competitors by raising their costs 
and at the expense of its 
buyers/consumers by trying to 
appropriate some of their 
surplus. This can happen when 
the up-stream and down-stream 
company share the extra profits 
or when one of the two imposes 
the vertical restraint and thereby 
appropriates all the extra profits. 
In this article I will not go into 
the question when is inter-brand 
competition weak and when is 
market power present. This can 
only be assessed on a case by 
case basis. One could only 
observe that, as most markets 
are rather competitive, in many 
instances vertical restraints are 
unlikely to have significant 
negative effects. A large 
majority of actual vertical 
agreements are therefore 
unlikely to be of interest from a 
competition policy point of 
view. 
The success of any future policy 
will depend on it being able to 
provide a sufficiently wide and 
well defined safe harbour to 
exclude this large majority of 
agreements from competition 
policy scrutiny. In addition its 
success will depend on the 
predictability and clarity of 
policy towards agreements that 
are outside the defined safe 
harbour. It is in this light that in 
this article an economic 
classification of vertical 
restraints is presented. This 
classification is based on the 
main negative effects that may 
result from the different vertical 
restraints. It also describes the 
positive effects linked to vertical 
restraints. Finally it draws some 
general conclusions. 
The final formulation of policy 
will of course not only depend 
on the economics of vertical 
restraints. It will also and most 
importantly be determined by the 
choice of policy objectives, the 
effects on enforcement costs, the 
effects on legal certainty for 
industry etc. For example, the 
assessment of a resale restriction 
may be very different when not 
only the protection of 
competition but also the goal of 
market integration is considered. 
However, these issues are also 
not covered in this article as it 
concentrates on the economic 
classification of vertical 
restraints. 
2. The negative effects 
2.1. Individual vertical 
restraints 
To analyse the possible negative 
effects it is appropriate to divide 
vertical agreements into four 
groups: an exclusive distribution 
group, a single branding group, a 
resale price maintenance group 
and a market partitioning group. 
The vertical restraints within 
each group (as opposed to 
between these groups) seem to 
have similar negative effects on 
competition. 
Before describing the four 
groups a number of general 
points need to be made. Firstly, 
the analysis applies to both 
goods and services, although 
certain restraints are mainly used 
in the distribution of goods. This 
is why throughout this text the 
term good(s) means both good(s) 
and service(s) unless otherwise 
stated. Secondly, vertical 
agreements can be concluded for 
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intermediate and final goods and 
services. Unless otherwise stated 
the analysis and arguments in the 
text apply to all levels of trade 
and the neutral terms supplier 
and buyer are used. When only a 
specific level is implicated this is 
indicated. Thirdly, the termino-
logy used may confuse some as 
it at times differs from the 
current legal definitions The 
classification is based upon what 
could be described as the basic 
components of vertical restraints. 
In practice many vertical 
agreements make use of more 
than one of these components. 
To give an example, exclusive 
distribution is usually limiting 
the number of buyers the 
supplier can sell to and at the 
same time limiting the area 
where the buyers can be active. 
The first component may lead to 
foreclosure of other buyers while 
the second component may lead 
to price discrimination. 
Exclusive distribution group 
Under the heading of exclusive 
distribution come those 
agreements/components that 
have as their main element that 
the manufacturer is selling only 
to one or a limited number of 
buyers. This may be to restrict 
the number of buyers for a 
particular territory or group of 
customers, or to restrict the kind 
of buyers. The group comprises 
exclusive distribution and 
exclusive customer allocation as 
the supplier is limiting its sales 
to only one buyer for a certain 
territory or class of customers. It 
also comprises exclusive supply 
and quantity forcing on the 
supplier, where an obligation or 
incentive scheme agreed 
between the supplier and the 
buyer makes the former to sell 
on a particular market only or 
mainly to one buyer. For 
example, when a manufacturer 
pays a shelf allowance to a 
retailer it will be in its interest to 
concentrate its sales with this 
retailer so as to spread the cost 
of the allowance. Lastly, this 
group comprises selective 
distribution, where the condi-
tions imposed on or agreed with 
the selected dealers may limit 
their number. 
There are two main effects on 
competition: (1) certain buyers 
within that market can no longer 
buy from this particular supplier, 
i.e. it leads to foreclosure of 
certain buyers, and (2) as far as 
the distribution of final goods is 
concerned, since less distributors 
will offer this good it will also 
lead to reduced intra-brand 
competition. In the case of wide 
exclusive territories or customer 
allocation the result may be total 
elimination of intra-brand 
competition. When the exclusive 
distribution type of agreement is 
used rather selectively, that is 
not many stores can carry the 
product, it also leads to less in-
stare competition and reduced 
inter-brand competition. 
Single branding group 
Under the heading of single 
branding come those 
agreements/components that 
have as their main element that 
the buyer is induced to 
concentrate his orders for a 
particular type of good with one 
supplier. The group comprises 
non-compete and quantity 
forcing on the buyer, where an 
obligation or incentive scheme 
agreed between the supplier and 
the buyer makes the latter 
purchase its requirements for a 
particular good or service and its 
substitutes only or mainly from 
one supplier. 
There are two main effects on 
competition: (1) other suppliers 
in that market cannot sell to the 
particular buyers, i.e. foreclosure 
of certain suppliers, and (2) as 
far as the distribution of final 
goods is concerned, the 
particular retailers will only sell 
one brand, therefore there will be 
no in-store competition in their 
shops. Both effects may lead to a 
reduction in inter-brand 
competition. 
The reduction in inter-brand 
competition may be mitigated by 
stronger ex-ante competition 
between suppliers to obtain the 
single branding contracts, but the 
longer the duration the more 
likely it will be that this effect 
will not be strong enough to 
fully compensate for the lack of 
inter-brand competition. 
Resale price maintenance group 
Under the heading ofresale price 
maintenance come those 
agreements/components that 
have as their main element that 
the buyer is obliged or induced 
to resell not below a certain 
price, at a certain price or not 
above a certain price. This group 
comprises minimum, fixed, 
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maximum and recommended 
resale prices. Maximum and 
recommended resale prices, 
although in theory unlikely to 
have negative effects, may work 
as fixed RPM. As RPM relates 
to the resale price it is mainly 
relevant for the distribution of 
final goods. 
There are two main effects of 
minimum and fixed RPM on 
competition: (1) the distributors 
can no longer compete on price 
for that brand, leading to a total 
elimination of intra-brand price 
competition, and (2) there is 
increased transparency on price 
and responsibility for price 
changes, making horizontal 
collusion between manufacturers 
easier, at least in concentrated 
markets. The reduction in intra-
brand competition may, as it 
leads to less downward pressure 
on the price for the particular 
good, have as an indirect effect a 
reduced level of inter-brand 
competition. 
Market partitioning group 
Under the heading of market 
partitioning come what may 
appear at first sight a 
miscellaneous group of 
agreements/components but that 
have as their main element that 
the buyer is restricted in where it 
either sources or resells a 
particular good. This group 
comprises exclusive purchasing, 
territorial sales restrictions, 
customer sales restrictions, after-
market sales restrictions, 
prohibitions of resale and tying. 
The main effect on competition 
is a reduction of intra-brand 
competition that may help the 
supplier or the buyer (in case of 
after-market sales restrictions) to 
partition the market and thus 
hinder market integration. This 
may facilitate price 
discrimination. Tying is slightly 
the odd one out. Its main effect 
is that the buyers may pay a 
higher price for the tied good 
than they would otherwise do 
but it may also lead to 
foreclosure of other suppliers 
and reduced inter-brand 
competition in the market of the 
tied good. 
2.2 Combinations of vertical 
restraints 
The next question to be 
considered is whether a 
combination of different vertical 
restraints increases the negative 
effects. In the Green Paper a 
rather prominent place is given 
to the argument that certain 
combinations of vertical 
restraints are better for 
competition than their use in 
isolation from each other. 
Although this may occasionally 
be the case, it does not appear to 
be the general rule. In general 
the opposite seems true, a 
combination usually aggravates 
the possible negative effects. 
For example, a combination of 
one of the restraints of the single 
branding group with one of thè 
exclusive distribution group 
combines a reduction of inter-
brand competition with a 
reduction of intra-brand 
competition. In the case of final 
Green Paper, point 67. 
goods a market is created with 
local brand monopolists without 
in-store competition. Also, to 
foreclosure at manufacturer level 
is added foreclosure at the retail 
level. This means that not only 
may it be difficult for a 
manufacturer to sell a new brand 
as stores are tied, but also that 
new entrants to the retail market 
may have difficulty obtaining 
some of the leading brands. This 
results in a situation where it 
may be both difficult to find 
outlets and unprofitable to set up 
new outlets. 
Another example is the 
combination of one of the 
restraints of the exclusive 
distribution group with one of 
the RPM group. To the reduction 
of intra-brand competition of the 
first is added the elimination of 
intra-brand price competition of 
the second. This quickly leads to 
a total elimination of intra-brand 
competition. This elimination of 
intra-brand competition may also 
help to sustain collusive 
tendencies between 
manufacturers facilitated by 
RPM. In general, this 
combination does also not make 
sense from an efficiency point of 
view as both protect the margin 
of the retailer. One of these 
restraints would normally suffice 
to overcome, for example, a free 
rider problem between retailers. 
Lastly, a combination of one of 
the restraints of the single 
branding group with one of the 
RPM group may combine a 
reduction of inter-brand 
competition resulting from a lack 
of in-store competition with a 
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facilitation of collusive 
behaviour between the 
manufacturers induced by RPM. 
Collusive behaviour may 
become easier as the lack of in-
store competition takes away 
some of the competitive 
pressure. In addition the 
reduction of inter-brand 
competition is combined with a 
loss of intra-brand price 
competition resulting from RPM. 
A number of combinations may 
however be viewed more 
positively, where it can be 
argued that one of the vertical 
restraints limits the possible 
negative effects of the other. In 
the combination of exclusive 
distribution with maximum RPM 
the latter restraint may help the 
supplier to limit possible price 
increases the buyer may want to 
implement under the protection 
of the territorial exclusivity 
obtained. The same reasoning 
can be applied to the 
combination of selective 
distribution and maximum RPM. 
Also the combination of 
exclusive distribution with 
quantity forcing on the buyer 
may work in the same way as the 
latter may prevent the distributor 
from raising his prices. 
There are three combinations 
that are particularly negative 
from a market integration 
perspective: (1) territorial sales 
restriction combined with 
selective distribution at the same 
level of distribution, (2) 
exclusive distribution combined 
with exclusive purchasing, and 
(3) selective distribution 
combined with exclusive 
purchasing. These combinations 
help to make a distribution 
system more watertight by 
making arbitrage, either by final 
customers or by distributors, 
more difficult if not impossible. 
3. The positive effects 
It is said that in a number of 
situations the usual arms length 
dealings between manufacturer 
and retailer, detailing only price 
and quantity of a certain 
transaction, lead to a sub-optimal 
level of investments and sales. 
The following generalisations can 
be made about this: 
1) The first and main reason why 
this (i.e. a sub-optimal level of 
investments and sales) is 
supposed to happen is the 
existence of some form offree 
rider problem The person who 
makes an effort may not be 
able to appropriate all the 
benefits his or her effort 
engenders and may therefore 
be inclined to invest sub-
optimally. This may be the 
result of free riding by one 
retailer on the promotion 
efforts of another retailer. 
Exclusive distribution or 
similar restrictions or RPM 
may be helpful in avoiding 
such free riding. Free riding 
can also occur between 
manufacturers where one 
invests in promotion in the 
shops for its brand, thereby 
also attracting customers for 
its competitors. Non-compete 
type restraints can help to 
overcome this. 
For there to be a problem there 
needs to be a real free rider 
issue, something that is not 
always so obvious. Free riding 
between retailers can only 
occur on pre-sales services and 
not on after-sales services. The 
good needs to be relatively 
new or technically complex as 
the customer otherwise may 
very well know what he wants 
from past purchases. And the 
good must be of a reasonably 
high value as it is otherwise 
not attractive for a customer to 
go to one shop for information 
and to another to buy. On top 
of this, when all these 
conditions are fulfilled it must 
not be practical for the 
manufacturer to agree with the 
retailers effective service 
requirements concerning the 
pre-sales services.4 
Free riding between 
manufacturers is also limited 
by rather strict conditions. It 
can be the case that a 
manufacturer who invests in 
promotion of his own product 
is also increasing demand for 
his competitors products. A 
vertical restraint may however 
not be helpful in addressing 
such a free rider problem. 
When for example advertising 
in the (national) media leads in 
general to extra demand with 
all outlets a vertical restraint 
will not help. Only in case the 
promotion leads to extra 
The standard argument against 
contractability of service requirements is 
that the costs of monitoring and the 
contract costs may be prohibitive for the 
manufacturer in case of a large number of 
small retailers. 
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demand via certain retail 
outlets, for example because 
these outlets are carrying the 
promotion, a non-compete 
type of agreement may help 
capture the full benefits. In 
addition, such free riding can 
only occur on pre-sales 
service, it must not be possible 
to make the promotion brand 
specific and it is only likely for 
relatively new and complex 
products as customers may 
otherwise know very well 
what they want already.5 
2) A second general point that 
needs to be made concerns the 
possible divergence between 
what is privately efficient and 
efficient from a total 
welfare/consumer point of 
view. What is privately 
efficient is not always good for 
total welfare. To go back to 
the free riding between 
retailers or between 
manufacturers. Let's suppose a 
real free rider problem exists 
and sales can be expanded by 
inducing more pre-sales 
services although this would 
also lead to higher prices. 
When these extra services are 
valued equally by the majority 
of consumers this may very 
well lead to higher total 
welfare. But when the infra-
marginal consumers (that is 
those who are already buying 
at the current price/service 
level) know what they want 
and do not appreciate the extra 
service, they only suffer from 
Promotion that only creates image 
without there being real extra quality has 
doubtful welfare effects and does not 
need to be protected. 
the higher price, especially if 
there is insufficient inter-brand 
competition. It may be 
privately efficient to increase 
the service level to attract 
more marginal consumers and 
thereby increase sales, but 
total welfare may nonetheless 
suffer. 
3) A special form of free riding is 
the certification free rider 
argument The hypothesis is 
that certain retailers perform a 
valuable service by identifying 
"good" products. The fact that 
these retailers sell a certain 
product signifies to the 
consumer that it is a good buy. 
This hypothesis may 
sometimes be useful for 
explaining the introduction of 
new products. New and 
complex products are first 
stocked by high quality, high 
margin stores where they are 
bought by avant-garde 
consumers. Gradually its 
reputation becomes 
established and demand grows 
enough for it to be sold 
through low price chains. If 
the manufacturer can not 
initially limit its sales to the 
premium stores, it runs the risk 
of being delisted and the 
product introduction may fail. 
If this is true, a problem 
analogous to invention patent 
protection exists. It may be 
necessary to provide 
temporary protection against 
price discounters to help the 
introduction of the product. 
However, a period of 
protection which is too long 
may only delay the product 
moving into the mature, price 
competitive stages of its life 
cycle, to the disadvantage of 
consumers. This means, at 
best, that there may be a 
reason to allow for a limited 
duration a restriction of the 
exclusive distribution or RPM 
kind; - enough to guarantee 
introduction, but not so long as 
to unduly delay large scale 
dissemination. 
4) Yet another special form of 
free riding is the so-called 
'hold-up' problem Sometimes 
there are specific investments 
to be made by either the 
supplier or the buyer, such as 
in special equipment or 
training. In such a case, after 
the investments have been 
made the investor becomes to 
a certain extent prisoner to the 
other side. The balance of 
power will shift. In fear of this 
the necessary investments may 
not be made, unless ex-ante 
supply arrangements can be 
fixed. The investor fears that 
the other side will free ride on 
its investment. However, as in 
the free riding example 
between retailers, there are a 
number of conditions which 
have to be met before such a 
risk is real. Firstly, the 
investment must be sunk and 
specific to deal with that other 
party only. Secondly, it must 
be a long-term investment 
which is not recouped in the 
short run. And thirdly, the 
investment must be 
asymmetric i.e. one invests 
more than the other. Only 
when these conditions are met 
can there be a real reason to 
have a vertical restraint for a 
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limited duration, of the non-
compete type when the 
investment is made by the 
supplier and of the exclusive 
distribution or exclusive 
supply type when the 
investment is made by the 
buyer. 
5) The last reason for sub-
optimal sales, also discussed in 
the Green Paper, that should 
be mentioned, is the problem 
of 'double marginalisation' In 
case both the manufacturer 
and the retailer have market 
power each will set its price 
above marginal cost. They 
both add their margin that 
exceeds the one that would 
exist under competition. This 
may result in a final price that 
even exceeds the monopoly 
price an integrated company 
would charge, to the detriment 
of their collective profits and 
consumers. In this, arguably 
rather hypothetical case, 
quantity forcing on the buyer 
or maximum RPM could help 
the manufacturer bring the 
price down to joint profit 
maximising level. 
6) In the economic literature it is 
explained that there is a large 
measure of substitutability 
between the different vertical 
restraints. This means that the 
same inefficiency problem can 
be solved by different vertical 
restraints. For example, as 
explained above, the problem 
of free riding between retailers 
or the certification free rider 
problem can be solved by 
means of exclusive 
distribution or fixed or 
minimum RPM. This is of 
importance as the negative 
effects on competition may 
differ between the various 
vertical restraints. This plays a 
role when indispensability is 
discussed under Article 85(3). 
As RPM is generally 
considered to be less 
acceptable from a competition 
point of view this may be a 
reason only to allow exclusive 
distribution or other less 
serious restraints and not 
RPM. 
4. Differentiation between 
vertical restraints 
A last question to be considered 
is whether some restraints are 
more or less harmful than 
others? To answer this question 
both negative and positive 
effects need to be considered. It 
may be a problem that some 
vertical restraints that may be 
most effective to solve a certain 
free rider problem may also have 
the most serious negative effects. 
In addition the answer will 
depend on the goals being 
pursued by competition policy. It 
is therefore not possible to 
answer this question solely on 
the basis of the economics 
involved. I will therefore just 
draw the attention to some 
general rules that can be 
formulated. 
As a first general rule, it can be 
said that exclusive agreements 
are generally worse for 
competition than non-exclusive 
agreements. Exclusive agree-
ments make, by the express 
language of the contracts or their 
practical effects, one party fulfil 
all or practically all its 
requirements from another party. 
For example, a non-compete 
obligation makes that the buyer 
purchases only one brand, while 
quantity forcing may leave the 
buyer scope to purchase 
competing goods. The degree of 
foreclosure is therefore different, 
while often the efficiencies are 
remarkably similar. 
A second general rule, 
applicable to all four groups, can 
be formulated restraints agreed 
for intermediate goods are in 
general less harmful than 
restraints affecting the 
distribution of final goods. At an 
intermediate level both the 
supplier and the buyer are 
usually professional and 
knowledgeable. This makes a 
possible loss of intra-brand 
competition less important 
because it stimulates 
specialisation which leads to 
comparative advantages. 
A third general rule, also 
applicable to all four groups, can 
be formulated the possible 
negative effects of vertical 
restraints are reinforced when 
not just one supplier with its 
buyers practices a certain 
vertical restraint but when also 
other suppliers and their buyers 
organise their trade in a similar 
way. These so called cumulative 
effects can be a problem in a 
number of sectors. To make a 
valid assessment of the effects of 
such a cumulation of vertical 
agreements requires a sector 
wide investigation and overview. 
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Within the RPM group, fixed 
and minimum price maintenance 
are evidently the serious 
restraints. Maximum and 
recommended prices, when 
really maximum or 
recommended, are clearly much 
less and possibly not at all 
restrictive. 
Within the market partitioning 
group, which assumes a market 
integration objective, restriction 
of resale and after-market sales 
restrictions seem the worst as 
they allow market partitioning 
without clear possible 
efficiencies. Tying is in general 
considered a somewhat less 
serious restriction. It concerns 
the possible extension of market 
power from one market into 
another. Possible efficiency 
arguments ("need to assure the 
buyer uses the right sort of input 
for the fragile machine we sold 
him as breakdowns may hurt our 
products image" or 'joint 
delivery is cost saving") may be 
limited. Exclusive purchasing is 
the least serious restriction 
within this group. 
5. Conclusion 
On the one hand economics tells 
us that it is only when inter-
brand competition is reduced 
that it may be necessary for a 
competition authority to 
intervene against vertical 
restrictions. It is only in such 
conditions that it may have to 
reduce the restrictions on inter-
or intra-brand competition which 
may result from vertical 
agreements. 
On the other hand economics 
also tells us that vertical 
agreements are often necessary 
to realise efficiencies and may 
help firms to enter new markets. 
At the same time rather strict 
conditions have to be met before 
one can actually speak of a real 
free rider problem that justifies 
the imposition of vertical 
restrictions. The case is strongest 
for vertical restrictions of a 
limited duration which help the 
introduction of new complex 
products. 
This leads to the conclusion that 
in situations where the parties 
have (considerable) market 
power a case by case approach is 
warranted for vertical 
restrictions. 
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Broadcasting of Sports events and 
Competition law 
An orientation document from the Commissions 
Services 
INTRODUCTION 
1. The purpose of this 
document1 is to develop an 
updated approach to the 
application of competition 
law to issues arising in the 
broadcasting of sports events 
in response to the rapid 
changes that are taking place. 
Over the last few years sports 
broadcasting has become a 
very important area 
economically. Sports 
programmes, and certain 
sports in particular, are a key 
ingredient for broadcasters 
and have driven the 
development of pay-TV. 
With increased deregulation 
and the introduction of new 
broadcasting technology, 
broadcasting services are 
going through continuous and 
rapid development with 
major consequences such as 
an increase in channels and 
capacity. Digital technology, 
pay-TV and pay-per-view 
services, providing additional 
broadcasting time and 
capacity, offer to viewers 
who are prepared to pay for 
the services, increasing 
opportunities to view a 
growing number of sports, 
This was prepared in consultation of 
Member State competition authorities 
either on theme channels or 
on an event-by-event basis. 
The new services potentially 
offer improved picture 
quality, a choice of 
perspective of the event and 
the opportunity to watch the 
programmes when the viewer 
wishes to. The importance of 
sports programming to 
broadcasters is demonstrated 
in the corresponding growth 
of competition (and price) for 
the acquisition of sports 
broadcasting rights. In the 
context of the new services, 
broadcasting of sports events 
can no longer be viewed in 
terms of a mix of 
programmes. 
2. While these developments 
may indicate a potentially 
highly competitive market, 
concerns have been expressed 
about the consequences on 
the television landscape of 
the EU of current practices in 
the buying, selling and 
exploitation of broadcasting 
rights to sports rights. There 
is now a need for the 
Commission to examine these 
practices, many of which 
have not been considered 
contentious in the past, and to 
draw up a general 
competition policy approach 
to their assessment. Some 
Member States have already 
initiated actions under their 
domestic competition rules. 
3. Broadcasting of sports events 
is becoming more and more 
cross-border or international. 
Television viewers in one 
Member State are 
increasingly able to see not 
only the most important 
international championships 
but national championships 
from other countries. 
International player and 
management mobility has 
generated more interest in 
sports events taking place in 
other Member States. The 
Commission will have to 
apply the competition rules 
more and more to horizontal 
and vertical arrangements 
relating to the broadcasting 
rights to sports events. 
4. It may be helpful, when 
considering whether an 
agreement affects trade 
between Member States, to 
consider the following: 
• television programmes are 
received and seen in a second 
Member State - this is not in 
itself sufficient to make 
community law applicable; 
• if clubs or teams in one 
Member State make an 
agreement amongst them-
selves to fix prices for 
broadcasts of their sporting 
events, such an agreement 
would probably not be 
sufficient to make Article 85 
of the EC Treaty applicable. 
It would be applicable if the 
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teams involved came from 
more than one country, for 
example, for the World Cup; 
• there will probably be an 
effect on trade between 
Member States if a vendor of 
rights has sold or is likely to 
sell to a buyer in another 
Member State; 
• if the buyer of the rights is 
likely to sublicense in other 
Member States, there will 
usually be an effect on trade 
between Member States. 
5. Similar issues arise under 
Community competition law 
and national competition law 
when assessing agreements 
and complaints. A common 
approach to analysing the 
competition problems would 
offer a degree of certainty to 
those concluding 
broadcasting contracts. It is 
however not possible to 
provide an answer to each 
problem, which could then be 
applied in each Member State 
or by the Commission to 
cross-border cases. The facts, 
and viewers' preferences for 
sports, will be different in 
each Member State. The 
solution in one Member State 
may be different to the 
solution in another Member 
State. The effect on trade 
between Member States of 
national arrangements will 
also differ. 
6. Many of the issues identified 
in the following chapters are 
often inter-related and so 
cannot be considered in 
isolation. This analysis is by 
no means exhaustive and 
other issues may arise in 
different circumstances in the 
future. 
7. Exclusivity is an accepted 
commercial practice in the 
broadcasting sector. It 
guarantees the value of a 
programme, and is 
particularly important in the 
case of sports, as a broadcast 
of a sports event is valuable 
for only a very short time. 
Exclusivity for limited 
periods should not in itself 
raise competition concerns. 
However, competition 
problems may arise. 
Duration, quantity and 
upstream and downstream 
market power need to be 
examined in order to assess 
whether the exclusivity 
seriously restricts 
competition. A longer period 
of exclusivity may be 
appropriate in certain 
circumstances, for example, 
for the broadcasting of the 
Olympic Games, which occur 
every four years. 
8. Exclusivity has also been 
questioned on grounds not 
related to competition law, in 
particular, where it is 
exercised by pay-TV 
operators. Article 3A of the 
new "television without 
frontiers" Directive, is an 
important measure addressing 
exclusive broadcasting rights 
to sports events which was 
introduced to ensure that 
Member States are able, at 
the national level, to protect 
the right to information and 
to provide for wide access by 
the public to television 
coverage of events of major 
importance for society? 
9. Competition rules are neutral 
with respect to different types 
of broadcasters and do not 
provide a legal basis for 
favouring one category over 
another. The Court of First 
Instance (in the EBU 
Eurovision judgment) has 
stated that, unless Article 
90(2) applies, the 
Commission would not be 
justified in giving a 
preference to television 
stations merely because they 
have a public service role, or 
to publicly owned stations, or 
to those financed from 
officially-collected licence 
fees. 
lO.Fundamental to consideration 
of any competition policy 
implications is the issue of 
who owns the broadcasting 
rights to sports events, as 
witnessed by recent court 
cases in the Netherlands' and 
For aspects other than those related to 
competition law, see the Communication 
from Mr Oreja to the Commission 
entitled 'Exclusive Rights for TV 
Broadcasting of Major (sports) Events" 
(SEC(97) 174 final. 
The High Court of Amsterdam verdict of 
8 November 1996 (on Feyenoord's 
appeal against the President of the 
Utrecht court's previous verdict) was that 
the television rights in principle belong 
to the home team and that the statutes of 
the KNVB are too general to be 
interpreted as an assignment of the 
broadcasting rights to the KNVB. 
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Germany4 concerning rights 
to national football games. 
11. Many sports have now 
entered the realms of the 
market economy. Their 
commercial activities are 
operated as businesses. The 
income received from the 
sale of broadcasting rights is 
transforming the sports 
world and widening the gulf 
between amateurs and 
professionals. As with any 
market, commercial 
practices fall under the 
scrutiny of the competition 
rules. Not only competition 
among participants in a 
particular sport may be 
affected by commercial 
practices but competition 
among broadcasters may 
also be affected. 
12. Apart from commercial 
considerations affecting 
competition, regard may 
also be had for genuine 
objectives based on other 
considerations applicable to 
sport because of its intrinsic 
characteristics and 
importance to society : 
"Maintaining a balance 
between clubs by preserving 
a certain degree of equality 
and uncertainty as to 
results" and "encouraging 
Decision of the Bundesgerichtshof 11 
December 1997 in case Deutscher 
Fußball­Bund, UFA Film and ISPR ν 
Bundeskartellamt took the view that 
teams are the natural owners of the 
broadcasting rights in the games in 
question, but left open the question of 
whether associations may also have a 
claim to ownership in different 
circumstances. 
the training of young 
players" ­ were two 
legitimate objectives 
recognised in the Judgment 
of the Court in the Bosman 
case5. 
13. In the light of these general 
considerations, this paper 
now turns to the main legal 
issues which arise, or may 
arise, under Community 
law, firstly concerning the 
provisions for the 
broadcasting rights to major 
sports events under Article 
3A of the new "television 
without frontiers" Directive, 
then with respect to 
Community competition 
law. 
I. Priority for free-access 
television for the coverage 
of major sports events 
1. There are advantages for 
viewers if important sports 
rights are broadcast by free­
access television, so that 
consumers are not obliged to 
make additional payments for 
decoders, receiving equip­
ment or cable subscription to 
view such events, in 
particular, those in which 
their compatriot sports men 
and women take part in 
international events. 
2. More generally, concern has 
arisen, with the growth and 
development of pay­TV, that 
viewers are being denied 
free­access to important 
5 C­415/93, 15 December 1995 
national events because large 
subscription broadcasters 
have been buying up those 
rights to develop their own 
services. It is said that some 
sporting events are of such 
national or heritage 
importance, that they reflect 
common identity and value, 
so that broad free access 
should be given to them. The 
complaints are from "public 
interest" or "national 
heritage" concern, rather than 
on competition grounds, and 
a regulatory approach would 
be necessary to achieve the 
desired result. 
3. As confirmed by the 
Eurovision judgment, 
competition rules are neutral 
with respect to different types 
of broadcasting and in 
principle, do not provide a 
legal base for favouring one 
category of broadcaster over 
others. 
4. Further to an amendment by 
the European Parliament, the 
directive modifying directive 
89/552/EEC7 ("television 
without frontiers") includes a 
new Article 3A. The 
purpose of this Article is 
explained in recital 18, which 
reads as follows: 
Joined Cases T­528/93, T­542/93, T­
543/93 and T­546/93, judgement of the 
Court of First Instance of 11 July 1996 
Directive 97/36/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 30 June 
1997 amending Council Directive 
89/552/EEC on the co­ordination of 
certain provisions laid down by law, 
regulation or administrative action in 
Member States concerning the pursuit of 
television broadcasting activities (OJ No 
L202/60 of 30.7.1997) 
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"Whereas it is essential that 
Member States should be able 
to take measures to protect 
the right to information and 
to ensure wide access by the 
public to television coverage 
of national or non-national 
events of major importance 
for society, such as the 
Olympic Games, the football 
World Cup and the European 
football Championship; 
whereas to this end Member 
States retain the right to take 
measures compatible with 
Community law aimed at 
regulating the exercise by 
broadcasters under their 
jurisdiction of exclusive 
broadcasting rights to such 
events". 
5. Article 3A paragraph 3 
stipulates, moreover, that 
Member States shall ensure 
that broadcasters under their 
jurisdiction do not exercise 
the exclusive rights 
purchased by those 
broadcasters in such a way 
that a substantial proportion 
of the public in another 
Member State is deprived of 
the possibility of following 
events, which are designated 
by that other Member State, 
on free television. According 
to information supplied to the 
Commission by national 
delegations to the Contact 
Committee set up by the 
Directive, a large majority of 
Member States intends to 
notify their measures taken 
under Article 3 A paragraph 1 
in the course of 1998. All 
Member States have 
indicated timetables for 
transposition of Article 3A 
paragraph 3 by the deadline 
required by the Directive, i.e. 
30 December 1998. 
6. The procedure laid down in 
Article 3 A paragraph 2 
requires the Member States to 
notify their measures and the 
Commission to verify their 
compatibility with 
Community law within a 
period of three months. The 
Commission must seek the 
opinion of the Committee 
established by the Directive. 
Measures taken by Member 
States in order to guarantee 
the availability of coverage of 
certain events must be in 
accordance inter alia with 
Article 90 of the Treaty. 
II. The relevant market in 
sports broadcasting cases 
1. The correct definition of the 
relevant market will be 
crucial to the assessment of 
cases concerning the issues 
referred to below. In the 
current climate of quickly 
evolving broadcasting tech-
nology and means of 
distribution, in particular, the 
development of pay-TV and 
pay-per-view, the nature and 
scope of the markets, which 
are relevant, are changing. 
The geographic market also is 
becoming more and more 
international as more cross-
border broadcasts of sports 
are offered. 
2. With the emergence and 
growing importance of 
dedicated subscription 
television sports channels 
over the last five years, the 
market seems to be evolving 
in such a way that it will be 
no longer possible to define it 
as for sport programmes in 
general, but for some specific 
sports, for example, for 
football or for Formula 1 
motor racing. Standard 
market definitions may not 
apply in all Member States. 
The markets are not 
necessarily the same in all 
Member States, as national 
preferences differ from State 
to State. 
3. When defining the relevant 
market, demand substitution 
is not to be viewed 
exclusively from the 
viewpoint of the final 
consumer, since some of the 
available services are not 
offered to the final consumer. 
In connection with rights to 
televise sports events, a 
variety of services can be 
provided: 
• owners of broadcasting 
rights to sports events sell 
the rights to broadcasters or 
to sports rights agencies; 
• the rights can be exclusive 
or non-exclusive, for live or 
deferred transmission, or for 
highlights; 
• a rights owner or 
broadcaster may subcon-
tract the production of the 
signal; 
• sports rights agencies sell 
rights to broadcasters; 
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• companies wishing to 
associate their brand with a 
particular sport, particularly 
if it receives television 
exposure, sponsor compe-
titions, organisers of sports 
events, clubs, teams or 
individuals; 
• broadcasters and/or adver-
tising brokers sell 
advertising time or sponsor-
ship to companies who want 
exposure on television 
during sports programmes; 
• broadcasters owning sports 
programmes, or owners of 
the rights or their agents, 
license other broadcasters to 
broadcast the programmes; 
• broadcasters can contract 
with cable companies or 
operators of other means of 
transmissions to broadcast 
their channels and sports 
programmes; 
• cable companies provide 
television to householders 
• broadcasters transmit sports 
programmes to viewer? 
• viewers may exercise a 
choice by subscribing to a 
dedicated sports broad-
casting service (rather than 
choosing from a variety of 
entertainment programmes 
on traditional advertising or 
licence fee funded 
television). 
4. Some sports events are more 
important, and attract the 
attention of more viewers, 
than others. A survey in the 
UK for the BBC on sport on 
television indicated that 92% 
of viewers were interested in 
watching one or more of the 
major sports events on 
television8. For really 
important events, there is no 
satisfactory substitute for live 
coverage (viewers' interest in 
most events is short-lived). 
There is little substitutability 
between sports for fans. For 
football supporters, television 
coverage of athletics or golf 
is not a satisfactory 
substitute. There may be 
little substitutability between 
different sports for sponsors, 
whose investment can be vital 
for the viability of a sport. 
For broadcasters some sports 
generate more income from 
advertising revenue or 
subscription than others. 
There may be an element of 
prestige in broadcasting 
certain major sports. For 
them, the importance and 
interest of a sports event to a 
large number of viewers 
determines whether other 
sports programmes are a 
satisfactory substitute. 
Football, the Olympic Games 
and Formula One racing are 
the most popular televised 
sports events world-wide. 
5. There is a market for sports 
rights, whether sold or 
licensed, and this market may 
be further sub-divided into 
the market for rights to 
specific sports. Broadcasting 
rights may be for live or 
Convergence within the media industry, 
and between media, information 
technology and/or telecommunications -
Prospective for competition and 
competition policy - Report to DGIV 
prepared by London Economics 
deferred full coverage of an 
entire event, for extracts and 
for highlights. The value and 
use of each type of right 
differs for broadcasters. The 
conditions of competition for 
the various types of 
broadcaster need to be taken 
into consideration. Condi-
tions for traditional 
incumbents - terrestrial and/ 
or free-access broad-casters, 
offering a general programme 
mix, who are dependent on 
licence fee or advertising 
revenue for their funding, are 
likely to be different from 
those for the emerging new 
broadcasting services, pay-
TV and pay-per-view, which 
include dedicated sports 
channels and which are 
dependent upon viewers' 
subscription fees. A larger 
proportion of the 
programming of the new 
services consists of sports. In 
the context of sponsors, 
television advertisers or pay-
TV, these factors suggest that 
it is necessary to define the 
markets more narrowly, as 
those for coverage of 
important events in a 
particular sport. 
6. In the Netherlands, the 
Decision of the Ministry for 
Economic Affairs in the 
KNVB/collective selling of 
highlights to football games 
case, the decision defines a 
separate market for football 
broadcasting rights9. 
7. In any event, the guidelines 
set out in the Commission 
9 Decision of 23 December 1997 
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Notice on Market Definition" 
should be referred to when 
considering definition of the 
relevant market. 
III. Exclusivity 
1. The sale of exclusive rights to 
broadcast sports events is an 
accepted commercial 
practice. For sports 
organisers, the sale of 
exclusive rights is a way of 
ensuring the maximum short-
term profitability of the event 
organised, the price paid for 
the exclusivity by one 
broadcaster probably being 
higher than the sum of the 
amounts which would be paid 
by several broadcasters for 
non-exclusive rights. 
2. For the broadcaster, sports 
programmes are considered 
as particularly suited to 
attracting a large number of 
viewers. For them, it can be 
said that exclusivity 
represents : 
• the only way to guarantee the 
value of a given sports 
programme; 
• the broadcasting company 
may get more value from the 
rights if it can sub-license to 
competitors; 
• a way to build up audience, in 
the short as well as in the 
long term (consolidation of 
audience base, fostering 
loyalty, improvement of 
image); 
OJ C 372, 9 December 1997 
• a substantial increase in 
advertising or sponsorship 
revenue as sports 
programmes are a means of 
targeting a specific audience, 
often in large numbers; 
• a degree of prestige in being 
the only broadcaster showing 
a particularly popular sport; 
• for pay-TV channels, 
exclusivity of rights to very 
popular sports events is 
fundamental in order to 
attract new subscribers; this is 
especially true for sports 
theme channels persuading 
viewers with specialised 
tastes to pay for specialised 
channels is the only way that 
many such channels could be 
financed, since the number of 
interested viewers would be 
too small to attract enough 
advertising revenue; it may 
also be vital to re-coup 
investment in infrastructure, 
• the revenue may be needed 
by a broadcasting company 
which wants to invest in 
cable, decoders and/or 
satellites. 
3. Despite the very large 
amounts paid by broadcasters 
for exclusive rights to the 
most popular sporting events, 
the purchases are still 
profitable as long as the 
acquisition price is 
outweighed by advertising or 
sponsorship revenue or 
subscription fees. Different 
types of broadcasters, as 
defined by their method of 
financing (licence-fee, 
advertising revenue, 
subscription etc) are be 
subject to differing 
constraints upon their ability 
to bid for sports rights. 
4. In the CODITEL II 
decision", the ECJ held that 
exclusive licences of 
performing rights did not per 
se infringe Article 85(1), 
even though they conferred 
absolute territorial protection 
and might prevent 
transmission into a 
neighbouring State. The 
Advocate General had 
observed that since 
performing rights affect the 
supply of services rather than 
goods and the doctrine of 
exhaustion was excluded by 
Coditel I, such exclusive 
licences would confer 
absolute territorial protection. 
The ECJ concluded that the 
exercise of those rights may 
come within the prohibition 
of Article 85(1) where, regard 
having been had to the 
specific characteristics of that 
market, there are economic or 
legal circumstances the effect 
of which is to restrict 
distribution to an appreciable 
degree. Certain parallels 
could be drawn with the 
granting of exclusive licences 
for broadcasting rights to 
sports events, which concern 
allowing a third party access 
to land or property or to the 
participants for filming 
purposes. 
5. Agreements for exclusivity 
may fall within the scope of 
Article 85(1) if they lead to 
" Case 262/81 
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foreclosure. Duration should 
not be excessive in length or 
scope. It is not possible to 
state what the maximum 
duration should be, as much 
will depend on individual 
circumstances. The effects of 
an exclusive licence will 
depend on market definition. 
The market power of the 
seller and the acquirer and 
whether the downstream 
market is likely to be 
foreclosed need to be 
assessed. The cumulative 
effect of the acquisition of the 
right may strengthen an 
already strong position of a 
broadcaster because it adds to 
an already attractive portfolio 
of sports rights. The existence 
of a sublicensing policy 
cannot, in itself, alter the 
need for an individual 
exemption in circumstances 
where exclusivity is caught 
under Article 85(1). 
6. Under current practices, the 
exclusivity granted can vary 
significantly. It can apply to 
the live broadcasting of an 
entire event; to a deferred 
transmission of an entire 
event, or for short clips for 
use in sports programmes. 
(For the purposes of news 
reporting, it is the general 
practice, often enshrined in 
national legislation, for short 
clips of an event to be made 
available to all broadcasters 
on a non-exclusive basis). It 
can also be limited to 
exploitation by any of the 
different broadcasting 
modalities - in the clear 
broadcasting, pay-TV or pay-
per-view. Exclusivity for all 
means of exploitation can be 
granted to a single operator, 
who either exploits some of 
the rights himself and 
withdraws the remainder 
from the market, or who is 
prepared to sub-licence other 
broadcasters on a live, 
deferred or highlight basis, 
according to the different 
modalities. Alternatively, the 
right to broadcast through 
only one modality can be 
granted only to one operator. 
Exclusivity can also be 
granted to a number of 
operators each exploiting a 
particular modality. The 
more forms of exclusive 
exploitation that are granted 
to other broadcasters for a 
particular right or rights the 
more the strength of each 
form of exclusivity is diluted, 
because there is an element of 
competition for viewers 
between the various 
modalities. 
7. There are circumstances 
when a long period of 
exclusivity may be justified, 
for example to assist a new 
entrant becoming established 
in the market (the "new 
entrant" rationale) and in 
particular, a new entrant 
introducing new and 
expensive technology who 
needs a long period of 
exclusivity in order to recover 
large investment costs. 
'Introducing these new 
technologies may require 
exclusive access to particular 
forms of sufficiently 
attractive content in order to 
drive penetration and 
consumer investment into 
new reception equipment'12. 
When considering the 
introduction of commercially 
new, high-risk and potentially 
pro-competitive services as 
justification for the granting 
of an exemption for a long 
period of exclusivity, a 
balancing needs to be carried 
out under Article 85(3). This 
is particularly relevant when 
the party is already powerful 
or the partners to an 
agreement or a joint venture 
are already part of large, 
powerful groups. 
IV. Collective selling 
1. The broadcasting rights to 
matches or competitions are 
often marketed centrally, or 
sold in exclusive bundled 
form, by a league or 
association representing the 
clubs or participants. At the 
national level, this practice 
has been challenged under 
national cartel law by 
competition authorities in 
The Netherlands13, the UK'4 
Convergence within the media industry, 
and between media, information and 
technology and/or telecommunications -
Prospective for competition and 
competition policy - Report to DG IV 
prepared by London Economics 
The Ministry for Economic Affairs took 
the view on 6 November 1996 that the 
collective selling by the KNVB to Sport 
7 of the broadcasting rights to matches 
was a cartel. On 28 December 1997 the 
Ministry issued a decision that the 
collective selling of highlights of soccer 
games was a restriction of competition 
but gave it a temporary and transitional 
exemption, on the basis of public interest 
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and most recently in 
Germany15, where the 
Bundesgerichtshof concluded 
that the central marketing of 
broadcasting rights to 
European Cup football 
matches by the national 
football association was a 
cartel for which exemption 
was not justified. If there 
exists an inter­state trade 
effect, it will be necessary to 
examine whether the 
collective selling of rights to 
broadcasting matches or to 
series of events or 
competitions results is an 
agreement restrictive of 
competition contrary to 
Article 85(1) of the EC 
Treaty and the Commission 
will have to examine whether 
the criteria for exemption 
could nevertheless be met by 
the arrangements. 
2. Before considering the 
question of the applicability 
of Community competition 
law, the ownership of rights 
needs to be taken into 
account as there is a danger 
that commercial agreements 
may collapse in a dispute 
about ownership, as has been 
witnessed in the Netherlands. 
The question of who owns 
the rights to broadcast any 
given event (or series of 
considerations, in order not to disrupt the 
market. 
Hearing of the Restrictive Pradices 
Court in January 1999 of the collective 
selling by the Premier League of 
broadcasting rights to the clubs'matches 
Decision of the Bundesgerichtshof 11 
December 1997 in case Deutscher 
Fußball­Bund, UFA Film and ISPR ν 
Bundeskartellamt 
events) is not one which can 
be answered by competition 
law. It is a question governed 
by the applicable national 
law. The Commission notes 
the tendency which is 
emerging in national court 
cases concerning football to 
conclude that the football 
clubs are the primary owners 
of the broadcasting rights to 
football matches in the cases 
examined by the courts. 
3. As ever larger sums are paid 
for exclusive rights, it is 
likely that disputes about 
ownership and the exercise of 
those rights will increase. 
Leagues or associations at 
both the national and 
international level are 
increasingly assuming the 
control and sale of 
broadcasting rights to 
individual events or matches 
by change to their 
constitutions or rules. The 
question of who owns the 
rights has to be determined 
under national law. Criteria 
under national law for 
determining ownership of 
broadcasting rights are 
different in different Member 
States. Ownership can be 
based on various 
considerations, such as the 
ownership of land, "the arena 
rights" or who takes the 
commercial risk in staging an 
event. Circumstances relating 
to the organisational structure 
of each sport will have a 
bearing on determining 
ownership; these are likely to 
be different for team sports 
such as football and rugby; 
series in which a number of 
teams or individuals compete 
at several locations; and 
events where there is one 
organiser but where a number 
of individuals take part, such 
as marathons, or tennis 
tournaments. It may be 
necessary for rights 
belonging to a number of 
contributors to the sport to be 
transferred to the organiser 
responsible for the game or 
competition. 
4. When considering collective 
selling or "central marketing" 
arrangements, it may be 
relevant to recall: 
• the competitive situation in 
each circumstance has to be 
evaluated, in order to avoid 
approving cartel­like 
arrangements which could be 
contrary to Article 85(1), 
particularly when the 
participants are capable of 
concluding their own 
contracts with broadcasters; 
• those assuming responsibility 
for selling the rights on 
behalf of individual 
participants or events may 
enjoy a position of market 
power, either already held as 
a result of a regulatory or 
supervisory function, or 
gained as a result of the 
acquisition of a large number 
of rights. If the acquisition, 
exercise or exploitation of 
those rights is abused, Article 
86 is likely to be applicable; 
• the conditions for 
international events may be 
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different to those for national 
events; 
• collective selling of 
broadcasting rights entails 
providing a bundle of rights, 
which may or may not be 
capable of being competitors 
to each other. The product 
may therefore be different to 
a product supplied by a single 
rights holder. 
5. Up until now, collective 
selling of broadcasting rights 
by national leagues has been 
left by the Commission to be 
dealt with under national 
competition law. No 
agreements for collective 
selling had been notified to 
the Commission, and it was 
not clear whether there was a 
significant effect on trade 
between Member States 
arising from some of the 
arrangements which have 
been made so far. 
6. The Commission is currently 
examining collective selling 
arrangements for interna-
tional motor sports. 
7. If a competition authority 
does not permit collective 
selling of sports rights for 
national events, a greater 
number of separate rights will 
be available to broadcasters. 
Collective selling or central 
marketing can be the source 
of other competition issues 
related to the broadcasting of 
sports events. 
8. Collective selling arrange-
ments, if they cannot be 
shown not to be a restriction 
of competition, are likely to 
affect the functioning of the 
market, because they permit 
only periodic transactions, 
restrict output and bundle the 
products offered. Collective 
selling can facilitate other 
restrictive practices, such as 
granting a long duration of 
exclusivity, giving 
preferential treatment to one 
set of rights at the expense of 
another, or the denying of the 
rights to other broadcasters. It 
could result in the hindering 
of the development of other 
sports or participants in the 
sport, which as a 
consequence of preferential 
treatment for some classes of 
participants, were not able to 
obtain satisfactory television 
exposure or attract sponsors. 
Such restrictions on output 
could in turn slow down the 
development of new 
broadcasting technologies at 
the national and cross-border 
levels. The terms of the 
agreements will affect the 
price broadcasters are willing 
to pay for the rights. 
Whether the resulting 
restraints on competition are 
indispensable to the 
functioning of the market 
would depend on all the 
circumstances. 
9. Before it could be said 
whether such arrangements 
fulfil the criteria for 
exemption under Article 
85(3), a thorough 
examination is required, first, 
of the extent of any 
restrictions of competition 
under Article 85(1) that arise 
for the individual parties 
concerned. Such restrictive 
agreements must meet the 
four criteria for exemption of 
Article 85(3). The fulfilment 
of these criteria should not be 
based on purely commercial 
considerations. The special 
characteristics of the sport in 
question have to be taken into 
account. These could include, 
for example, the need to 
ensure "Solidarity" between 
weaker and stronger 
participants or the training of 
young players, which could 
only be achieved through 
redistribution of revenue 
from the sale of broadcasting 
rights. Such aims would have 
to be a genuine and material 
part of the objectives and 
ones which could not be 
achievable under less 
restrictive arrangements. 
V. Sublicensing 
1. If an agreement involving 
exclusivity for rights gives 
the parties the possibility of 
eliminating competition in 
respect of a substantial part of 
the products or services in 
question, a possible remedy 
could be to require them to 
share with third parties the 
rights or advantages they 
have obtained. This may be 
particularly relevant when the 
owner of important rights is 
also their exploiter in a 
vertical joint venture with a 
broadcaster. Sublicensing 
could therefore be necessary 
in order to comply with Art. 
85(3)(b) as a means of 
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reducing the anti-competitive 
affect of exclusivity or of 
joint buying of sports rights. 
For certain events, such as the 
Olympics, sublicensing may 
be the only fair and 
competitive way to deal with 
exclusivity. Before 
considering arrangements for 
sublicensing under 
competition law, it should 
first be established whether 
the exclusivity is justified. 
2. Sublicensing should not be 
regarded as a solution to all 
the competition issues which 
arise. In most cases it will be 
necessary and sufficient to 
deal with, for example, 
exclusivity which is of an 
excessive duration or scope. 
To be effective, the value of 
sublicensing will depend on 
the terms on which 
sublicenses are granted. 
These should be known, as 
far as possible, in advance, 
because the value of the 
exclusive rights to the 
company obtaining them 
depends on any duty to 
sublicence which it may 
have. The terms of 
sublicences should be 
transparent. They should be 
non-discriminatory as 
between licensees in each 
category. Where the price of 
the sublicences is 
unregulated, this may result 
in prices at monopoly levels 
and it is not desirable for a 
competition authority to 
allow the broadcaster to 
obtain exclusive rights and 
then charge other 
broadcasters monopoly 
prices. Another adverse 
consequence could be that of 
excluding small-scale entry. 
"Terms" must deal with 
payment, access to unedited 
material, embargoes on live 
transmission or on 
transmission at popular times, 
and subject matter (interest 
and importance of the games 
or events sublicensed). There 
should be provision for 
settlement of disputes. There 
may be different categories of 
sublicences. The advantages 
obtained by the parties in 
comparison with the 
sublicense must be 
proportionate, so that 
sublicences are of real value 
to the licensees : the owner 
of the exclusive rights may 
not keep all the valuable 
rights for itself. 
3. The Commission will not 
normally fix the terms of 
sublicences, and may not find 
it easy to ensure that the 
terms are reasonable. In 
summary, encouraging 
sublicensing is not by itself 
either a satisfactory or a 
convenient way of solving the 
competition problems of 
sports broadcasting. 
VI. Collective purchasing by 
broadcasting companies 
1. Broadcasting companies 
sometimes join together to 
acquire the right to broadcast 
sports events. Whether this 
kind of collective buying falls 
under Article 85(1), and in 
what circumstances it fulfils 
the requirements of Article 
85(3), depends on all the 
circumstances. For example, 
whether such arrangements 
are anti-competitive will 
depend, inter alia, on whether 
the parties are found to be 
important competitors with a 
strong position in the relevant 
market, and the scope and 
duration of the exclusive 
rights purchased. In 
particular, collective 
purchasing will not raise 
competition problems if no 
one member of the group 
alone would have the 
resources to bid successfully 
for any of the rights in 
question, or where a number 
of small broadcasters come 
together which each, 
individually, have no 
possibility of acquiring the 
rights in question. 
2. Where collective purchasing 
is caught under Article 85(1), 
exemption can be envisaged 
if its purpose is pro-
competitive, for example, by 
maintaining a broadcasting 
sector with limited resources 
facing the big four 
broadcasters, BSkyB, Canal 
Plus, Bertelsmann and Kirch, 
on the market for the 
procurement of broadcasting 
rights, or for events of major 
national public importance, 
such as the Olympic Games. 
3. The removal of joint selling 
arrangements will minimise 
the need for collective 
purchasing. 
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This paper only intends to lay 
down some broad lines identified 
to date for the application of 
competition law in a sector in 
which the structure and 
economics are very complex and 
which is the subject of 
continuous and very rapid 
developments. Practice in 
relation to Articles 85 and 86 
will be developed by the 
Commission on a case-by-case 
basis. 
4 May 1998 
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In this section DG IV officials outline developments in community competition procedures. It is important to recognise 
that the opinions put forward in this section are the personal views of the officials concerned. They have not been 
adopted or in any way approved by the Commission and should not be relied uon as a statement of the Commission^ 
or DG IVs views . 
La politique de concurrence, une 
politique en faveur de lemploi 
EricCuziat, DG IV-A-1 
Introduction 
Au Conseil européen 
extraordinaire sur l'emploi, 
premier sommet européen 
entièrement consacré à ce sujet, 
qui s'est tenu à Luxembourg les 
20 et 21 novembre 1997, les 
États membres ont abouti à un 
accord sur des 'lignes 
directrices" pour renforcer 
l'action de lUnion européenne 
en faveur de l'emploi. Il apparaît 
clairement à la lecture de ces 
orientations que la lutte pour 
l'emploi est multiforme et 
qu'elle nécessite une multi-
thérapie. Toutes les politiques de 
la Commission sont en 
conséquence mobilisées. Plu-
sieurs des axes définis par ces 
'lignes directrices" intéressent 
directement la politique de 
concurrence: soit de façon 
implicite lorsque par exemple il 
est question de l'outil de 
croissance que constitue "un 
marché intérieur performant" 
auquel contribuent activement 
les politiques de décloison-
nement des marchés ou 
d'allégement des charges 
administratives pour les Petites 
et Moyennes Entreprises, soit de 
façon explicite comme dans cette 
section intitulée 'Les politiques 
communautaires au service de 
l'emploi" au nombre desquelles 
figure la concurrence. Le 
sommet de Luxembourg assigne 
clairement un rôle en matière 
d'emploi à la politique de 
concurrence, principalement 
dans le domaine des aides d'état. 
Le paragraphe 27 des "lignes 
directrices"affirme en effet quii 
convient de "s'orienter vers des 
régimes d'aides qui favorisent 
l'efficacité économique et 
l'emploi sans pour autant 
entraîner des distortions de 
concurrence". 
Le champ d'action de la 
politique de concurrence en 
faveur de l'emploi est beaucoup 
plus étendu que celui que les 
lignes directrices lui attribuent. 
Certes, la résolution du problème 
du chômage implique un 
florilège de solutions diverses et 
complexes. Toutefois, la 
politique de concurrence a un 
rôle non négligeable à jouer dans 
cet objectif de soutien à 
l'emploi. En effet, par l'appui 
qu'elle apporte à la croissance, 
liée au niveau de compétitivité 
des marchés qu'elle s'efforce de 
rendre plus ouverts, par sa 
contribution active au 
mouvement de libéralisation des 
industries de réseaux, par ses 
actions en direction des petites et 
moyennes entreprises, de la 
recherche et de linnovation, 
mais aussi au travers de son 
activité de contrôle en matière 
d'aides d'état, la politique de 
concurrence reste lune des 
politiques majeures de la 
Commission qui puisse au mieux 
contribuer à améliorer la 
situation de l'emploi en Europe. 
1. Le champ d'action de la 
politique de concurrence en 
faveur de 1 emploi 
Dans son discours donné à la 
conférence sur la croissance et 
l'emploi qui se tenait à Rome en 
juin 1996, le Président Santer 
indiquait déjà quelle devait être 
l'approche globale que devaient 
suivre la Commission et ses 
partenaires pour améliorer la 
situation de l'emploi en Europe. 
Il définissait quatre orientations 
créer un cadre macro-
économique tourné vers 
l'emploi, engager une action 
résolue en vue d'achever le 
marché intérieur, accélérer la 
réforme des systèmes d'emploi, 
enfin utiliser au mieux les 
politiques structurelles 
européennes. Dans ses lignes 
directrices en faveur de l'emploi 
du 1er octobre 1997, la 
Commission, quant à elle, 
proposa aux États membres 
quatre axes d'action: libérer 
lïnitiative entrepreneuriale, 
développer une nouvelle culture 
de l'emploi, encourager la 
flexibilité, renforcer l'égalité 
entre hommes et femmes. Les 
conclusions du sommet de 
Luxembourg de novembre 1997 
reprennent pour une large part 
ces propositions. La politique de 
concurrence peut concourir au 
succès d'au moins trois des 
quatre objectifs définis par le 
Président Santer et contribuer 
efficacement à la réalisation des 
objectifs fixés par le Sommet de 
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Luxembourg. En effet, par son 
action sur la structure des 
marchés, elle exerce une 
influence directe sur la 
compétitivité de l'économie 
européenne et sur son niveau de 
croissance, et, en conséquence, 
participe à cette orientation du 
cadre macro­économique vers 
l'emploi. Les efforts déployés 
par la Commission au travers de 
sa politique de concurrence pour 
décloisonner les marchés au sein 
de 1 Union, apportent un soutien 
majeur à l'achèvement du 
marché intérieur. Enfin, le 
contrôle des aides d'état, comme 
le souligne le paragraphe 27 des 
'lignes directrices", permet de 
faire en sorte que de telles aides 
contribuent à créer des 
entreprises saines et donc des 
emplois durables, tout en 
garantissant une concurrence 
loyale. Gageons aussi qubne 
réduction des budgets consacrés 
aux aides d État permettrait de 
libérer des ressources qui 
pourraient être réorientées vers 
des actions plus prometteuses en 
matière de création d'emplois. 
2. La libéralisation et remploi 
La politique de libéralisation des 
services publics de l'énergie, des 
transports ou des télécommuni­
cations, que la Commission 
mène avec mesure dans le 
respect des missions dintérêt 
économique général,conduit elle 
aussi au soutien dbne politique 
en faveur de l'emploi. La mise 
en concurrence des opérateurs 
jouissant au préalable dbne 
situation de monopole et 
lîntroduction de nouveaux 
entrants sur ces marchés se 
traduisent de façon quasi­
immédiate par une amélioration 
de la productivité des anciens 
monopoleurs et une réduction de 
leurs coûts d'exploitation. Ce 
phénomène génère un double 
effet positif il renforce la 
compétitivité des anciens 
monopoleurs et provoque des 
baisses tarifaires pour les 
consommateurs. Cette tendance 
décroissante des prix des 
services des industries de réseau 
est un facteur déterminant pour 
la compétitivité de l'industrie 
européenne dont les différents 
rapports du Groupe consultatif 
sur la Compétitivité ont montré 
que les entreprises souffraient 
dbn véritable handicap vis­à­vis 
de leurs principaux concurrents 
internationaux, lié aux prix 
élevés de ces services. Dans le 
premier rapport par exemple, il 
est fait état dbne étude qui 
montre que certains de ces 
services coûtaient en 1995, 22 
fois plus cher en Europe qu'aux 
États­Unis. Le . renforcement 
global de la compétitivité de 
notre économie soutient la 
croissance et favorise l'emploi. 
Par ailleurs, le processus de 
libéralisation entamé dans les 
secteurs de haute technologie 
comme les télécommunications 
provoque du fait de 
lîntroduction de la concurrence 
une émulation entre les 
entreprises en termes de 
recherche, d'investissements et 
de développement de nouveaux 
produits et services, émulation 
propre à stimuler la création 
d'emplois. La libéralisation 
conduit également de nouveaux 
entrants à pénétrer des marchés 
jusque là forclos et à créer de 
nouveaux emplois. Une étude 
réalisée en 1996' a montré que 
dans le cadre dbne libéralisation 
rapide du secteur des télécom­
munications et dbne diffusion 
accélérée des technologies, la 
création globale nette (ou la 
sauvegarde) de 1,3 millions 
d'emplois en Europe pouvait être 
envisagée en 2005. Dans le cadre 
dbn scénario où la libéralisation 
serait moins rapide, l'impact est 
évalué à 200 000 emplois 
nouveaux. 
Au nombre de ces emplois, 
l'étude précitée souligne que 
l'apparition de nouveaux 
opérateurs et prestataires de 
services se traduirait par la 
création de 50 000 à 160 000 
emplois, selon les scénarios. 
L'ouverture des transports 
aériens à la concurrence a 
provoqué la restructuration des 
compagnies nationales qui s'est 
très souvent traduite par des 
suppressions d'emplois. En 
1994, les membres de ΓΑΕΑ qui 
regroupe les compagnies 
aériennes européennes avaient 
ainsi supprimé 5000 postes de 
travail. Il y a fort à parier 
qu'après la mise en oeuvre des 
restructurations, dans un 
contexte d'accroissement du 
trafic aérien, ces mêmes 
compagnies renoueront avec les 
créations d'emplois. On se 
souvient du plan de survie de 
British Airways en 1982 qui 
entraîna une réduction de 
' Les effets sur l'emploi du processus de 
libéralisation dans le secteur des 
télécommunications, Rapport final, BIPE 
Conseil, octobre 1996. 
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quelques 20 000 emplois sur les 
55 000 que comptait l'entreprise. 
Après plusieurs années d'efforts, 
la compagnie ayant renoué avec 
les bénéfices, British Airways a 
retrouvé ses effectifs du début 
des années 1980. Ces emplois 
doivent être considérés comme 
des emplois plus sains et plus 
stables. Parallèlement, la 
libéralisation a donné naissance 
à de nouvelles compagnies 
aériennes2, créatrices d'emplois. 
Les tarifs concurrentiels de ces 
entreprises qui ont entraîné une 
baisse générale des prix dans ce 
secteur ont permis à des 
catégories nouvelles de 
consommateurs d'accéder au 
marché du transport aérien3 et ce 
faisant ont accru la demande 
globale sur ce marché. Cet 
accroissement de la demande, 
fruit de la libéralisation, réduit le 
risque dbn simple transfert des 
postes de travail et garantit une 
stabilité des emplois maintenus 
ou créés. 
Ainsi, la politique de la 
Commission en matière 
d'ouverture des industries de 
réseaux à la concurrence, 
politique qui demeure 
respectueuse des missions de 
service public, est-elle 
génératrice d'effets positifs sur 
l'emploi. 
Sur dix ans (1986-1996), le nombre total de 
compagnies aériennes communautaires 
opérant des vols réguliers est passé de 99 à 
156. Entre 1993 et 1996, 80 compagnies se 
créèrent, en majorité des compagnies 
privées, tandis que 60 disparaissaient, y 
compris à la suite de regroupement. 
Il est estimé qu'environ 90 à 95% des 
passagers voyagent désormais à des prix 
réduits.(1996). 
3. Une action multiforme en 
faveur de 1 emploi 
Par des actions plus ponctuelles, 
la politique de concurrence peut 
également contribuer à soutenir 
les autres politiques favorables à 
la création d'emplois. 
Il est bien connu que les Petites 
et Moyennes Entreprises sont 
des viviers en matière d'emplois. 
Toute action qui tend à libérer 
leur initiative entrepreneuriale 
est donc positive. Le sommet de 
Luxembourg recommande 
notamment de simplifier leur 
environnement réglementaire et 
administratif. Dans ses réformes 
législatives en cours, la 
Commission a tenu compte de 
cette exigence, y compris dans le 
domaine de la concurrence. Non 
pas que ces règles vont à 
rencontre de la création 
d'emplois puisqu'elles cherchent 
à créer les conditions optimales 
de fonctionnement des marchés, 
mais, dans la mesure où les 
éventuelles restrictions de 
concurrence mises en oeuvre par 
les PME ont rarement un effet 
sensible sur le marché commun, 
la Commission considère qu'il 
ny a pas lieu d'alourdir 
inutilement la charge 
administrative de ces entreprises 
qui se caractérisent par leur 
capacité dinitiative et leur 
célérité. C'est ainsi que la 
communication sur les accords 
dîmportance mineure réserve un 
traitement plus favorable aux 
PME qui se voient exemptées 
sous certaines conditions de 
l'application des règles de 
concurrence. La Commission a 
adopté une démarche parallèle 
en ce qui concerne le contrôle 
des aides dÉtat, dans ses lignes 
directrices sur les aides aux 
PME. De même, certains textes 
qui cherchent à alléger les 
contraintes réglementaires et 
administratives des grandes 
entreprises peuvent également 
voir leurs effets bénéfiques se 
répercuter au stade des PME. 
Ainsi, le règlement d'exemption 
concernant les accords de 
transfert de technologie qui 
favorise la diffusion rapide des 
innovations technologiques 
intéresse les PME qui, dans les 
secteurs de haute technologie, 
sont de grandes consommatrices 
de produits innovants. 
Le Conseil indique également 
dans ses conclusions que la 
recherche et l'innovation 
constituent des facteurs 
importants pour la croissance et 
donc l'emploi. La politique de 
concurrence adopte en général 
une attitude bienveillante à 
l'égard de ces alliances qui 
contribuent à la découverte de 
nouveaux produits et services et 
à la diffusion de l'innovation 
technologique. Elle demeure 
toutefois vigilante sur le respect 
des principes de concurrence 
afin que tous les acteurs 
économiques puissent tirer profit 
de ces innovations et intensifier 
le jeu de la concurrence, facteur 
de compétitivité et de croissance. 
Dans cet esprit, la Commission a 
par exemple autorisé la création 
d'entreprises communes entre 
concurrents puissants ayant pour 
objet le développement et la 
fabrication de nouveaux 
produits: Pasteur Mérieux/Merck 
dans le domaine pharmaceutique 
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(1994) ou ATR/BAe dans le 
secteur aéronautique (1995) par 
exemple. La Commission est 
également conduite à faire en 
sorte que certains accords ne 
comportent pas de clauses qui 
restreignent la capacité 
innovatrice de lbn des 
contractants comme dans 
l'affaire Santa Cruz/Microsoft 
(1997). En outre, il convient de 
rappeler ici que la Commission 
cherche à faciliter la recherche et 
la diffusion de l'innovation en 
allégeant la charge adminis-
trative qui pèse sur les 
entreprises en en simplifiant le 
cadre réglementaire: citons ici 
l'adoption du règlement sur les 
transferts de technologie, déjà 
mentionné, ou les réflexions 
engagées sur le règlement 
d'exemption sur les accords de 
recherche et développement, 
mais aussi l'action de la 
Commission en ce qui concerne 
la société de l'information où les 
technologies jouent un rôle 
capital. Ajoutons enfin que les 
aides à la recherche, autorisées 
dès lors qu'elles ne 
contreviennent pas aux dispo-
sitions communautaires en 
matière de concurrence, peuvent 
constituer des incitations non 
négligeables à la recherche et à 
lînnovation. 
4. L exigence sociale 
Bien entendu, l'intensification de 
la concurrence se traduit aussi 
par des restructurations et par 
l'éviction des acteurs du marché 
les moins dynamiques, ce qui 
inévitablement implique, de 
façon conjoncturelle, la 
fermeture dbnités de production 
et donc des effets négatifs sur 
l'emploi. Dans de telles 
circonstances, il est difficile 
d'expliquer que l'action en 
faveur de la compétitivité n'est 
pas, partiellement au moins et à 
court terme sans doute, 
destructrice d'emplois. Au-delà 
des solutions en termes de 
croissance auxquelles la 
politique de concurrence peut 
contribuer activement, il est 
nécessaire d'apporter une 
réponse sociale à ces effets 
conjoncturels, car lEurope, 
comme le rappelait le président 
Santer, ne saurait être qubn seul 
projet économique. 
Tout d'abord, il faut souligner 
que dans l'application des règles 
de concurrence, la Commission 
n'ignore pas de prendre en 
compte des considérations 
d'ordre social, respectant ainsi 
l'objectif de cohésion 
économique et sociale qui figure 
au nombre des objectifs 
fondamentaux du traité. Cela est 
particulièrement vrai dans le 
domaine des aides dÉtat non 
seulement lorsquîl s'agit 
d'évaluer la compatibilité des 
aides à l'emploi ou à la 
formation mais aussi lorsque la 
Commission apprécie la légalité 
de certaines aides sectorielles ou 
régionales et notamment les 
plans de restructuration qui les 
accompagne. Cela est vrai 
également dans le cadre du 
contrôle des concentrations. Le 
considérant 13 du règlement 
stipule en effet que 'la 
Commission se doit de placer 
son appréciation dans le cadre 
général de la réalisation des 
objectifs fondamentaux du traité, 
y compris celui du renforcement 
de la cohésion économique et 
sociale". C'est dans l'affaire 
Kali und Salz/MdK que la 
Commission rappela pour la 
première fois cette exigence en 
autorisant une concentration sur 
la base du principe de 
T'entreprise défaillante". De 
même, dans son arrêt du 27 avril 
1995, (affaire Nestlé/Perrier), le 
Tribunal de premier instance a 
souligné que dans son analyse 
dbne concentration, la 
Commission peut dans certaines 
circonstances tenir compte de 
considérations d'ordre social. 
Rappelons enfin que la Cour de 
justice dans l'arrêt Metro-Saba a 
fait référence au progrès social 
comme cause d'exemption dbne 
entente, bien que les dispositions 
de l'article 85-3 du traité ne le 
prévoient pas de façon expresse4. 
La Commission cherche donc 
dans la mesure du possible à 
concilier les principes de libre 
concurrence et de cohésion 
économique et sociale de sorte 
que l'application du droit 
communautaire de la 
concurrence ne se fasse pas au 
mépris du tissu social. 
En outre, il est nécessaire de 
respecter le dialogue social 
informer les représentants du 
personnel et discuter avec eux 
des solutions alternatives 
La Cour observe en effet quline obligation 
se justifiait dans la mesure où elle 
constituait "en ce qui concerne le maintien 
de l'emploi, un élément de stabilisation 
dont la recherche rentre, au titre de 
l'amélioration des conditions générales de 
production, spécialement dans les 
circonstances dline conjoncture 
économique défavorable, dans le cadre des 
objectifs que 1 article 85-3 permet de 
viser". 
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possibles, comme le stipule la 
directive communautaire sur les 
licenciements collectifs. Ce 
dialogue, au­delà des exigences 
humaines, répond aussi à une 
nouvelle conception de 
l'efficacité économique. 
Associer les salariés de 
l'entreprise aux décisions 
stratégiques de ce type est un 
facteur de gain de compétitivité. 
Il est sans doute nécessaire 
également d'introduire une 
certaine flexibilité dans le 
marché du travail, comme le 
recommandait déjà le Livre 
Blanc de la Commission sur la 
croissance, la compétitivité et 
l'emploi et que le Conseil de 
Luxembourg à fort justement 
rappelé, d'inciter les salariés à la 
mobilité professionnelle et 
géographique, afin de faciliter 
les reconversions vers les 
nouveaux marchés créateurs 
d'emploi, de développer les 
actions de formation et le 
développement des compétences 
au sein de l'entreprise ou encore 
de réduire le coût relatif de la 
main d'oeuvre non qualifiée. Ces 
mesures qui figurent dans les 
propositions du Groupe 
consultatif sur la compétitivité 
dépassent la politique de 
concurrence à proprement parler 
et relèvent du champ plus large 
de la politique économique et 
sociale dont la première ne 
constitue qubn des aspects. Il 
appartient sans doute aux 
services en charge de la 
concurrence de placer leur action 
dans cette perspective. 
5. Le contrôle des aides d et at 
Il est un autre domaine important 
où la Commission trouve à 
appliquer le principe de la 
cohésion économique et sociale, 
à savoir celui du contrôle des 
aides d'état. Ce n'est pas sans 
raison que les conclusions du 
Sommet de Luxembourg se 
focalisent sur cet aspect. En 
effet, les aides dÉtat peuvent 
être particulièrement nuisibles au 
fonctionnement concurrentiel 
des marchés et par conséquent à 
la croissance et à l'emploi dans 
la mesure où ces aides isolent et 
protègent les entreprises qui en 
sont bénéficiaires des effets du 
processus concurrentiel. Les 
restructurations nécessaires de 
ces entreprises maintenues 
artificiellement en activité en 
sont retardées. Une telle 
situation ne manque pas de 
dissuader les entreprises non 
bénéficiaires d'entrer sur ces 
marchés protégés. Ainsi, les 
régions ou les secteurs 
économiques dans lesquels les 
aides dEtat produisent leurs 
effets entrent­elles dans un 
phénomène de sclérose qui ne 
contribue ni à promouvoir la 
croissance, ni à créer des 
emplois stables et durables. 
C'est pourquoi l'article 92 du 
Traité interdit l'octroi d'aides 
publiques à certaines entreprises 
qui conduisent à fausser la 
concurrence dans le marché 
commun. Il n'en autorise pas 
moins sous certaines conditions 
les aides nécessaires à la 
restructuration des entreprises en 
difficulté ou au développement 
des régions les plus défavorisées 
de 1 Union. 
En ce qui concerne le premier 
point, la Commission, 
conformément aux lignes 
directrices qu'elle a publiées en 
1994, subordonne l'approbation 
des aides à la restructuration au 
respect de conditions strictes qui 
permettent de s'assurer que ces 
aides, limitées dans le temps et 
de façon irrévocable, ne visent 
pas à maintenir artificiellement 
des entreprises, et donc des 
emplois, en sursis mais à opérer 
un rétablissement de la viabilité 
à long terme de l'entreprise dans 
un délai raisonnable. Dans ces 
conditions, les aides publiques 
concourrent à renforcer la 
capacité des entreprises à 
affronter la concurrence sur les 
marchés. C'est ainsi que la 
Commission a approuvé la 
recapitalisation et les plans de 
restructuration de nombreuses 
compagnies aériennes natio­
nales, ces dernières années. 
En matière d'aides à finalité 
régionale, la Commission sur la 
base de critères économiques 
s'attache à circonscrire les zones 
les plus défavorisées de 1 Union 
et à déterminer pour chacune 
d'elles le niveau d'intensité des 
aides, afin que les aides d'état 
soient ciblées sur les régions de 
lUnion réellement en difficulté. 
Alors que le cinquième rapport 
sur les aides d'état souligne un 
arrêt de la tendance à la 
réduction des aides, la 
Commission vient d'adopter de 
nouvelles lignes directrices 
concernant ces aides à finalité 
régionale. Elles répondent au 
besoin de plus en plus ressenti de 
réduire l'effet distorsif des aides 
sur la concurrence et d'assurer 
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une plus grande efficacité pour 
le développement des régions en 
retard ou en difficulté. 
Le contrôle des aides d'état 
contribue ainsi, de façon 
décisive, à la cohésion 
économique et sociale de 
lUnion européenne dans sa 
globalité. Il permet notamment 
d'éviter que certaines aides qui 
ne seraient pas directement liées 
au renforcement de la 
compétitivité ou du 
développement régional ne 
maintiennent artificiellement en 
activité des entreprises ou des 
régions et ne transfèrent en 
définitive leurs problèmes 
d'emploi, temporairement 
résolus, vers d'autres entreprises 
ou régions qui, elles, ne 
bénéficieraient d'aucune aide 
publique. Veiller à ce que ces 
transferts ne se produisent, c'est 
aussi anticiper sur d'éventuelles 
surenchères entre États ou 
régions en ce qui concerne le 
volume des aides accordées pour 
un résultat neutre en matière 
d'emplois. 
Enfin, la Commission est 
particulièrement attentive aux 
aides publiques destinées à 
l'emploi. De manière générale, 
un dispositif d'allégement de 
charges sociales pour un secteur 
d'activité particulier est 
considéré comme un système 
d'aides au fonctionnement. Ces 
dernières sont reconnues comme 
perturbant fortement les 
échanges intra-communautaires 
et faussant gravement la 
concurrence entre les États 
membres sur le long terme. La 
Cour de justice a confirmé dans 
sa jurisprudence le caractère 
d'aide d'État de toute mesure 
d'allégement de charges sociales 
ou fiscales qui ne se justifie pas 
par la nature et l'économie du 
système dans lequel elle 
slnscrit. 
En revanche, la Commission a 
fait preuve d'ouverture et de 
bienveillance à l'égard d'aides à 
l'emploi notamment pour les 
catégories les plus défavorisées 
de chômeurs ou pour les zones 
urbaines difficiles tout en 
s'entourant des garanties 
nécessaires pour donner un 
véritable effet utile à l'objectif 
de création nette d'emplois 
stables. C'est ainsi quà la suite 
de la notification par la France 
de son pacte de relance pour la 
ville, consistant notamment dans 
des interventions financières de 
lÉtat, la Commission a exprimé 
une position de principe 
favorable à l'égard de ces aides 
dont l'objectif est de résoudre 
autant que faire se peut les 
problèmes dont souffrent 
certaines zones urbaines. 
Conclusion 
Contrairement à une idée reçue, 
la mise en oeuvre dbne 
politique de concurrence est 
compatible avec une action en 
faveur de l'emploi. Elle est à 
même en effet de contribuer au 
maintien voire à la création 
d'emplois stables et durables en 
Europe. Dans un contexte 
d'internationalisation croissante 
des marchés, la bataille pour 
l'emploi se gagnera sur le terrain 
de la compétitivité. A certains 
égards, il n'est pas faux 
d'affirmer qubn marché à haut 
degré de concurrence prépare les 
emplois de demain. 
À n'en pas douter, une politique 
de concurrence, menée sans 
raison, serait à tout le moins 
indifférente vis-à-vis de 
l'emploi. Or, la Commission 
conduit sa politique de 
concurrence de façon équilibrée 
en respectant le principe de 
cohésion économique et sociale 
ou celui de service d'intérêt 
général, dès lors que le 
fonctionnement concurrentiel 
des marchés n'est pas mis en 
cause. Il s'agit non pas 
d'appliquer les règles de 
concurrence de manière extrême, 
mais de tenir compte des 
difficultés sociales dans une 
mesure compatible avec les 
règles du traité. 
La Commission ne méconnaît 
pas les effets destructeurs sur 
l'emploi des restructurations 
qu'implique l'intensification de 
la concurrence. C'est pourquoi, 
elle promeut le dialogue social 
qui est à la base du modèle 
européen mais incite également 
les partenaires sociaux à faire 
preuve d'imagination en matière 
d'organisation du travail et 
soutient les actions menées en 
matière de flexibilité ou de 
temps partiel qui ont donné des 
résultats encourageants dans 
certains États membres de 
lUnion. 
La bataille pour l'emploi se 
gagnera de deux façons : 
-par le développement de la 
croissance économique, en 
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misant notamment sur linno-
vation et les produits de haute 
technologie; 
-par une modification de 
l'organisation du travail dans le 
sens dbne plus grande 
flexibilité, sans renoncer pour 
autant au modèle social 
européen. 
Commission Practice concerning 
excessive pricing in 
Telecommunications 
By Marcel HAAG and Robert KLOTZ, DG IV-C-1 
Some of the main recent 
controversial issues in the 
telecommunications sector are 
related to prices for access to 
services, networks and other 
facilities of the incumbent 
telecommunications operators. 
Already in the run-up to the full 
liberalisation of the European 
telecommunications sector as 
from 1 January 1998 (cf. Article 
2 of Commission Directive 
90/388/EEC, OJ No L 192, 
24.7.1990, p. 10, as amended by 
Commission Directive 
96/19/EC, OJ No L 74, 
22.3.1996, p. 13), network 
access pricing 
specifically, 




to be of 
for the 
market entry of competitors. 
After the full liberalisation, 
access pricing by the incumbent 
operators has become even more 
important, as competitors try to 
gain market share in the core 
markets of the traditional 
carriers, i.e. voice telephony and 




As the central problem of 
opening up telecommunications 
markets, certain aspects of 
access to facilities of the former 
monopoly undertakings have 
been specifically addressed in 
secondary Community 
legislation. For interconnection 
to the telephone network, the 
most important examples of 
access in telecommunications, a 
set of sector-specific rules were 
created in the framework of the 
directives on Open Network 
Provision (ONP), especially by 
the one concerning 
interconnection (Directive 
97/33/EC, OJ No L 199, 
26.7.1997, p. 32). These 
provisions, which have to be 
transposed by the Member States 
into domestic law and applied by 
the national telecommunications 
regulators, are more specific 
than the general competition 
rules of the EU and will make 
their application unnecessary in 
many cases. In principle, though, 
the competition provisions, 
including Article 86 EC-Treaty, 
continue to be applicable 
alongside the ONP rules. 
However, Article 86 EC-Treaty 
empowers the Commission only 
to carry out an a posteriori 
control of abuse. This means 
that, in general, the Commission 
is entitled to intervene, be it at its 
own initiative or upon a 
complaint, only once the prices 
are effectively charged by the 
telecommunications operator 
concerned. 
To take account of the 
importance of the competition 
related problems of access in 
telecommunications, the 
Commission adopted on 31 
March 1998 a notice on the 
application of the competition 
rules to access agreements in the 
telecommunications sector (cf. 
the contribution by K. Coates in 
this issue), which inter alia 
explains how the Commission 
intends to apply Article 86 EC-
Treaty to these issues. 
According to Article 86 EC-
Treaty, the abuse of a dominant 
position within the common 
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market shall be prohibited. This 
provision explicitly mentions in 
its paragraph 2 lit. a that such an 
abuse may in particular consist 
in "directly or indirectly 
imposing unfair purchasing or 
selling prices to other 
companies". In case that such an 
abuse is found, the Commission 
is empowered, pursuant to 
Council Regulation 17/62 
implementing Articles 85 and 86 
EC-Treaty (OJ No. 13, 
21.2.1962, p. 204/62), to oblige 
the companies concerned to 
terminate the abuse and to 
impose fines. 
Although price abuses are 
explicitly mentioned in Article 
86 EC-Treaty, formal 
Commission decisions 
concerning price abuse are rare. 
One of the main reasons for the 
absence of a more extensive case 
law can be found in the practical 
difficulties of establishing price 
abuse. In particular as regards 
excessive pricing, little case law 
has developed so far. 
According to the European Court 
of Justice, a price is excessive if 
it is "excessive in relation to the 
economic value of the service 
provided" (Case 26/75, General 
Motors Continental, ECR 1975, 
p. 1367, para. 12). The Court 
held that one method of 
establishing a price excess is by 
comparing the price and the 
production cost of a product. In 
United Brands, the Court stated 
that an "excess could, inter alia, 
be determined objectively if it 
were possible for it to be 
calculated by making a 
comparison between the selling 
price of the product in question 
and its cost of production" (Case 
27/76, United Brands, ECR 
1978, p. 207, para. 251). 
However, given the practical 
difficulties in many cases to 
determine the production cost of 
a product or service, the Court 
also admitted other methods of 
calculation. In Ahmed Saeed, the 
Court indicated that Community 
legislation setting out pricing 
principles may be taken into 
account (Case 66/86, Ahmed 
Saeed, ECR 1989, p. 838, para. 
43). Furthermore, such an 
assessment may be made by 
comparing the prices charged for 
the same product or service on 
other geographic markets (cf. 
Case 395/87, Tournier, ECR 
1988, p. 2521, para. 38; and. 
Joint Cases 110/88, 241/88 and 
242/88, Lucazeau, ECR 1988, p. 
2811, para. 25). In these cases, 
the Court stated that "when an 
undertaking holding a dominant 
position imposes scales of fees 
for its services which are 
appreciably higher than those 
charged in other Member States 
and where a comparison of the 
fee levels has been made on a 
consistent basis, that difference 
must be regarded as indicative of 
an abuse of a dominant position. 
In such a case, it is for the 
undertaking in question to justify 
the difference by reference to 
objective dissimilarities between 
the situation in the Member 
States concerned and the 
situation prevailing in all the 
other Member States." In 
particular, a comparison between 
the prices charged by a dominant 
undertaking and those charged 
on comparable competitive 
markets could, according to the 
Court, provide a basis for 
assessing whether or not the 
prices charged by the dominant 
undertaking are fair (cf. Case 
30/87, Bodson, ECR 1988, p. 
2507, para. 31). 
The assessment of the cost of a 
service is particularly difficult in 
the telecommunications sector, 
as many of the dominant 
operators in the EU have until 
recently been operated as 
government departments under 
public budget rules. Appropriate 
cost allocation is therefore 
currently in many cases 
impossible. In the future, 
however, it can be expected that 
cost allocation will be facilitated 
by the cost accounting 
requirements set out in the ONP 
framework (cf. Article 7 of 
European Parliament and 
Council Directive 97/33/EC, OJ 
No L 199, 26.7.1997, p. 32). 
RECENT PRACTICE IN 
THE ASSESSMENT OF 
PRICE ABUSE 
In spite of the practical 
difficulties entailed in the 
application of Article 86 EC-
Treaty to excessive pricing, the 
Commission assessed a number 
of such cases in the 
telecommunications sector. The 
Commission's recent practice in 
this field can be illustrated by the 
following examples: 
1. Upon a complaint by 
ITT Promedia, the Belgian 
directory-publishing subsidiary 
of the US ITT World Directories 
company, the Commission 
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investigated into Belgacom's 
prices for access to subscriber 
data for the publication of 
telephone directories. The 
complainant alleged that the 
prices charged by the Belgian 
incumbent telecommunications 
operator were excessive and 
discriminatory in the sense of 
Article 86 EC­Treaty. The 
Commission carried out an 
assessment of the prices charged, 
with the support of an expert 
auditing firm, and insisted in 
fully implementing the cost­
orientation principle. After the 
Commission had sent out a 
formal statement of objections at 
the end of 1995, Belgacom 
finally agreed, in a settlement 
with the Commission, to a 
substantial reduction (by more 
than 90%) of these prices by 
dropping any variable 
component in relation to the 
turnover or profit of directory 
publishers. Following the 
complainant withdrawing its 
complaint, this procedure was 
terminated by the Commission in 
April 1997 (cf. Press Release 
IP/97/292 of 11.4.1997). 
2. In another case, the 
Commission dealt with the 
problem of access to the network 
of Deutsche Telekom (DT) on 
the basis of a complaint against 
DT's business customer tariffs, 
which was lodged by certain 
providers of corporate network 
services in Germany. The 
Commission found in this case 
that the introduction of such 
tariffs lead to an abusive price­
cost squeeze on competitors. To 
get rid of this effect, the 
Commission invited DT inter 
alia to conclude more favourable 
agreements on access to the 
public telephone network with 
competitors. DT subsequently 
put forward an agreement 
stipulating prices which were 
unacceptable to competitors. A 
comparative market study 
ordered by the Commission 
showed that the proposed prices 
were exorbitant. In this study, it 
was assumed that, in the absence 
of special circumstances, a price 
is highly likely to be abusive if it 
exceeds by more than 100% the 
ones found on comparable 
competitive markets and that 
under those circumstances, the 
continuation of the procedure 
would normally be warranted. 
As a result, DT declared itself 
willing to substantially reduce its 
tariffs and presented an 
appropriate draft contract to the 
complainants. The tariff 
reductions conceded by DT were 
considerable, as they range from 
38% in the case of local network 
access to 78% for access to the 
long­distance network (cf. Press 
Release IP/96/975 of 4.11.1996; 
and K. Van Miert, Wirtschaft 
und Wettbewerb, 1/1998, p. 7). 
3. In an own­initiative 
procedure regarding access 
pricing, which was opened in the 
early days of January 1998, the 
Commission proceeded against 
DT's high fees concerning the 
provision of carrier­preselection 
and number portability. In order 
to determine whether these fees 
were excessive in the sense of 
Article 86 EC­Treaty, the 
Commission used its powers 
under Article 11 of Regulation 
17/62 to request information 
from undertakings and industry 
associations in all EU Member 
States. With the help of the 
replies provided, the 
Commission established a 
comparative market analysis, on 
the basis of which an abuse 
assessment could be carried out. 
In the course of the procedure, 
DT considerably reduced the 
amounts of the fees concerned, 
notably for carrier preselection 
by almost 50%. As Community 
interest and the rights of third 
parties did not require that the 
Commission continued its 
examination pending a parallel 
procedure before the national 
regulatory authority, the own­
initiative procedure was 
terminated and the analysis of 
the information received was 
communicated to the competent 
national authorities in order to 
support them in their 
investigation of the case (cf. 
Press Release IP 98/430 of 
13.5.1998). 
CONCLUSION 
The preceding examples show 
that in recent cases of alleged 
excessive pricing in the 
telecommunications sector, the 
Commission used a cost­price 
analysis (see case 1, supra) or, 
where necessary, a comparative 
market analysis (see cases 2 and 
3, supra), in order to assess a 
possible abuse. Given that an 
extensive body of sector­specific 
legislation, including pricing 
principles, is now in place, the 
Commission might in the future, 
where appropriate, also take 
those principles into account in 
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an assessment of a possible price 
abuse. 
In some of the above mentioned 
cases, it appears that the 
Commission had to use a 
comparative approach, because 
the necessary cost information 
was not available. To carry out a 
comparative analysis, the 
Commission either used expert 
studies, in particular where 
complex accounting information 
was required (see case 2, supra) 
or information gathered on the 
basis of requests for information 
in accordance with Regulation 
17/62 (see case 3, supra). It is 
clear that a market comparison 
can only provide an indication of 
an abuse, if the difference 
between the prices charged on 
the various markets is 
significant. On the contrary, in 
cases were the prices charged 
deviate only slightly from the 
price level on comparative 
markets, this disparity could not 
be considered as giving a prima 
facie indication for abuse. 
Depending on the merits of each 
individual case, the benchmark 
for Commission intervention 
may vary considerably. In the 
second case mentioned above, a 
difference of more then 100% 
between the price examined and 
the price levels in comparative 
markets was found to be 
unacceptable. In other cases, 
however, the Commission might 
have to intervene even if this 
difference is significantly 
smaller. In any event, even 
where a significant difference 
exists, the undertaking 
concerned always has the 
possibility of demonstrating that 
higher prices are objectively 
justified. 
The Commission itself never 
aspired to use Article 86 EC-
Treaty in order to act as a price 
setting authority (cf. already the 
Fifth Report on Competition 
Policy, 1975, point 76). Recent 
Commission practice in cases 
concerning the telecommuni-
cations sector is fully in line with 
this general policy. Price 
regulation has been left to the 
national regulatory authorities, 
acting on the basis of sector-
specific telecommunications 
regulations, which are 
harmonised under the EC rules 
on ONP. However, it has also 
become clear that the 
Commission will make full use 
of its powers under Article 86 
EC-Treaty wherever this is 
necessary to prevent abusive 
pricing strategies and in 
particular excessive pricing 
obstructing effective market 
entry on the liberalised 
telecommunications markets. 
Commentaire sur I ArrŒt de la Cour du 31 
mars 1998 dans laffaire Kali und Salz 
F. E. GonzÆlez-D az, DG IV-B 
Le 31 mars 1998 la Cour a rendu 
son arrêt dans les affaires mettant 
en cause la légalité de la décision 
du 14 décembre 1993 par laquelle 
la Commission a déclaré, sous 
conditions, le projet de 
concentration entre Kali und Salz 
AG (ci-après K+S) et 
Mitteldeustche Kali AG (ci-après 
MdK) compatible avec le marché 
commun. 
Cette décision avait fait l'objet de 
deux recours, l'un intenté par la 
République française, l'autre 
intenté par la Société 
commerciale des potasses et de 
l'azote (ci-après SCPA) et par la 
société Entreprise minière et 
chimique (ci-après EMC), 
entreprise mère de SCPA. 
Les griefs des requérantes à 
l'égard de la décision peuvent être 
résumées comme suit 
a) la Commission n'aurait pas 
respecté l'obligation qui lui 
incombe de collaborer avec 
les autorités nationales en 
vertu de l'article 19 du 
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règlement sur les concen-
trations en ce que, d'une part, 
elle n'aurait pas fourni en 
temps utile des données 
indispensables à l'appré-
ciation de la pertinence de la 
définition des marchés en 
cause et de l'impact 
concurrentiel de l'opération de 
concentration, et, d'autre part, 
la remise de ces données à 
l'occasion de la réunion du 
comité consultatif aurait été 
beaucoup trop tardive; 
b) la Commission aurait fait une 
application incorrecte de la 
"failing company defence" 
dans son appréciation de 
l'effet de la concentration sur 
le marché allemand en ce 
qu'elle n'aurait pas pris en 
compte la totalité de critères 
retenus dans la réglementation 
antitrust américaine, qu'elle 
aurait introduit arbitrairement 
le critère de l'absorption des 
parts de marché, qu'elle aurait 
négligé l'éventualité que MdK 
puisse, avec des aides d État, 
retrouver sa viabilité ou la 
possibilité de reprise moins 
dommageable pour la 
concurrence, et, enfin, qu'elle 
aurait dû imposer des 
conditions précises et 
suffisantes visant à ouvrir le 
marché pertinent à la 
concurrence; 
c) la Commission aurait fait une 
appréciation erronée de 
l'opération de concentration 
sur le marché communautaire 
à l'exception de l'Allemagne 
en ce que: i)le marché 
géographique de référence 
aurait été incorrectement 
défini; ii)le règlement sur les 
concentrations ne serait pas 
applicable à la création et/ou 
renforcement d'une position 
dominante collective; iii)à 
supposer même que le 
règlement soit applicable à ce 
genre de situations, l'opération 
de concentration ne donnerait 
pas lieu, en l'espèce, à la 
création d'une position 
dominante collective; 
En ce qui concerne la prétendue 
violation de l'article 19 du 
règlement sur les concentrations, 
la Cour se borne à constater que 
les données demandées par les 
autorités françaises (et transmises 
par la Commission à l'occasion de 
la réunion du comité consultatif) 
n'étaient pas de nature à remettre 
en cause l'état du marché tel que 
résultant des informations 
contenues dans l'avant-projet de 
décision qui, lui, avait été 
transmis en temps utile aux 
autorités françaises et au comité 
consultatif. La Cour a donc suivi, 
du moins implicitement, sa 
jurisprudence traditionnelle en 
matière de violation de droits 
procéduraux selon laquelle ce 
type de violations n'est 
susceptible d'entraîner l'annu-
lation d'une décision que lorsque 
l'absence d'irrégularité aurait pu 
conduire à un résultat différent de 
celui qui aurait été retenu si ces 
droits procéduraux avaient été 
respectés. 
Pour ce qui est de l'application de 
la "failing company defence" la 
Cour accepte la thèse soutenue 
par la Commission selon laquelle 
dès lors qu'une opération de 
concentration n'est pas la cause 
de la création ou du renforcement 
d'une position dominante 
affectant de manière significative 
la situation concurrentielle sur le 
marché pertinent, il y a lieu de la 
déclarer compatible avec le 
marché commun ainsi que les 
critères d'application de cette 
théorie. 
S'agissant de la critique de la 
France selon laquelle la 
Commission aurait négligé 
l'éventualité que MdK puisse, 
avec des aides d État, retrouver sa 
viabilité, l'analyse de la Cour est 
fort intéressante. 
Selon la Cour l'argument de la 
République française n'était pas 
fondé étant donné que, en 
l'espèce, MdK avait déjà reçu des 
aides d État considérables et que 
même avec les aides prévues dans 
le projet de concentration, à 
savoir 1 044 millions de DM, il 
n'était pas probable qu'elle 
pouvait devenir viable. 
Or, bien que la Cour n'ait pas fait, 
du moins formellement, de 
l'examen des possibilités de 
restructuration une condition 
d'application de la "failing 
company defence", l'on ne saurait 
exclure, compte tenu de l'analyse 
qu'elle a réalisée aux points 117 à 
120 de l'arrêt, que l'absence 
d'examen de cette question puisse 
s'avérer fatal dans une autre 
affaire. Par ailleurs, il semble 
logique de considérer que si 
l'entreprise défaillante a des 
chances de se restructurer, 
éventuellement après avoir 
obtenu des aides dÉtat 
compatibles avec le marché 
commun, il est préférable, du 
point de vue de la protection de la 
libre concurrence, d'interdire la 
concentration. Néanmoins, ces 
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possibilités de restructuration ne 
devraient pas être purement 
hypothétiques mais devraient être 
fondées, d'une part, et par 
analogie avec les règles en 
matière d'aides à la 
restructuration, sur la base d'un 
plan de restructuration crédible, 
et, d'autre part, sur l'existence 
d'une forte probabilité d'obtention 
des aides en question. 
En ce qui concerne la définition 
du marché géographique de 
référence, la Cour a suivi son 
approche traditionnelle en la 
matière. Ainsi, elle a mis l'accent 
sur l'existence d'un volume 
appréciable d'importations dans 
tous les États membres, à 
l'exception de l'Allemagne, en 
provenance d'autres États 
membres, sur l'homogénéité du 
produit et l'absence de 
préférences marquées du 
consommateur pour des 
spécialités qui ne sont disponibles 
qu'auprès des producteurs locaux, 
sur l'uniformité des prix dans tous 
les pays de la Communauté à 
l'exception de l'Allemagne et sur 
l'absence d'obstacles aux flux 
commerciaux à l'intérieur de la 
Communauté hormis l'Allemagne 
en termes de coûts de transport ou 
d'accès aux canaux de 
distribution. 
Pour ce qui est de l'applicabilité 
du règlement aux positions 
dominantes collectives la Cour a 
accepté l'interprétation de la 
Commission selon laquelle s'il 
était admis que seules les 
opérations de concentration qui 
créent ou renforcent une position 
dominante des parties à la 
concentration sont visées par ce 
règlement, la finalité de celui-ci 
telle que résultant de ses 
considérants serait partiellement 
mise en échec en le privant ainsi 
d'une partie non négligeable de 
son effet utile, sans que cela 
s'impose au regard de l'économie 
générale du régime 
communautaire de contrôle des 
opérations de concentration. 
En ce qui concerne la 
constatation de l'existence d'une 
position dominante collective 
dans le cas d'espèce la Cour 
commence son analyse en 
décrivant le type d'analyse et les 
éléments de base caractérisant 
l'existence d'une position 
dominante collective. 
D'après la Cour, s'agissant d'une 
prétendue position dominante 
collective, la Commission est 
tenue d'apprécier, selon une 
analyse prospective du marché 
de référence, si l'opération de 
concentration dont elle est saisie 
aboutit à une situation dans 
laquelle une concurrence 
effective dans le marché en cause 
est entravée de manière 
significative par les entreprises 
parties à la concentration et une 
ou plusieurs entreprises tierces 
qui ont, ensemble, notamment en 
raison des facteurs de 
corrélation existant entre elles, le 
pouvoir d'adopter une même 
ligne d'action sur le marché et 
d'agir dans une mesure 
appréciable indépendamment des 
autres concurrents, de leur 
clientèle et, finalement, des 
consommateur^. 
Cette référence à l'existence de facteurs 
de corrélation entre les membres de 
l'oligopole sembler indiquer que la Cour 
n'exclut pas, a priori, lapplication de la 
théorie de l'oligopole à des cas de 
Selon la Cour, une telle démarche 
nécessite un examen attentif 
notamment des circonstances qui, 
selon chaque cas d'espèce, se 
révèlent pertinentes aux fins de 
l'appréciation des effets de 
l'opération de concentration sur le 
jeu de la concurrence dans le 
marché de référence. 
En ce qui concerne le critère de la 
part de marché, la Cour constate 
qu'une part de marché totale 
d'environ 60 % répartie à 
concurrence de 23% pour 
K+S/MdK et de 37% pour SCPA 
ne saurait constituer par elle-
même un indice décisif de 
l'existence d'une position 
dominante collective desdites 
entreprises. 
En d'autres mots, en l'absence de 
symétrie entre les parts de marché 
des entreprises en cause, 
l'existence de parts de marché 
combinées assez élevées ne 
constitue pas un indice décisif de 
l'existence d'une position 
dominante collective. 
Quant aux liens structurels entre 
K+S et SCPA, dont l'existence a 
constitué le facteur essentiel sur 
lequel s'est fondée la Commission 
pour conclure à la création d'une 
position dominante collective, la 
Cour observe que la Commission 
n'a pas établi à suffisance de droit 
l'existence d'une relation causale 
entre l'appartenance de K+S et de 
SCPA au cartel à l'exportation et 
leur comportement anticon-
currentiel sur le marché en cause. 
La Cour exige donc que la 
Commission montre clairement 
concentration même en l'absence de lien 
structurels au sens strict du terme. 
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une relation causale entre le lien 
structurel et le comportement 
escompté des entreprises sur le 
marché. Il ne suffit donc pas de 
mentionner toute une série de 
liens structurels entre les 
membres de l'oligopole pour que 
la Cour accepte que ces liens sont 
de nature à éliminer leurs 
rapports de concurrence. 
Pour ce qui est des liens entre 
K+S et SCPA relatifs aux 
livraisons de K+S en France, la 
Cour relève que les seuls liens 
spécifiques de distribution 
existant entre ces deux entreprises 
portaient sur la kiesérite, c'est-à-
dire un produit ne relevant pas du 
marché du produit en cause, et 
que pour le reste, SCPA se 
limitait à acheter à K+S, aux 
conditions normales de marché, 
de la potasse utilisée par EMC ou 
destinée à la vente en dehors du 
marché français. La Cour 
constate donc que K+S et SCPA 
n'avaient aucun rapport privilégié 
pour la distribution de produits à 
base de potasse. 
La Cour en conclut que le 
faisceau de liens structurels 
unissant K+S et SCPA, qui, selon 
la décision constituait le coeur de 
la décision litigieuse, n'est pas 
aussi dense et probant que ne l'a 
voulu faire apparaître la 
Commission. 
Néanmoins, et malgré le fait que 
la Cour aurait pu terminer à ce 
stade ci son analyse de cette 
partie de la décision attaquée, 
étant donné que selon la décision 
elle-même en l'absence de liens 
structurels la concentration n'était 
pas de nature à créer une position 
dominante collective, elle 
examine également la question de 
savoir si l'argument sous-jacent à 
la constatation de la création 
d'une position dominante 
collective entre K+S/MdK et 
SCPA, selon lequel 
l'«importante» agrégation de 
MdK à la seule entreprise K+S 
maintiendra dans le chef du 
groupe allemand et SCPA un 
intérêt commun à ne pas 
s'engager dans une concurrence 
active l'un vis-à-vis de l'autre, est 
ou non suffisamment fondé. 
Or, bien que la Cour considère 
que, compte tenu des asymétries 
en termes de capacité de 
production ainsi qu'en termes de 
puissance économique entre K+S 
et MdK, d'une part, et SCPA, 
d'autre part, et du fait que, un 
marché en baisse, tel que celui de 
la potasse, est généralement 
considéré comme favorisant, en 
principe, la concurrence entre les 
entreprises du secteur concerné 
(points 235 à 239 de l'arrêt), 
l'existence de cet intérêt commun 
n'a pas, en l'absence d'autres 
éléments décisifs, été prouvé, 
cette démarche sembler confirmer 
que la Cour n'est pas hostile à 
l'idée que l'existence d'une 
position dominante collective 
puisse être démontrée même en 
l'absence de liens structurels entre 
les membres de lbligopole. 
En ce qui concerne l'accord entre 
K+S et SCPA interdit par la 
Commission en 1973, la Cour 
considère quii constitue, en 
raison du temps écoulé, un indice 
extrêmement faible, voire 
insignifiant pour faire présumer 
l'absence de concurrence entre 
K+S/MdK et SCPA. 
Enfin, s'agissant de l'analyse de la 
Commission relative au degré de 
pression concurrentielle pouvant 
être exercée par les concurrents 
sur le prétendu groupe formé par 
K+S/MdK et SCPA, la Cour 
constate que, contrairement à ce 
qui a été dit dans la décision 
attaquée, les possibilités de 
concurrence des producteurs 
établis dans la CEI et du 
producteur espagnol avaient été 
soit incorrectement évaluées soit 
sous-estimées. 
Dans ces conditions, la Cour a 
conclu que la Commission n'est 
pas parvenue à démontrer 
l'absence d'un contrepoids 
concurrentiel effectif à l'égard du 
prétendu groupe formé par 
K+S/MdK et SCPA. 
En ce qui concerne la portée de 
l'arrêt d'annulation la Cour a 
considéré qu'une annulation 
limitée à la partie du dispositif de 
la décision litigieuse qui porte sur 
les conditions et obligations 
énoncées à son point 63 n'était 
pas possible sans que la substance 
de cette dernière soit modifiée. 
En effet, selon la Cour lesdites 
conditions forment, avec la 
déclaration de compatibilité 
contenue dans le dispositif, une 
unité indissociable. La Cour a 
donc annulé la totalité du 
dispositif de la décision litigieuse. 
Ceci signifie qu'en principe la 
Commission serait libre, à l'issue 
de l'examen de l'opération de 
concentration telle que notifiée 
prévu à l'article 10, paragraphe 5 
du règlement sur les 
concentrations, soit de la déclarer 
compatible, avec ou sans 
conditions, avec le marché 
commun soit de l'interdire si. 
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compte tenu des conditions du 
marché présentes au moment de 
la reprise de la procédure, cela 
s'avère nécessaire. 
En conclusion, l'arrêt de la Cour a 
été globalement favorable à la 
Commission. En effet, sur le plan 
des principes, la Cour a accepté 
l'interprétation du règlement 
proposée par la Commission 
concernant tant son applicabilité à 
la création ou au renforcement 
d'une position dominante 
collective que la théorie de la 
société défaillante. Elle a été 
aussi sensible aux difficultés 
administratives découlant des 
délais rigoureux imposés par le 
règlement dans son examen des 
critiques formulées par le 
gouvernement français à l'égard 
de la mise en oeuvre du devoir de 
collaboration étroite et constante 
avec les autorités nationales 
chargées des questions de 
concurrence. Quant à l'analyse au 
fond, elle a accepté la définition 
du marché proposée dans la 
décision. S'agissant de 
l'application de la théorie de 
l'oligopole aux faits de l'espèce, 
elle n'a pas remis en cause les 
critères de base proposés par la 
Commission mais plutôt l'examen 
des faits lui servant de soutien 
nécessaire. Elle s'est donc bornée 
à rappeler les obligations qui 
incombent à la Commission en 
matière d'instruction d'affaires de 
concurrence tout en mettant 
l'accent sur les difficultés 
découlant de l'analyse prospective 
qui caractérise l'examen préventif 
des opérations de concentration. 
Enfin, en annulant la totalité du 
dispositif de la décision, elle a fait 
preuve de son respect pour une 
allocation correcte de tâches entre 
les institutions. 
Comment on the Judgment of the Court of 2 
April 1998, Case C-367/95 P: Commission oi 
the European Communities and French 
Republic v Chambre syndicale nationale 
des entreprises de transport de fonds et 
valeurs (Sytraval) and Brinks France SARL 
Ansgar HELD, DG IV-G-1 
1. The Background 
With judgment of 28 
September 1995 the Court of 
First Instance (CFI) annulled 
a Commission decision to 
reject the applicant's request 
to declare that the French 
Government has infringed Art 
92 and 93 of the Treaty by 
granting aid to Sécuripost. On 
2 April 1998 the European 
Court of Justice (ECJ) 
rejected an appeal of the 
Commission against this 
judgment. 
a. The Facts 
In 1987 the French Post Office 
entrusted to its newly created 
subsidiary company Sécuripost 
SA the transportation of money 
and valuables, which it had 
previously carried on itself. The 
applicants are operating in the 
same market. In September 1989 
they filed a request asking the 
Commission to declare, that 
several aspects in the relation 
between the Post Office and 
Sécuripost constituted state aid 
and would be in violation of Art 
92 and 93 of the Treaty. These 
circumstances namely regarded 
• Leasing of buildings to 
Sécuripost 
• Maintenance of Sécuripost's 
vehicles 
• A loan of 15 000 000 FF 
• The prices paid by the Post 
Office for the transport 
services 
• The secondment of 
administrative staff of the 
Post Office to Sécuripost 
with the possibility to 
reassign the officials in case 
of staff reduction, saving 
Sécuripost the costs for 
redundancy compensation 
• The consequent absence of 
contributions by Sécuripost 
to unemployment insurance 
funds. 
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In January 1993 the Commission 
informed the applicants that it 
had entered the measures 
mentioned above in the register 
of non notified aids. On 31 
December 1993 the Commission 
informed the French government 
that it has decided to close the 
investigation because the 
contested circumstances did not 
constitute state aid. On that 
same day it sent a letter to the 
applicants, responding to their 
arguments and informing them 
about its decision. 
b. Decision of the Court of 
First Instance 
On 2 March 1994 the applicants 
filed an action against this 
decision at the CFI. The Court 
admitted the action, considering 
the letter of the Commission of 
31 December to the applicants as 
a decision within the meaning of 
Art 189(4). The Court annulled 
the Commission decision for 
lack of sufficient statement of 
reasons, constituting an 
infringement of Art 190 of the 
Treaty. It held that the reasons 
stated for the decision do not 
bear out the conclusion that the 
measures complained of by the 
applicants did not constitute state 
aid within the meaning of Art 
92. 
The Court maintained that the 
Commission, if the complainant 
was not able to comment on 
information obtained in the 
context of the investigation, is 
under an 'automatic" obligation 
to examine any objection the 
complainant would have raised if 
it had been given the opportunity 
to comment on this information. 
More alarming for Commission 
services sounded the opinion of 
the Court that the obligation to 
state reasons for its decision may 
in some circumstances require an 
exchange of views and 
arguments with the complainant. 
It found this necessary for the 
Commission in order to ascertain 
what view the complainant takes 
of the information gathered by it 
in the course of its inquiry. 
The Court, consequently, did not 
any more address the issue 
whether the treatment of 
Sécuripost by the Post Office 
constituted state aid or not. 
2. The Decision of the Court of 
Justice 
On appeal of the Commission 
the ECJ upheld the decision of 
the prior instance, at least in the 
result. 
a. Addressee of the 
Commission Decision 
The ECJ agreed with the 
Commission's view that the 
complainants were not the 
addressees of the Commission 
decision. It underlined that any 
decision adopted by the 
Commission in the area of state 
aids is only addressed to the 
Member States concerned. This 
applies also if the decision 
concerns complaints from 
private persons against state 
measures, which they consider to 
be state aid. If the Commission 
takes such a decision and 
informs the complainant as a 
measure of good administration, 
it still is the decision addressed 
to the Member State which has 
to be the subject of an action of a 
third party and not the letter 
informing this party about the 
decision. 
This legal error, however, did 
not affect the Court's decision. 
The Commission could 
nevertheless be challenged in the 
Court by private enterprises for 
its conclusions in the matter 
since the complainants, as 
competitors of Sécuripost, are in 
any case directly and 
individually affected by the 
decision (Art 173(4)). They must 
have the possibility to contest 
the decision not to open the Art 
93(2) procedure. 
b. Violation of Art 190 
The ECJ underlined that it is the 
Commissions obligation, 
pursuant to Art 190, to explain to 
a complainant in a sufficiently 
clear way, for what reasons the 
factual or legal elements of the 
complaint were not sufficient to 
suggest the existence of state aid. 
This obligation, however, the 
Court underlined, does not 
include a duty of the 
Commission to enter into a 
debate with the complainant. 
That would clearly overstate the 
procedural obligations within the 
preliminary proceeding before 
the opening of the procedure 
according to Art 93(2). 
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Such an obligation would indeed 
gravely impede the efficient 
work of the responsible 
Commission services and be 
contradictory to the 
Commission's duty to conclude 
the preliminary phase of the 
procedure without delay. In this 
stage therefore it cannot be 
concluded from the obligation to 
give a motivation for decisions 
that hearings with affected 
parties are held. 
There is furthermore, the Court 
stated, no obligation for the 
Commission to put itself ex 
officio in the place of the 
complainant and to examine any 
possible comment he could have 
made to facts and observations 
that came up during the 
investigation. 
Nevertheless the Court upheld 
the finding of the first instance 
that the decision of the 
Commission was not sufficiently 
motivated. In its view the 
Commission failed to give 
reasons why it did not consider 
as state aid the secondment of 
Post Office staff to Sécuripost, 
with the possibility to return it to 
the Post Office, and the saving 
of unemployment fund 
contributions by the said 
company. 
Concerning the other complaints 
mentioned above the ECJ 
admitted that the CFI had 
confounded the violation of the 
procedural obligation of Art 190 
and the legality of the decision. 
While the former constituted an 
infringement of an essential 
procedural requirement in the 
sense of Art 173, the latter 
would be a question of the 
infringement of the Treaty or a 
rule of law relating to its 
application and could only be 
assessed by the court if invoked 
by the applicant. In fact the CFI 
had concluded that the 
Commission had not sufficiently 
assessed and examined the 
relevant facts and erroneously 
considered this as lack of 
motivation. 
The ECJ did, however, not 
assess the findings of the first 
instance with regard to the 
possible manifest error of 
appreciation. It did also not 
address the question whether the 
applicants have invoked these 
issues of law. It contented itself 
with the* statement that the 
attacked decision suffers in any 
case from a lack of motivation. 
This would in itself be perfectly 
sufficient to justify its annulment 
and consequently the rejection of 
the Commission's appeal. 
c. Consequences 
The wrong assessment of several 
parts of the Commission 
decision therefore did not lead to 
a revision of the court ruling. 
The ECJ confirmed the 
annulment of the entire decision. 
It had, indeed, no other choice. If 
only a part of the decision is not 
sufficiently motivated, this 
affects the essential of the whole 
decision to open an Art 93(2) 
procedure or not. Any further 
assessment as to the compliance 
of other parts of the decision 
with Community law was 
unnecessary. 
The Commission has to take the 
decision in question anew. In 
fact it has already decided to 
open the Art 93(2) procedure in 
1996, after the ruling of the CFI. 
Any decision closing this 
procedure needs, of course, to 
meet at least the same procedural 
standards as the challenged 
decision, if not even more, given 
that the procedure in question 
was just a preliminary one. 
3. Conclusion 
The judgment confirmed but did 
not widen the procedural 
position of private complainants 
in an Art 93 proceeding. The 
Commission will have to take 
the new decision in respect of all 
6 points raised by the applicants. 
Apart from the necessity to 
motivate all parts of the new 
decision, it will certainly be 
helpful to consider the remarks 
the CFI has made with respect to 
a manifest error of appreciation. 
In any case it is to be welcomed 
in the interest of administrative 
efficiency that the ECJ denied 
the existence of an obligation for 
the Commission to enter into 
controversial debates with 
complainants in the course of the 
preliminary proceeding of Art 
93(3). It can be questioned, of 
course, if it wouldnt have been 
appropriate to open the Art 93(2) 
procedure in a case where the 
'preliminary" phase already 
lasted more than 4 years. 
44 Competition Policy Newsletter ***** if it 
it it 
** ** 
* < r * 
C ^ = 1998 Number 2 June 
ANTI-TRUST RULES 
Application of Articles 85 & 86 EC and 65 ECSC 
Main developments between Is' January and 30"' April 
Recent Developments 
Commission Notice on the Application 
of the Competition Rules to Access 
Agreements in the 
Telecommunications Sector 
Kevin COATES, DG IV-C-1 
Background 
On 31 March 1998, the 
Commission adopted a Notice on 
the Application of the 
Competition Rules to Access 
Agreements in the 
Telecommunications Sector (the 
Access Notice). 
The purpose of the Access 
Notice is three-fold 
• To set out access principles 
stemming from EU 
competition law as shown in a 
large number of Commission 
decisions in order to create 
greater market certainty and 
more stable conditions for 
investment and commercial 
initiative in the télécoms and 
multimedia sectors; 
• To define and clarify the 
relationship between 
competition law and sector 
specific legislation under the 
Article 100A framework (in 
particular this relates to the 
relationship between 
competition rules and Open 
Network Provision 
legislation); 
• To explain how competition 
rules will be applied in a 
consistent way across the 
sectors involved in the 
provision of new services, and 
in particular to access issues 
and gateways in this context. 
It is hoped that the Notice will be 
of assistance not only to operators 
in the sector, but also to national 
courts, competition authorities, 
and, particularly, regulatory 
authorities, the latter being 
obliged by Community law to 
take account of Community 
competition law provisions in 
their implementation of the 
regulatory framework. 
The Notice is not a formal legal 
text, but is an expression of the 
Commission's view as to the 
best interpretation of 
Community competition law as 
it applies to the most important 
issues in the telecommunications 
sector. The Commission will 
follow the approach set out in 
the Access Notice not only in 
cases pending before it, but also 
in the context of any comments 
it may make on cases pending 
before the Court of Justice or 
Court of First Instance. The 
Commission will also apply the 
principles set out in the Notice in 
the context of any requests from 
national courts or authorities for 
guidance on the application of 
the competition rules. 
Procedural Issues 
The first section of the Notice 
examines various procedural 
issues of particular relevance to 
the telecommunications sector. 
Community law has established 
a sector specific regulatory 
regime for the 
telecommunications sector, 
responsibility for which is 
largely in the hands of national 
regulatory authorities (NRAs) 
established in each Member 
State. 
There are large areas of overlap 
between the responsibilities of 
these NRAs, and the 
responsibility of the Commission 
and of national competition 
authorities to apply Community 
competition rules. Given this 
overlap the Commission has 
sought to provide guidance as to 
when it will be appropriate for 
the Commission to act in a 
particular case. 
There is no change in cases 
which must be notified under 
Regulation 17 in order to benefit 
from an exemption. Similarly, 
cases which fall under the 
Merger Regulation are 
unaffected by the Notice. 
In cases where it is not necessary 
to notify to the Commission and 
which fall within the jurisdiction 
of the NRAs, the Commission 
would encourage applicants to 
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approach the NRAs in the first 
instance, approaching the 
Commission only if the applicant 
feels that its rights under 
Community competition law 
have not been respected. The 
Commission is encouraging this 
decentralised approach given the 
more detailed and specific 
powers given to NRAs. 
However, applicants continue to 
have rights under Community 
competition law and the 
Commission must intervene 
where there is no other 
appropriate means of protecting 
those rights. The Notice 
therefore sets out the criteria 
where the Commission will 
intervene. 
Market Definition 
The Commission has approved a 
Notice on Market Definition, 
and Notices such as the Access 
Notice will simply refer to the 
more general Notice on Market 
Definition, with further 
explanation being limited only to 
points of particular importance 
to the subject in question. 
The Access Notice therefore sets 
out in general terms the 
distinction between the provision 
of services, and the provision of 
access to the facilities necessary 
to provide those services to end-
users. The distinction is 
important to bear in mind, as 
historically télécoms operators 
are vertically integrated and 
would not necessarily have 




The section on Article 86 is 
probably the most important 
aspect of the Notice. It sets out a 
number of practices which could 
constitute abuses where 
operators are either solely or 
jointly dominant. 
In relation to refusals to grant 
access to facilities, this could 
constitute an abuse on the basis 
of a number of different legal 
arguments: 
• essential facilities: if the 
facility is essential to the 
business of the requesting 
party; 
• discrimination: if the facility 
is refused to the requesting 
party, but is made available to 
its competitors; 
• bundling: if the requesting 
party is offered access to the 
facility only in combination 
with other elements which the 
requesting party does not 
require. 
The Notice also looks at some 
detail at various pricing 
problems: 
• excessive pricing: if the price 
charged for a good or service 
is unrelated to the costs of 
provision. In determining 
this the Commission can have 
regard to the actual costs of 
provision, the price charged 
by the operator for 
comparable goods or 
services, the price charged in 
other geographic areas, or the 
price which would prevail in 
a competitive market 
(building on the work of the 
Commission and national 
regulatory authorities in this 
area). 
• discriminatory pricing: if an 
operator charges different 
prices for equivalent 
transactions, where such 
discrimination could have an 
effect on competition. One 
example of this would be if a 
dominant télécoms operator 
charged different prices for 
call termination depending on 
whether the call originated on 
a fixed or a mobile network. 
• predatory pricing: if an 
operator charges a price for a 
good or service below which 
it could only make a profit by 
weakening or eliminating one 
or more competitors Again, 
drawing on the work of the 
Commission and the national 
regulatory authorities, this 
determination would tend to 
be based on costs which are 
incremental to the provision of 
the service, over a period of 
longer than one year. 
Article 85 
The Notice also looks briefly at 
Article 85 issues: in the current 
development of the 
telecommunications sector, there 
is relatively little concern about 
the possible anti-competitive 
implications of interconnection 
agreements. Concerns related to 
market partitioning may develop 
over time, however, and this is 
an area which the Commission 
will keep under careful review. 
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Conclusions and Review 
The Commission has indicated 
that the Notice will be kept 
under general review in light of 
technical and economic 
developments in the market, and 
particularly in light of the 
implications of the convergence 
of the telecommunications, 
media and information 
technology industries. 
The principles set out in the 
Notice do, however, apply to 
other sectors to the extent that 
comparable problems emerge, 
and it is anticipated that the 
Access Notice will be a useful 
reference for competition 
problems in areas other than 
traditional telecommunications. 
Recent important decisions 
EACEM scheme to reduce stand by 
power use of TVs and VCRs receives a 
comfort letter because of its 
environmental benefits 
John FINNEGAN, DG IV-C-3 
The European association of 
consumer electronics manufac-
turers (EACEM) and sixteen of 
its members, all major 
manufacturers of televisions and 
video recorders, made a 
voluntary commitment to reduce 
the electricity consumption of 
televisions and video recorders 
when they are in "stand by" 
mode. Although such an 
agreement between competing 
manufacturers to act in parallel 
can be seen as a restriction of 
competition in breach of Article 
85(1) of the Treaty, the 
environmental benefits of the 
scheme, the fact that these 
benefits will be shared with 
consumers and the fact that the 
scheme will not eliminate 
competition in the sector mean 
that the scheme meets the 
conditions for the grant of an 
exemption under Article 85(3) of 
the Treaty. The scheme was 
devised in consultation with the 
staff of DG XVII - Energy of the 
Commission. The reduction in 
power use could result in total 
European electricity use being 
3,2 TWh lower each year than it 
would otherwise have been by 
2005. This energy saving will 
have significant environmental 
benefits, reducing C02 
emission, resource use and 
global warming. 
The vast majority of televisions 
and video cassette recorders in 
use are operated using a remote 
control, and are typically turned 
off using a remote control rather 
than disconnected totally from 
their power supply. Turning a 
television or video cassette 
recorder off using a remote 
control switches it to a stand by 
mode where it continues to 
consume electricity at a rate that 
can exceed 10W. The consumer 
electronics industry was aware 
that televisions and video 
cassette recorders are typically 
left in this stand by mode for 
long periods of time and that 
their design could be improved 
to reduce this stand by power 
use. A report prepared for DG 
XVII - Energy of the 
Commission quantified this 
power use, and estimated the 
savings that would result from 
reducing it. The key result of this 
research was that simply by 
reducing average stand by power 
use to 6W, total power use could 
be reduced by 3,2 TWh per year 
by 2005, and by 4,9 TWh per 
year by 2010. The maximum 
cost per unit of reducing the 
stand by power use of a 
television or video cassette 
recorder was estimated as 3 
ECU. 
No individual firm in the 
industry felt able to introduce 
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lower power use in their 
products. Margins are low in the 
industry and the firms feared that 
consumers would not be 
prepared to pay for the cost of 
the power savings, despite the 
fact that they would save money 
in the long term. The consumer 
electronics industry therefore 
devised the voluntary scheme in 
consultation with the services of 
the Commission. The manufac-
turers who entered the scheme, 
and membership is open to 
additional firms, have 
undertaken to meet certain 
targets on power use. The 
European Association of 
Consumer Electronics Manufac-
tures (EACEM) has undertaken 
to monitor the operation of the 
scheme and to report regularly to 
the Commission on its progress. 
In order to avoid any exchange 
of confidential information 
between the member firms, 
which could have a negative 
effect on competition, EACEM 
has engaged an independent 
consultant who will gather 
information from the firms as to 
their sales and the power use of 
units sold, and simply report the 
names of manufacturers not 
meeting their commitment. 
Under the scheme the 
manufacturers have undertaken 
that, by 1 January 2000, the TVs 
and VCRs that they sell will 
consume no more than 10 W of 
power when in standby mode 
and that the average power 
consumption of all TVs and 
VCRs that they sell will be no 
more than 6 W in stand by mode. 
Such an agreement to act in a co-
ordinated way is a restriction of 
competition, and falls under the 
prohibition of Article 85(1) of 
the EC Treaty. However Article 
85(3) provides that the 
Commission can exempt an 
agreement from this provision 
where it meets certain 
conditions. These conditions are 
that the agreement contributes to 
technical and economic progress, 
that its benefits be shared with 
consumers, that competition not 
be eliminated in the sector and 
that the restrictions of 
competition are indispensable to 
achieving the benefits of the 
agreement. The energy saving 
and environmental benefits of 
this scheme clearly represent 
technical and economic progress, 
and by their nature are passed on 
to consumers. The Commission 
was also satisfied that 
competition would not be 
eliminated in the affected 
markets and that the restrictive 
effect of the scheme was 
essential to achieving its full 
benefits. 
(see also the Commission's press 
release : IP/98/346) 
Commission clears the IFCO 
packaging system 
Dieter BIRKENMAI ER and Sari SUURN'KKI, DG IV-E-1 
On 20 May 1998 the 
Commission declared the 
Articles 85(1) and 86 of the EC 
Treaty to be inapplicable to the 
German IFCO packaging system 
(International Fruit Container 
Organization). This system is a 
multi-transport way of packing 
fruit and vegetable, based on the 
use of standardised, collapsible 
and reusable plastic crates. The 
boxes are produced by 
subsidiaries of the firm Schoeller 
Plast Holding GmbH, 
Düsseldorf, and used for the 
transport of goods between 
producers, grocers and shops by 
twelve big German food trading 
companies. The crates had been 
introduced at the end of 1992, 
when the trading chains declared 
to their suppliers that they would 
prefer goods to be packed in 
plastic crates. 
Following complaints introduced 
by some trade associations, 
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traders and fruit producers, the 
Commission examined the IFCO 
system under the competition 
rules of the EC Treaty. In the 
course of the procedure, the 
Commission demanded 
substantial modifications to the 
system. Accordingly, the 
obligatory use and other aspects 
of the system such as to fix 
model contracts, lump sum 
payments to IFCO, an arbitration 
system for users and an 
obligation for the food traders to 
exchange detailed information 
about trade flows, were 
abolished. The Commission 
informed the public about these 
modifications by a press release 
of 3 June 1993 and in letters to 
food traders. 
In its juridical analysis the 
Commission defined the relevant 
product market as being the 
market for packaging intended 
or suitable for transportation of 
fresh fruit and vegetables, 
irrespective of the material used 
(plastic, wood or carton). In 
fact, price and cost differences 
for these materials are existing, 
but not important enough so as 
to assume different markets. 
Nor should, at present, a 
distinction be made - in the 
absence of a clear preference 
established by national or 
European environmental 
legislation on packaging and 
packaging waste - between 
reusable (multi-trip) or 
recyclable and recoverable 
materials. 
Regarding the relevant 
geographical market for IFCO 
crates, the Commission held that 
it is rapidly becoming EU-wide, 
even if the stronghold of the 
system is still Germany. 
Analysing a potential prevention 
or restriction of competition 
caught by Article 85(1), the 
Commission concluded that the 
IFCO system does not violate 
the Treaty, taking into account 
the modifications introduced to 
the system during the procedure. 
The Commission based its 
argumentation on the fact that 
the use of crates is organised 
unilaterally by IFCO/Schoeller, 
which lend their products on the 
base of bilateral contracts to 
users. These contracts are partly 
based on standard general terms, 
partly on individually negotiated 
stipulations. The IFCO system 
is therefore a market-based 
service in direct competition 
with other packaging systems 
e.g. those based on plastic, wood 
or cartonboard. 
The Commission had also to 
examine the compatibility of the 
IFCO system with Article 86 of 
the EC Treaty. According to the 
results of an inquiry into the use 
of crates by German foodtraders 
done in March 1997, the traders 
participating in IFCO have a 
market share for fruit and 
vegetable of around 47%. About 
23% of their trade in the relevant 
goods is packed in IFCO crates, 
corresponding to 13% of 
German sales. Consequently, 
the Commission concluded that 
the IFCO system does not have a 
dominant position on the 
German market for fruit and 
vegetable packing. The relevant 
market share is considerably 
below the percentage normally 
necessary for assuming a 
dominant position; a collective 
dominance could be excluded, as 
competition among the IFCO 
users and with other companies 
active in the German food 
trading sector is vivid. 
On the basis of the above 
considerations, the complaints 
against the IFCO-system have 
been rejected. 
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La Commission condamne un cartel 
de prix entre des producteurs dacier 
inoxydable 
CØline GAUER, DG IV-E-1 
Le 21 janvier 1998', la 
Commission a adopté une 
décision d'interdiction assortie 
d'amende à rencontre de 6 
producteurs de produits plats en 
acier inoxydable représentant 
plus de 80% de la production 
européenne de produits finis en 
acier inoxydable. 
Les entreprises s'étaient réunies 
en décembre 1993 à Madrid et 
avaient convenu dbne hausse 
identique et simultanée des prix 
de l'acier inoxydable. Cette 
augmentation a été obtenue par 
la modification concertée de la 
formule de calcul de l'extra 
alliage, supplément de prix 
fonction du cours des éléments 
d'alliage utilisés dans l'acier 
inoxydable. 
La Commission a décidé que cet 
accord de prix constituait une 
infraction grave à l'article 65 du 
traité CECA et a infligé aux 
entreprises des amendes dbn 
montant total de 27,3 millions 
d'écus. 
Cette décision est la deuxième 
décision d'interdiction au titre de 
l'article 65 CECA en l'espace de 
quelques moté. Elle s'inscrit, 
' JO L100 du 1.04.1998 p.55 
La première a été adoptée le 26 
novembre 1997 dans l'affaire 
"Wirtschaftsvereinigung Stahl" et 
concernait un accord déchange 
comme déjà la décision 
"Poutrelles"1 en 1994, dans le 
cadre de la lutte contre les 
ententes illégales dans le secteur 
sidérurgique. 
Dans cette décision, la 
Commission a pour la première 
fois fait application des lignes 
directrices pour le calcul des 
amendes4 et de la communication 
de la Commission concernant la 
non­imposition d'amendes ou la 
réduction de leur montant dans 
les affaires portant sur des 
ententes*. 
Les amendes ont donc été 
calculées à partir dbn montant 
en valeur absolue déterminé en 
fonction de la gravité de 
l'infraction pondérée par la 
durée de participation de 
chacune des entreprises. Ce 
montant de base a été majoré et 
minoré pour tenir compte des 
circonstances aggravantes et 
atténuantes propres à chacune 
des entreprises. Il a enfin été fait 
application de la communication 
sur la non­imposition d'amendes 
précitée. 
La rédaction de la décision 
(paragraphe 73 et suivants) 
dlnformations (JO Ll du 3.01.1998 
p. 10) 
JOLl lödu 6.5.1994, p.l 
JOC9du 14.01.1998 p.3 
JOC207du 18.07.1996 p.4 
montre comment l'objectif de 
transparence des lignes 
directrices peut être atteint. En 
effet, dans une affaire impliquant 
plusieurs entreprises, il est 
possible à chacune d'entre elle 
de connaître à la lecture de la 
décision l'appréciation sur les 
différents paramètres 
déterminant l'amende pour tous 
les auteurs de l'infraction. La 
motivation de chacun des 
paramètres de calcul est très 
détaillée. 
Ceci est particulièrement 
important pour la coopération 
des entreprises. En l'espèce, 
toutes les entreprises ont invoqué 
la communication sur la 
coopération mais seules deux 
d'entre elles ont véritablement 
coopéré en mettant fin à 
l'infraction pour lbne et en 
apportant des informations 
importantes à la Commission au 
cours de l'instruction pour 
l'autre. Grace au détail du calcul 
présenté dans la décision 
publiée, les entreprises ont été en 
mesure d'apprécier la différence 
de traitement effectuée par la 
Commission entre celles qui 
coopèrent réellement et celles 
qui se limitent à une déclaration 
dîntention. 
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The old entrepreneur standard UK 
pub leases 
By Dirk VAN ERPS, DG IV-F-3 
By Decisions of 5 March and 14 
April 1998', the Commission has 
rejected the last two complaints 
concerning the "old" standard 
UK pub leases used by 
Inntrepreneur. 
The Commission rejected the 
complaints because there was no 
longer a Community interest to 
deal with these cases following 
the withdrawal by Inntrepreneur 
of the notification of these "old" 
standard leases. 
By withdrawing the notification, 
the question of whether Article 
85(1) applies can be decided by 
the UK courts. Unlike the 
Commission, the national judge 
could, if he found Article 85(1) 
to apply, also determine the civil 
law effects following from the 
prohibition set out in Article 
85(2). 
If the Commission had continued 
with the case, this would have 
lead to a duplication of 
procedures, which is not in the 
Community interest. 
Furthermore, the Commission 
has pointed out in the Decisions 
that the national judges could 
take some indirect guidance on 
the application of Article 85 
from published communications 
pursuant to Article 19(3) of 
Regulation No 17, indicating the 
Commission's intention to 
exempt the 'hew" Inntrepreneur 
pub leases (see footnote 2). 
Both published on DG IV's Internet site 
(Antitrust - Cases - Cases closed by 
Formal Decision 85Æ6 1998 - pick 
"NAIL" and "AIL"). 
With the reference to "old", the 
Commission refers to the standard leases 
entered into by Inntrepreneur with its 
lessees since 1989 that do not 
incorporate a discount scheme 
introduced by Inntrepreneur in February-
March 1997. Leases that do incorporate 
this scheme are called the "new" leases. 
For these "new" leases, notifications are 
still pending and the Commission has 
published "exemption" 19(3) notices for 
the Inntrepreneur (OJ C 374, 
10.12.1997) and Spring (OJ C 61, 
26.2.1998) estate covering the period up 
to 28 March 1998 and a "negative 
clearance" 19(3) notice for thereafter (OJ 
C 133, 30.4.1998). These notices are also 
available on DG IV's Internet site. 
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The Commission adopts a Decision 
against Unilever concerning freezer 
cabinet exclusivity in the Irish ice 
cream market 
By Stephen RYAN, DG IV-F-3 
On 11 March 1998, the 
Commission adopted a Decision 
condemning Unileverb practice 
of 'freezer exclusivity" in 
Ireland, with a view to 
facilitating access by other 
suppliers to the 'impulse" ice 
cream market. A Unilever 
subsidiary, Van den Bergh 
Foods Limited, is the leading 
supplier of ice cream in Ireland, 
with a market share in excess of 
85%. The company has an 
extensive network of freezer 
cabinets which are put at the 
disposal of retailers, with no 
direct charge but subject to the 
condition that the cabinets are to 
be used exclusively for the 
storage of Unilever's products. 
The Commission has found that, 
in the circumstances of the Irish 
market, this provision of 
cabinets on exclusive terms 
results in many of the recipient 
outlets only being in a position 
to offer for sale the ice cream 
products of Unilever. Market 
research relied on by the 
Commission demonstrates that 
retailers are very unlikely either 
to replace incumbent cabinets, in 
particular those installed by 
Unilever, or to install additional 
ones, particularly alongside 
Unilever cabinets. Unilever's 
competitors are consequently 
denied access to these outlets, 
with the result that their products 
are not offered for sale from a 
very substantial proportion of 
retail outlets in Ireland. 
TheCommission therefore found 
that the exclusivity condition, as 
applied in relation to outlets 
whose only ice cream cabinets 
have been provided by Unilever, 
infringes Article 85 of the EC 
Treaty. The Commission has 
moreover found that Unilever is 
abusing its position of market 
dominance in Ireland, contrary 
to Article 86 of the EC Treaty, 
by inducing retailers to enter into 
exclusive arrangements of this 
sort. 
The case originated with a 
complaint made by Mars in 1991. 
In the light of objections first 
made by the Commission in 1993, 
Unilever had made a number of 
modifications to its distribution 
arrangements. In particular, a 
scheme allowing retailers to hire 
purchase freezer cabinets from 
Unilever was introduced in 1995 
as an optional alternative to the 
traditional method of cabinet 
provision. It was expected that 
these changes would be likely to 
render Unilevers distribution 
arrangements compatible with the 
competition rules by facilitating 
an evolution toward wider freezer 
cabinet ownership by retailers. 
This would have enabled retail 
outlets to offer for sale the 
products of any supplier, thereby 
contributing to a real opening up 
of the Irish impulse ice cream 
market. The changes did not 
however succeed in bringing 
about such an evolution, a failure 
confirmed by a comprehensive 
market survey carried out on 
behalf of the Commission in the 
summer of 1996, and a new set 
of objections was accordingly 
put to Unilever in 1997. 
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Affaire IV/35.733 - Volkswagen 
Ulrich KRAUSE-HEIBER, DG IV-F-2 
Décision de la Commission du 
28 janvier 19981 
La Commission a infligé une 
amende dbn montant de 102 
millions dEcus à l'entreprise 
Volkswagen AG - le principal 
groupe de constructeurs 
automobiles européen - pour 
avoir systématiquement forcé ses 
concessionnaires italiens à 
refuser de vendre des 
automobiles de la marque 
Volkswagen et Audi à des clients 
étrangers, notamment allemands 
et autrichiens. Depuis 1995, de 
nombreux consommateurs se 
sont plaints à la Commission des 
difficultés quîls rencontraient 
pour l'achat de voitures neuves 
en Italie. Dans sa décision, la 
Commission conclut que 
Volkswagen AG, sa filiale 
italienne Autogerma S.p.A. ainsi 
que sa filiale Audi AG se sont 
entendus avec leurs 
concessionnaires italiens sur une 
stratégie visant à empêcher et/ou 
limiter substantiellement le 
commerce en provenance dltalie 
et à destination des autres Etats 
membres, en particulier 
l'Autriche et l'Allemagne. 
voir IP/98/94 du 28.1.1998; le texte 
intégral de la décision se trouve au JO L 
124 du 25.4.1998, p.60. 
Volkswagen disposait de trois 
mois pour acquitter l'amende et 
devait, en outre, dans un délai de 
deux mois, prendre toutes les 
dispositions imposées par la 
Commission afin d'éliminer ces 
diverses pratiques. 
La décision de la Commission 
est l'aboutissement dbne 
procédure entamée à la suite de 
nombreuses réclamations 
introduites par des 
consommateurs sur les 
difficultés d'acheter en Italie des 
voitures neuves de marque 
Volkswagen et Audi. 
En octobre 1995, la Commission 
a effectué des inspections dans 
les locaux de Volkswagen AG à 
Wolfsburg, de Audi AG à 
Ingolstadt et de Autogerma 
S.p.A. à Vérone (filiale à 100 % 
de Volkswagen et l'importateur 
officiel des deux marques pour 
lltalie) et auprès dbn certain 
nombre de concessionnaires 
VAG dans le nord de lltalie. 
Les documents découverts lors 
de ces inspections ont apporté la 
preuve évidente de la politique 
de cloisonnement des marchés 
mise en place par Volkswagen, 
Audi et Autogerma. 
La Commission établit dans sa 
décision que la conduite de 
Volkswagen menace le 
fonctionnement normal du 
Marché Unique et constitue une 
très grave infraction aux règles 
du droit communautaire de la 
concurrence. 
Pour fixer l'amende, la 
Commission a tenu compte de la 
durée de lînfraction - plus de 
dix ans - et entre autres, du fait 
que les sociétés membres du 
groupe Volkswagen ont exploité 
leur puissance économique vis-
à-vis de leurs réseaux de 
concessionnaires en Italie pour 
mettre en place les pratiques 
restrictives. En outre, la 
Commission a retenu comme 
facteur aggravant le fait que 
Volkswagen n'a pas réagi de 
manière appropriée aux 
injonctions de la Commission de 
mettre fin à cette infraction 
grave. 
L'importance de l'amende 
démontre la volonté de la 
Commission de ne pas tolérer de 
telles pratiques et d'agir avec la 
même rigueur vis-à-vis d'autres 
constructeurs qui entendent 
cloisonner le marché intérieur. 
Par date du 8.4.1998, l'entreprise 
a introduit son recours contre la 
décision et l'amende infligée 
auprès du Tribunal de Première 
Instance. 
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Parrainage et homologation darticles 
sportifs : le cas de la FØdØration 
danoise de tennis 
Franco GIUFFRIDA, DG IV-F-1 
1. A lîssue dbn e procédure 
déclenchée par la plainte 
dbn importateur parallèle 
danois de balles de tennis, 
la Commission, après avoir 
amené la Fédération 
danoise de tennis (FDT) 
d'abord à changer ses 
pratiques et ensuite à les 
notifier, a approuvé le 
système de parrainage 
mis en oeuvre par la 
Fédération. Au­delà du cas 
concret, cette approbation, 
sous la forme dbne lettre 
administrative de clas­
sement de type attestation 
négative, constitue un 
signal donné aux 
fédérations sportives natio­
nales et internationales et 
aux producteurs/distribu­
teurs de produits sportifs 
quant à certaines pratiques 
que la Commission 
considère comme compa­
tibles avec les articles 85 et 
86. 
2. Pour mieux comprendre la 
portée de cette première prise 
de position de la 
Commission, il convient de 
rappeler la situation telle 
qu'elle se présentait au 
moment de l'introduction de 
la plainte. Lîmportateur 
parallèle qui s'était d'abord 
adressé à l'Autorité danoise 
de la concurrence et ensuite, 
sur conseil de cette dernière, 
à la Commission, se plaignait 
dbne situation bloquée II ne 
pouvait pratiquement pas 
vendre au Danemark des 
balles achetées dans d'autres 
États membres à cause 
d'accords conclus entre la 
FDT et un certain nombre de 
producteurs/importateurs. 
Ces accords prévoyaient que 
dans tous les tournois 
organisés par la FDT, seules 
pouvaient être utilisées les 
balles des firmes ayant conclu 
un accord de parrainage avec 
la FDT et étant de ce fait 
autorisées à apposer sur les 
boîtes de leurs balles, le 
sticker "balle officielle de la 
FDT". Toute partie de tennis 
jouée avec des balles autres 
que celles vendues par les 
réseaux officiels des 
fournisseurs officiels était 
déclarée nulle. Les arbitres 
des compétitions organisées 
par la FDT étaient sous 
l'obligation de contrôler que 
les balles utilisées sortaient 
bien de boîtes munies de 
stickers. Dans ces conditions, 
un double effet de forclusion 
se manifestait : dans les 
tournois de la FDT, il n'était 
pas question dbtiliser des 
balles de marques autres que 
celles des fournisseurs 
officiels et, en plus, il était 
interdit dbtiliser des balles, 
même de ces marques, si 
celles­là provenaient du 
marché parallèle. Le 
plaignant faisait observer que 
l'effet de ces pratiques était 
de lui interdire pratiquement 
toute vente de balles, les 
joueurs préférant acheter 
même pour leurs parties en 
dehors des tournois, les balles 
des fournisseurs officiels de 
la FDT (effet "vitrine", ou en 
mots simples : "si ces 
producteurs sont les 
fournisseurs officiels de la 
FDT, cela signifie que leurs 
balles sont meilleures que les 
autres"). 
Les services de la 
Commission essayèrent de 
convaincre la FDT que ces 
pratiques contrevenaient aux 
articles 85 et 86 du Traité 
CEE. A la suite de l'envoi 
dbne lettre de mini­griefs et 
ensuite dbne communication 
de griefs, dans laquelle la 
FDT se voyait reprocher la 
violation tant de l'article 85 
(à cause de ses accords avec 
les fournisseurs officiels, 
destinataires eux aussi, dbne 
communication de griefs tant 
au niveau national 
qu'international ­coupe 
Davis­) que de l'article 86 
(abus de position dominante 
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sur le marché de 
l'organisation des tournois), 
la FDT préféra mettre fin aux 
pratiques incriminées. Elle 
notifia donc un nouveau 
système de parrainage qui se 
caractérisait essentiellement 
par les 3 aspects suivants : 
- mise sur pied dbn pool de 
sponsors, constitué après 
appel d'offres et portant 
sur une période dbne 
année; 
- renonciation à Ibtilisation 
de la dénomination 'balles 
officielles de la FDT", 
- libre utilisation des balles 
de marques composant le 
pool, indépendamment de 
l'achat par le biais des 
réseaux officiels, c'est-à-
dire, possibilité d'achats 
sur le marché parallèle. 
3. La Commission considérant 
que, sous cette forme, le 
contrat de parrainage ne 
soulevait plus les mêmes 
objections que les contrats 
précédents non notifiés, 
publia une communication 
art. 19§3 annonçant son 
intention de prendre une 
attitude favorable à son 
égard. 
4. Entre-temps, la FDT avait 
toutefois à nouveau changé 
de système. Il lui était en 
effet apparu que la mise en 
oeuvre du pool de sponsors 
provoquait des problèmes 
concrets de difficile solution 
et avait remplacé ce système 
par une troisième version de 
ses contrats de parrainage. 
Une deuxième notification 
intervint donc en 1995. 
L'élément qui distinguait les 
deux accords notifiés était les 
disparition du pool remplacé 
par le choix dbn seul sponsor 
qui aurait été lié à la FDT 
pour une période de 3 ans, 
sans toutefois pouvoir utiliser 
la mention 'balles officielles 
de la FDT" ni imposer 
Ibtilisation de balles vendues 
par le réseau officiel. 
5. Face à cette nouvelle donne, 
les services de la Commission 
furent obligés à apprécier si 
un contrat d'exclusivité qui 
donnait à une seule marque 
le droit de voir ses balles 
utilisées - à l'exclusion de 
toutes autres - pour une 
période de 3 ans, pouvait 
obtenir son accord. 
Si après discussions avec la 
FDT, qui accepta de réduire 
la durée du contrat de 3 à 2 
ans et de mettre sur pied un 
système structuré d'appel 
d'offres avec mention des 
critères employés pour le 
choix de la firme retenue, la 
Commission put enfin 
marquer son accord, cela est 
dû essentiellement aux 
considérations suivantes : 
a) Il est vrai que le caractère 
exclusif du contrat 
représente une restriction 
de concurrence, en ce 
qu'il limite la liberté 
contractuelle de la FDT de 
conclure avec d'autres 
producteurs/distributeurs 
ainsi que la liberté des 
tiers qui ne peuvent pas 
être choisis comme co-
contractants. Il est tout 
aussi vrai que le système 
initialement notifié dbn 
pool de sponsors pourrait 
être considéré comme 
étant moins restrictif de 
concurrence. L'argument 
invoqué par la FDT pour 
justifier le passage du 
système du pool à celui du 
contractant exclusif a 
toutefois convaincu les 
services de la 
Commission. Sur un 
marché de dimensions 
réduites comme le marché 
danois, il est 
vraisemblable quìi ny ait 
pas d'espace pour 
plusieurs membres dbn 
pool : les perspectives de 
voir augmenter ses ventes 
ne sont pas suffisantes 
pour induire plusieurs 
entreprises à devenir 
sponsors. La conclusion 
que les services de la 
Commission en tirent est 
que si dans le cas d'espèce 
la restriction de 
concurrence a été 
considérée comme non 
sensible, il pourrait en être 
autrement sur d'autres 
marchés plus importants, 
où un contrat de 
parrainage avec un seul 
contractant exclusif serait 
susceptible d'engendrer 
des effets sensibles sur la 
structure du marché que ce 
soit à lîntérieur dbn 
territoire dbn ou plusieurs 
Etats membres. 
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b) La FDT a accepté de 
réduire de 3 à 2 ans, la 
période de chaque contrat 
de parrainage en mettant 
sur pied un système 
d'appel d'offres assurant 
que la sélection se fasse de 
manière transparente, non 
discriminatoire et ouverte 
à tous les fournisseurs. 
c) La FDT a accepté de 
supprimer la mention de 
'balle officielle" en 
'fournisseur officiel". Cet 
aspect mérite un approfon-
dissement afin d'expliquer 
la position de la 
Commission à l'égard du 
problème de lhomo-
logation de produits 
sportifs par la Fédération, 
nationale ou 
internationale. 
A ce sujet, il y a lieu de 
noter que l'homologation 
technique des balles de 
tennis intervient au niveau 
de la Fédération interna-
tionale de Tennis. Toute 
balle satisfaisant aux 
normes techniques défi-
nies par la fédération 
internationale peut être 
homologuée, moyennant 
paiement dbne somme 
forfaitaire destinée à 
couvrir les frais des tests 
et des analyses. Les balles 
homologuées reçoivent la 
dénomination de 'First 
grade Tennis Balls" et 
sont reconnues de la sorte 
aptes à être utilisées dans 
tous les tournois et 
compétitions. 
La plupart des fédérations 
nationales de tennis 
introduisent cependant, ce 
que l'on pourrait appeler 
un second niveau 
dhomologation ou de 
sélection, basé celui-ci, 
sur des critères purement 
financiers. Moyennant 
paiement dbne somme 
forfaitaire ou moyennant, 
dans certains cas, 
négociations ou même 
procédures d'enchères, 
une ou certaines marques 
de balles de tennis peuvent 
se voir attribuer le label de 
"Balles officielles" de 
telle ou telle fédération 
nationale - ou encore 
"Balles officielles" de tel 
ou tel grand tournoi 
organisé par cette 
fédération. Le label peut 
être apposé sur les boîtes 
ou même imprimé sur les 
balles. Et la mention de 
"Balles officielles" peut 
généralement être suivie 
du texte "Balles sélec-
tionnées" ou "Balles 
recommandées" par ces 
fédérations. 
Outre divers avantages 
supplémentaires en ma-
tière publicitaire ou de 
promotion qui leur sont 
réservés (et qui varient 
dbne fédération à l'autre), 
ces "Balles officielles" 
sont également générale-
ment les seules à pouvoir 
être utilisées dans les 
tournois, championnats et 
autres activités organisées 
par ou sous l'égide de ces 
fédérations. En tournoi et 
champion-nat, la sanction 
en cas dbtilisation par des 
club de tennis de balles 
non-officielles consiste 
généra-lement en l'annu-
lation du match. Quant au 
joueur qui voudrait utiliser 
une balle non officielle, il 
se voit en principe déclaré 
perdant. Les fédérations 
nationales rappellent régu-
lièrement aux clubs de 
tennis qu'ils sont tenus de 
respecter ce règlement. 
L'appréciation de pareils 
systèmes dhomologation 
par les fédérations de 
tennis nationales au regard 
des articles 85 et 86 a été 
développée 
essentiellement dans la 
présente affaire. 
Le monopole dont 
disposent les fédérations 
nationales de tennis dans 
l'organisation des activités 
officielles relatives à ce 
sport leur donne non 
seulement une position 
dominante sur ce marché, 
mais leur confère 
également (outre, bien sûr, 
l'exclusivité d'attribuer le 
label de 'balles 
officielles') une autorité 
morale indéniable pour 
tout ce qui concerne la 
pratique de ce sport. Cette 
autorité leur permettra 
notamment d'influencer, 
le cas échéant, le choix du 
consommateur pour les 
produits (balles, raquet-
tes,...) utilisés dans cette 
pratique. Le label de 
"Balles officielles" et 
56 Competition Policy Newsletter ***** 
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l'autorisation de faire 
suivre cette mention par 
les termes "recomman-
dées" ou "sélectionnées" 
par une fédération 
nationale de tennis est 
ainsi de nature à inciter les 
consommateurs à consi-
dérer que ces balles sont 
meilleures sur le plan 
technique, alors même que 
l'autorisation de porter ce 
label a été conditionnée 
par des critères purement 
financiers et que les balles 
non sélectionnées, pour 
autant qu'elles aient été 
homologuées comme 
"First Grade Tennis Balls" 
par la Fédération 
internationale de Tennis, 
possèdent les mêmes 
qualités techniques. 
Il s'ensuit que le système 
de délivrance par les 
fédérations nationales de 
tennis du label de "Balles 
officielles" doit être 
considéré discriminatoire 
à l'égard des producteurs 
et/ou distributeurs exclus 
et partant, compte tenu de 
la position dominante de 
ces fédérations, comme un 
abus au titre de l'article 
86. 
Un tel système porte 
également préjudice aux 
consommateurs dans la 
mesure où il entraîne 
inévitablement un niveau 
plus élevé des prix des 
balles sélectionnées. 
C'est pour cet ensemble 
de raisons que l'abandon 
par la FDT de la mention 
'balle officielle" a amené 
la Commission à renoncer 
à sa communication de 
griefs basée sur l'article 
86. 
En conclusion : 
Par la présente affaire, la 
Commission entend donner des 
indications aux parties 
intéressées quant à la ligne de 
conduite qu'elle adoptera à 
l'avenir. Il n'est pas exclu que, 
comme cela a été fait notamment 
par l'Autorité suisse de la 
concurrence, la Commission soit 
amenée à l'avenir, à publier une 
communication au sujet de 
matériel sportif officiel et du 
parrainage dans le secteur du 
sport. 
La Commission approuve laccord de 
coopØration conclu entre 
les plus grands producteurs 
dappareils photos et de films 
Franco GIUFFRIDA, DG IV-F-1 
Quand les plus grands 
producteurs au monde dbn 
produit se mettent d'accord pour 
coopérer au développement dbn 
nouveau produit destiné, dans 
leurs intentions, à supplanter à 
moyen terme les produits 
existant sur le marché et à 
devenir le nouveau "standard", 
on imagine aisément que cette 
coopération fasse l'objet dbn 
examen attentif de la part des 
Autorités de concurrence. 
C'est exactement ce qui s'est 
passé dans le cas de ce qu'il est 
convenu d'appeler le Advanced 
Photographie System (APS)1. 
La procédure 
En 1991, Kodak, Fuji, Canon, 
Minolta et Nikon avaient conclu 
entre elles un accord pour le 
développement et l'exploitation 
sous licence dbn nouveau 
système photographique de 
pointe constituant une alternative 
aux précédents systèmes ainsi 
quà l'imagerie électronique. 
Press Release IP/98/353 of 15/4/1998. 
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Les difficultés techniques à 
surmonter étaient considérables 
et portaient tant sur la production 
de nouveaux types d'appareils 
photos que de nouveaux films 
ainsi que d'équipements de 
développement des films. 
En 1993, les parties notifièrent à 
la Commission les accords 
intervenus, bien que les accords 
ne fussent pas tout à fait 
complets: l'activité de 
coopération entre elles se 
poursuivît, tant au plan 
technique, quà celui de la mise 
au point des textes juridiques 
régissant leur relation. 
Les services de la Commission 
ne soulevèrent toutefois aucune 
objection à examiner des accords 
qui constituaient manifestement 
une base de travail susceptible 
dêtre adaptée et précisée en 
cours de route. Il fut de la sorte 
possible d'amener les parties 
notifiantes à englober dans leurs 
considérations industrielles, au 
cours dbn processus, certes de 
longue haleine mais cependant 
fructueux, des remarques tenant 
aux aspects de concurrence. 
Dans cette phase, la Commission 
a pu bénéficier des prises de 
position formulées par des tiers 
qui, tout en étant intéressés à 
devenir licenciés pour le 
nouveau produit, souhaitaient 
des changements dans les 
conditions de licence. 
La toile de fond des 
interventions de la Commission 
était constituée par deux 
principes : 
- la coopération était utile et 
devait être favorisée, 
- des efforts devaient être 
entrepris pour faire 
disparaître certains éléments 
considérés comme 
inacceptables du point de vue 
des règles de concurrence. 
A 1 issue de ce long processus de 
négociation, les parties 
notifiantes complétèrent leur 
notification début 1997 en tenant 
compte des souhaits exprimés 
par la Commission. Dans ces 
conditions, celle-ci publia une 
communication art. 19(3) au JO2 
qui ne donna lieu à aucune 
remarque des tiers. La 
procédure fut donc achevée par 
la consultation du Comité 
Consultatif et l'envoi dbne lettre 
administrative de classement de 
type "exemption". 
Le fond de 1 affaire 
Dès le début, il était clair aux 
parties notifiantes que le gage de 
succès du nouveau produit tenait 
à deux aspects essentiels 
d'abord un produit fiable, et 
ensuite son degré d'acceptation 
par les autres producteurs non 
parties à l'accord de coopération. 
Si l'APS devait avoir une chance 
de devenir le nouveau standard, 
les entreprises conceptrices 
devaient donc en assurer sa 
diffusion outre que par leur 
production propre par des 
accords de licence avec les 
concurrents. 
JO N°C 330 du 01/11/1997, p.10. 
Les parties notifiantes 
engagèrent donc des efforts 
considérables pour conclure des 
contrats de licences avec leur 
concurrents en organisant des 
réunions d'information et des 
séminaires. Le résultat en fût 
qubn nombre important de 
contrats de licence fût conclu 
bien avant la date de 
commercialisation du nouvel 
APS qui eu lieu en Europe en 
avril 1996. 
Lintervention de la Commission 
eut principalement pour but de 
faire modifier dans les contrats 
de licences certaines clauses qui 
à ses yeux limitaient indûment la 
liberté des licenciés. En effet les 
entreprises coopérantes, tout en 
souhaitant favoriser Ibtilisation 
sous licence de leur nouveau 
produit, affirmaient être en 
même temps soucieuses de 
limiter les risques de productions 
techniquement non fiables. 
D'où des restrictions sensibles 
dans les possibilités par les 
parties licenciées de coopérer 
entre elles. Le but de la 
démarche de la Commission était 
notamment d'assurer que les 
tiers, un fois les licences 
accordées, puissent être à temps 
sur le marché avec des produits 
sous licences pour concurrencer 
les cinq partenaires. 
A la suite de l'intervention de la 
Commission une certaine 
libéralisation de la politique de 
licence a été atteinte. Le savoir 
faire technique et un service 
d'assistance ont été offerts aux 
licenciés à une plus large échelle 
quînitialement proposé et ce 
contre redevance ou gratui-
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tement. En plus, s'agissant des 
clauses limitant la liberté 
industrielle des licenciés, un 
système dégressif dans le temps 
a été introduit de sorte qu'au 
plus tard en 2004 la coopération 
entre les licenciés sera 
totalement ouverte. 
Dans ces conditions il a été 
estimé que les cinq partenaires à 
l'issue des nombreuses réunions 
technique avec les services de la 
Commission, avaient montré leur 
promptitude a prendre toute les 
mesures nécessaires pour 
permettre aux licenciés d'accé­
der au marché en temps voulu et 
dans des conditions ne suscitant 
plus des inquiétudes en termes 
de concurrence. 
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European Commission exempts an 
industry scheme from the 
competition rules because of its 
environmental benefits 
IP/98/242 [1998­03­11] 
The Commission adopts a decision 
against Unilever concerning freezer 
cabinet exclusivity in the Irish ice 
cream market (see p. 52) 
IP/98219 [1998­03­05] 
Maritime Transport : Consortium 
agreements win approval of the 
Commission 
IP/98/197 [1998­02­26] 
The European Commission sets out 
its provisional position on Spring's 
« new » pub leases 
IP/98/154 [1998­02­13] 
Car prices in the European Union on 
1 November 1997 ­ differences 
remain high 
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IP/98/141 [1998-02-10] 
Commission launches inquiry 
into mobile and fixed 




Volkswagen ECU 102 million 
following consumer 
complaints (see p. 53) 
IP/98/70 [1998-01-21] 
Commission fines stainless 
steel cartel (see p. 50) 
IP/98/30 [1998-01-14] 
Book pricing agreements 
between publishers and 
booksellers in Germany 
IP/98/27 [1998-01-14] 




Commisison intends to clear 
Scottish and Newcqstle's 
standard pub leases 
IP/98/8 [1998-01-07] 
Reaction of Commissioners Flynn 
and Van Miert to Press Repots 
regarding FIFA's proposal to 
exclude sport from the scope of 
European Law 
IP/98/7 [1998-01-07] 
Commission has decided to examine 
agreements concerning air alliances 
between Air Grance/Delta and Air 
France/Continental 
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Application of Council Regulation 4064/89 
Main developments between Is' January and 30s' April 
Recent developments 
The new merger rules have entered 
into force 
Gudrun SCHMIDT, DG IV-B-3 
At the beginning of March 1998 
a package of new merger mies 
entered into force. The package 
includes modifications to the 
Merger Regulation adopted by 
the Council in June 1997, a new 
procedural Regulation adopted 
by the Commission (Imple­
menting Regulation) and a set of 
new explanatory notices. The 
notice aligning the procedural 
rules for processing mergers 
under the ECSC and EC 
Treaties, which had been 
adopted earlier were also 
applicable as from March 1998. 
The main changes to the Merger 
Regulation broaden its scope and 
deal with procedural aspects. 
The new implementing texts 
reflect these changes and also 
take account of the past 
experience in applying the 
Community merger rules. 
In view of the wide use that is 
made of these texts particularly 
by the general public, the 
Commission decided to adopt 
new texts rather than 
amendments to the old texts. 
This approach ensures that, in 
particular with regard to the 
Implementing Regulation, there 
will be a single legal text for 
each document which 
incorporates all the amendments 
rather than a number of texts. 
The new texts have been adopted 
by the Commission after 
widespread consultation with the 
Member States, interested 
industry associations and the 
legal profession. The texts were 
also published on the web site of 
DG IV on the internet. The 
overall reaction to the texts 
proposed by the Commission 
had been positive. Many of the 
remarks that were made in the 
course of the consultation are 
reflected in the final texts. 
The final texts are available to 
the public in the Community 
languages not only through their 
publication in the Official 
Journal but on the internet. The 
Commission services have 
furthermore prepared a 
consolidated version of the 
Merger Regulation for the 
facility of the reader which is 
also available there. In due 
course a paper copy of all 
relevant legislative and 
interpretative texts in the merger 
area will also be made available 
as a Commission publication. 
1. The Merger Regulation 
The amendments! to the Merger 
Regulation2 have been examined 
in detail in an earlier edition of 
this Newsletter.' In summary the 
changes include an additional set 
of thresholds designed to ensure 
a reduction in the number of 
multiple national filings of the 
same transaction. Furthermore 
all full-function joint ventures 
which meet the turnover 
thresholds of the Merger 
Regulation will now be assessed 
under the procedures of that 
regulation. Co-operative aspects 
of such joint ventures will be 
examined under the criteria of 
Articles 85 (1) and (3) of the 
EC-Treaty within the procedures 
of the Merger Regulation. The 
three week suspension period 
has been extended with the 
effect that a transaction can now 
only be implemented after a 
clearance decision by the 
Commission. In addition the 
parties will now be able to adapt 
the operation during the first 
month of the investigation in 
order to eliminate competition 
concerns. Operations which 
affect competition in more than 
one Member State can now be 
Council Regulation (EC) No 1310/97 of 30 
June 1997 amending Regulation (EEC) No 
4064/89 on the control of concentrations 
between undertakings, OJ L 180, p.l, 
9.7.1997; corrigendum in OJ L 40, p. 17, 
13.02.98. 
Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 on the 
control of concentrations between 
undertakings, OJ L 395, 30.12.1989: 
corrected version OJ L 257, 21.9.1990. 
See for more details Jean-Louis Aribaud, 
Summary of the most important recent 
developments, Competition Policy 
Newsletter, Volume 3, Number 2, Summer 
1997. 
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jointly referred to the 
Commission by two or more of 
these Member States. Other 
changes relate to the calculation 
of turnover for credit and 
financial institutions. 
2. The Implementing 
Regulation, including 
Form CO 
In order to implement these 
changes to the Merger Regulation 
the Commission has adopted a 
new Implementing Regulation on 
1 March 1998.4 Modifications 
have also been made to the 
notification Form CO, annexed to 
the regulation, in particular to 
reflect the fact that all full-
function joint ventures which 
meet the turnover thresholds will 
in future be treated under the 
Merger Regulation. Other 
amendments to the Implementing 
Regulation have been introduced 
on the basis of past experience 
with the application of the 
Community merger legislationdn 
some languages they include 
linguistic improvements, many 
of which were suggested by the 
Member States. The new 
Implementing Regulation 
entered into force on 2 March 
1998. 
4 Commission Regulation (EC) No 447/98 of 
1 March 1998 on the notifications, time 
limits and hearings provided for in Council 
Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 on the 
control of concentrations between 
undertakings, OJ L 61, 2. 3. 1998; 
replacing Commission Regulation (EC) 
3384/94 of 21. December 1989, OJ L 377, 
31.12.1994. 
Changes necessitated by the 
amendments to the Merger 
Regulation 
Full-function joint ventures 
One of the most important 
changes in the Merger 
Regulation relates to the 
application of the Merger 
Regulation to all full function 
joint ventures. The text of Form 
CO takes this into account at 
various points. A new Section 10 
has been introduced reflecting 
the treatment of co-operative 
joint ventures under the newly 
introduced Article 2 (4) of the 
Merger Regulation. 
New thresholds 
A new Section 2.4. has been 
introduced to Form CO to reflect 
the new turnover thresholds that 
have been introduced to Article 
1 paragraph 3 of the Merger 
Regulation. 
Calculation of deadlines 
The amended Article 23 of the 
Merger Regulation provided the 
legal basis for the Commission 
to streamline the calculation of 
the time periods foreseen by the 
Merger Regulation for a variety 
of procedures. In the old 
Implementing Regulation the 
rules on the calculation of time 
limits only applied to deadlines 
regarding decisions at the end of 
the first and second phase of the 
examination of an operation. 
Suspension of the concentration 
The text of Article 12 of the 
Implementing Regulation now 
takes account of the fact that 
under the amended Merger 
Regulation an operation remains 
suspended until it is cleared by 
the Commission. 
Suspension of time limits 
The suspension of time limits 
relating to first phase decisions 
under Article 6 Merger 
Regulation is now possible under 
similar conditions as in phase 
two. Furthermore a suspension is 
possible, if the parties are 
responsible for the failure of 
third parties to provide 
information. This case will now 
be treated in the same way as a 
refusal by the parties themselves 
to reply. 
Commitments 
The new wording of Article 18 
and the newly introduced Article 
19 of the Implementing 
Regulation take account of the 
amendments in the Merger 
Regulation providing for the 
express possibility of 
commitments in the first phase 
of the merger procedure. 
Changes due to past experience 
with the legislation 
Amendments considered useful 
on the basis of the experience 
with the application of the 
Community merger legislation 
include a variety of issues such as 
the way a notification or other 
communications to the 
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Commission have to be made, the 
extent of market related 
information to be supplied and the 
hearing procedure. 
Requirements on notifications 
and other submissions to the 
Commission 
The Implementing Regulation 
and Form CO clarify that the 
notification and other specified 
documents have to be submitted 
in one original as well as the 
indicated number of copies. The 
number of copies varies as to the 
needs of the stage of procedure 
for which they are required. The 
time by which the notification 
has to reach the Commission in 
order to ensure registration of a 
notification on the day of arrival 
has been specified. 
Form CO reiterates explicitly 
that in accordance with the 
requirements of the Merger 
Regulation the time limits will 
not begin to run before the 
parties have provided a complete 
notification. The rules governing 
the granting of waivers from the 
requirements in Form CO have 
also been amended with the 
same purpose of clarification. 
Information required in Form 
CO on market participants has to 
be provided even in cases of 
short form notification to enable 
the Commission to make market 
enquiries. It has further been 
clarified that generally such 
information shall relate to 
independent customers and 
suppliers to ensure that the 
information gathered by the 
Commission in a market enquiry 
does reflect the views of 
independent market participants. 
Market definition 
A number of points in Form CO 
relating to the information to be 
provided on the markets 
concerned by an operation have 
been clarified. In particular 
Sections 6.2 and 6.3 have been 
drafted to state that information 
must be provided for 
neighbouring markets to affected 
markets (i.e. markets on which a 
minimum level of market share 
is reached) as well as for non-
affected markets (markets on 
which the market share is lower 
than specified for affected 
markets). The text formerly in 
force contained certain 
ambiguities in this respect, in 
particular in some language 
versions. 
Hearings 
The text relating to the hearing 
provisions in Articles 14 and 15 
of the Implementing Regulation 
has been streamlined and 
modernised, taking account of 
the creation of the office of the 
Hearing Officer and introducing 
an obligation on parties to 
provide non-confidential 
versions of specified documents. 
A similar exercise is currently 
under way with regard to 
Regulation 99/63 on hearings in 
the area of Articles 85 and 86 
EC-Treaty. 
3. The Notices 
The amendments to the Merger 
Regulation also required changes 
to the Commissions explanatory 
notices. The notice on joint 
ventures5 and to a lesser degree 
the notice on the calculation of 
turnover6 are most affected. The 
notice on the concept of 
undertakings concerned has 
been modified only in one point 
of substance. The notice on the 
concept of a concentration8 takes 
account of the changes in its 
references to the other texts. In 
some languages linguistic 
changes have been made with a 
view to improve the text. The 
notice on ancillary restraints was 
not amended at this stage but is 
currently being revised. 
Notice on Joint Ventures 
The new notice on joint ventures 
reflects the fact that the 
distinction between 
concentrative and co-operative 
joint ventures has ceased to 
determine the applicability of the 
Merger Regulation. Jurisdiction 
will now be determined by 
applying the criterion of full 
functionality, on which further 
guidance has been given. Co-
" Commission notice on the concept of full-
function joint ventures under Council 
Regulation (EEC) No4064/89 on the 
control of concentrations between 
undertakings, OJ C 66, 2. 3. 1998, p. 1. 
6 Commission notice on the calculation of 
turnover under Council Regulation (EEC) 
No 4064/89 on the control of 
concentrations between undertakings, OJ C 
66,2.3. 1998, p. 25. 
7 Commission notice on the concept of 
undertakings concerned under Council 
Regulation (EEC) No4064/89 on the 
control of concentrations between 
undertakings, OJ C 66, 2. 3. 1998, p. 14. 
s Commission notice on the concept of 
concentration under Council Regulation 
(EEC) No 4064/89 on the control of 
concentrations between undertakings, OJ C 
66,2.3. 1998, p. 5. 
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operative aspects are therefore 
not discussed in the notice 
anymore. 
It is intended that guidance on 
the substantive issues regarding 
the co-operative aspects of full-
function joint ventures will be 
provided in due course after the 
Commission has had some 
experience in handling such 
issues. Pending the preparation 
of such guidance the notice 
refers to the relevant principles 
in the old notice. 
The opportunity has also been 
used to up-date the references to 
previous cases where the issue of 
full-functionality has been 
discussed in more detail. 
Notice on the Calculation of 
Turnover 
The new notice on the 
Calculation of Turnover reflects 
the fact that an additional set of 
turnover thresholds has been 
introduced into the Merger 
Regulation. More changes to the 
notice were needed due to the 
new rules on the calculation of 
turnover for financial 
institutions, based on banking 
income. 
Notice on Undertakings 
Concerned 
This notice has been changed 
only in one matter of 
significance, that is, to adapt 
paragraph 23 of the text to the 
Commission's policy regarding 
the treatment of a single parent 
subsidiary. The Commission 
considers that when one or 
several new shareholders acquire 
joint control of a single parent 
subsidiary while the initial 
parent company remains, the 
subsidiary is not an undertaking 
concerned. This policy had 
already been published by the 
Commission in its Competition 
Report 1996. 
Notice on the alignment of 
procedures for processing 
mergers under the ECSC and 
EC Treaties 
This notice sets out the treatment 
of concentrations that fall under 
the ECSC Treaty. The procedure 
for these mergers will be the 
same as applied to mergers 
under the EC Treaty within the 
limits imposed by the ECSC 
Treaty. The measures are 
designed to increase 
transparency, set out the rights of 
defence and to speed up the 
decision making process. They 
have to be seen against the 
backdrop of the forthcoming 
expiry of the ECSC Treaty. 
In particular the measures 
provide for the issuing of a 
statement of objections, access 
to file and an oral hearing in 
complex cases where the 
Commission is considering a 
conditional authorisation or a 
prohibition. They provide for 
time limits similar to those set 
out in the Merger Regulation. In 
addition the fact of a notification 
will be published in the Official 
Journal. Public versions of 
Article 66 ECSC decisions 
adopted after a statement of 
objections will be published in 
the Official Journal as will the 
fact of the adoption of other 
decisions. Public versions of 
these other decisions will be 
available to interested parties on 
request. 
4. Procedure 
These changes to the merger 
rules will entail a number of 
organisational changes within 
the Directorate General for 
Competition (DG IV). This 
applies in particular to joint 
ventures which may have co-
operative aspects which will be 
handled directly by the relevant 
sectoral unit within DG IV, 
thereby optimising the use of 
resources and expertise within 
the Directorate General. For the 
initial twelve months however 
all notifications and initial 
contacts will still be received by 
the Merger Task Force in DG 
IV. 
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Recent important decisions 
Geraldine Emberger and John Kemp, DG IV-Β 
(Merger Task Force) 
Statistical Overview 
The new year so far shows a 
further continuation and 
strengthening of the upward 
trend in activity recurrently 
noted in previous issues of the 
Newsletter. Sixty-nine 
operations were notified, an 
increase of 64% on the same 
period in 1997 and compared 
with an annual increase of 30% 
in 1997 over 1996. There were 
72 decisions disposing of cases 
under the Merger Regulations 
main provisions (ie, Articles 6,8 
and 9 of Regulation EC 4064/89) 
- an increase of some 100% on 
the equivalent period last year. 
Of this total, 60 decisions related 
to operations which were cleared 
by the Commission at the end of 
the first phase of investigation, 
and a further six to operations 
where a second, more detailed 
phase of investigation was 
opened because the Commission 
had serious doubts about the 
operation's compatibility with 
the common market. There were 
also two decisions on cases 
following second phase 
investigation, in both instances 
clearing the operation subject to 
undertakings from the parties to 
remove the risk of creation or 
reinforcement of the dominant 
positions identified by the 
Commission, and one decision 
under Article 9, granting partial 
referral of the case back to the 
relevant national competition 
authority. 
First Application of New 
Provisions 
The period also includes the 
introduction (as from the 
beginning of March) of the new 
thresholds and other changes to 
the regulation (see previous 
articles). Noteworthy in this 
respect were the completion of 
the first case involving 
undertakings given under the 
new powers to deal formally 
with such matters in the first 
phase of investigation (see 
Owens-Illinois/BTR Packaging 
below) and the first two notified 
cases which fell to be examined 
under Community merger 
control procedures because they 
satisfied the new second level of 
thresholds, designed to ensure a 
reduction in the number of 
national filings of the same 
transaction. 
The Commission also began to 
examine the potential application 
of Article 2(4) of the regulation 
to full-function joint ventures 
where cooperative aspects could 
be relevant. (For an explanation 
of the new rules on structural 
joint ventures see feature The 
New Merger Rules Have Entered 
Into Force' elsewhere in this 
issue of the Newsletter.). The 
organisational arrangements 
within DGIV in particular to 
deal with potential Article 2(4) 
cases - whereby full-function 
joint ventures which may have 
cooperative aspects will be 
handled by the relevant sectoral 
unit within DGIV - were also 
put into effect. 
First Company Fined for Non-
Compliance 
Finally, this period also saw the 
first case in which the 
Commission used its powers to 
impose fines on companies for 
late notification and unlawful 
implementation (see Samsung/ 
AST below). 
The following sections provide 
further details of the more 
significant cases dealt with in the 
period. 
DECISIONS UNDER 
ARTICLE 8 (including 
withdrawals in Phase 1$ 
Hoffmann-La Roche/ 
Boehringer Mannheim 
In September 1997, the Swiss 
pharmaceutical company 
Hoffmann-La Roche proposed to 
acquire Corage Ltd., ultimate 
parent company of the 
Boehringer Mannheim Group 
(BM). After a preliminary 
appreciation of the case the 
Commission concluded that in 
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clinical chemistry (CC) in vitro 
diagnostics - used to test 
cholesterol, glucose and other 
substances of the body - the 
parties would after the merger 
have a dominant position in 7 
Member States, namely Austria, 
Denmark, Germany, Finland, 
Portugal, Spain and Sweden, and 
on 2 October 1997 decided to 
undertake a detailed 
investigation of the case (Article 
6(l)(c) of the regulation). Its 
view was based not only on high 
combined market shares 
(between 40 and 80% in 
different national markets) but 
also on the weakness of existing 
competitors, the parties' 
unequalled installed base of 
instruments on which CC tests 
are performed, and the absence 
of countervailing purchasing 
power. In addition, Roche had 
built a dominant position in the 
DNA probes market in all 
Member States of the EEA, 
based on its significant patent 
estate relating to this key-
technology. The Commission 
found that the merger would 
have strengthened this position 
even further, as BM was about to 
enter this market and would have 
become one of the most 
important competitors to Roche. 
To address the Commission's 
competition concerns Roche 
undertook to divest the majority 
of its CC business in all Member 
States where the concentration 
would otherwise cause 
competitive concerns. Moreover 
in the market for DNA Probes, 
Roche undertook to grant world-
wide licences for its key probe 
technology to all interested 
market participants. Whereas 
the divestment of the CC 
activities will greatly reduce the 
market share additions created 
by the merger, the undertaking to 
license the probe technology will 
enable entry into the DNA probe 
market and should accelerate the 
development of this important 
growth market. 
On 4 February 1998 the 
Commission therefore approved 
the concentration, subject to full 
compliance with the 
undertakings. 
Agfa-Gevaert/Du Pont 
In September 1997, Agfa-
Gevaert NV and Agfa-Gevaert 
AG notified their intention to 
acquire the graphic arts films 
businesses of EI Dupont de 
Nemours & Co (Dupont). The 
operation concerned the sectors 
for graphic arts film and offset 
printing plates. The 
Commission was concerned at 
the possibility that in view of the 
large overlapping shares that 
appeared to be present, and other 
relevant factors the merger 
would create dominant positions 
in some or all of the sectors and 
geographic markets involved. 
Accordingly on 9 October 1997 
it decided to undertake a detailed 
investigation (see previous 
issue). 
In the second-phase 
investigation the Commission 
found that the proposed 
concentration would lead to a 
dominant position in the EEA 
market for negative plates for 
use in offset printing. The 
Commission defined separate 
markets for negative printing 
plates and offset printing plates. 
This definition was based on two 
main factors. First, there is only 
limited supply-side substitu-
tability, due to the substantial 
costs of adapting production 
lines and acquiring a new 
customer base. Second, in 
contrast to production costs, 
market prices for different types 
of plates were shown not to 
converge. The finding of 
dominance was based not only 
on the large market share Agfa 
would gain from the acquisition 
of Dupont (over 52% in the 
EEA) but also on a number of 
market-specific factors, in 
particular finance arrangements 
with manufacturers and 
exclusive arrangements Agfa 
and Dupont had with main 
distributors. 
To address the Commission's 
concerns, Agfa offered to 
terminate its exclusive 
arrangements with its equipment 
suppliers and distributors to 
allow competitors to offer their 
own negative plates to 
distributors and thereby develop 
their sales more readily. 
The Commission considered 
that, subject to full compliance 
with the conditions and 
obligations the operation would 
not lead to the creation or 
strengthening of a dominant 
position in the EEA, and 
accordingly decided, on 11 
February 1998, to approve the 
operation on that basis. 
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Wolters KIuwer/Reed Elsevier 
The proposed merger of Wolters 
Kluwer and Reed Elsevier was 
notified to the Commission on 
10 November 1997. After initial 
examination it was concluded 
that the operation gave rise to 
serious competitive concerns in a 
number of national markets for 
professional publishing, and an 
in-depth investigation was 
opened on 11 December 1998 
(see previous issue). This 
confirmed that the merger 
between these two leading 
publishers could create a 
dominant position in : the world-
wide market for academic 
publishing (scientific journals 
and books); in the markets for 
publications for professional use 
in the areas of law and tax in the 
Netherlands, the United 
Kingdom, France and Italy; in 
the market for publications for 
primary and secondary schools 
(educational publishing) in the 
United Kingdom; in a number of 
markets for business 
publications in the Netherlands 
in the market for Dutch 
dictionaries; and in the European 
market for the services provided 
from transport databases. 
An important aspect of the 
Commission's concerns related 
to the size of the merged entity -
several times larger than any 
other publisher of professional 
information in the Community. 
Such a market structure could in 
the Commission's view prevent 
the maintenance of a competitive 
situation in the supply of legal, 
fiscal and scientific information 
in the European Union, with a 
significant impact on the terms 
and prices at which this 
information is made available to 
user and consumers. In addition, 
the combination of the parties' 
financial resources and 
ownership of copyrighted 
content across Europe would 
discourage investments by 
competitors in this area. 
For these reasons, the 
Commission decided to raise 
objections to the merger on 
competition grounds and 
addressed a statement to that 
effect to Wolters Kluwer and 
Reed Elsevier. However, on 9 
March 1998 the parties 
announced that they had decided 
to abandon their current project 
to merge, so the Commission 
had no reason to continue its 
procedure under the merger 
regulation and no final decision 
on the planned merger has been 
or will be adopted. 
Wienerberger/Cremer & 
Breuer 
On 4 December 1997 
Wienerberger Baustoffindustrie 
AG ("Wienerberger') and 
Deutsche Steinzeug Cremer & 
Breuer ("Cremer & Breuer') 
notified their intention to combine 
their activities in the area of clay 
sewage pipes in a joint venture. 
Cremer & Breuer is the leading 
clay pipe producer in Germany 
and Wienerberger is the second 
biggest supplier of clay pipes. 
According to the parties, although 
the pipes are made from several 
different materials - clay, 
concrete, different kinds of 
plastic, and cast iron - users could 
easily substitute one type for 
another, so that there was a single 
product market, throughout 
Europe, for sewage pipes of all 
types. However, the 
Commissions initial examination 
found indications to suggest that 
certain materials were more 
suitable for particular applications 
than others. Moreover, there 
appeared to be specific 
preferences for certain materials 
in various Member States, which 
could lead to different conditions 
of competition. In Germany in 
particular, there was said to be a 
significant preference for clay 
pipes, especially for dirty-water 
main sewers and mixed-water 
sewers of small and medium-
sized diameters. In the light of 
these indications, on 15 January 
1998 the Commission decided to 
commence an in-depth 
investigation of the proposed 
operation. However, on 20 
March 1998 the parties informed 
the Commission that they had 
annulled their joint venture 
agreement and consequently 
withdrew their notification. 
KPMG/Ernst & Young 
On 23 December 1997 the 
Commission was notified of the 
proposed merger between 
KPMG and Ernst & Young, two 
of the so-called Big Six' 
worldwide accountancy and 
audit firms. On 5 February 1998 
the Commission announced its 
intention to carry out a detailed 
investigation of the proposal in 
view of the possibility that the 
merged entity would have high 
market shares in several EU 
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Member States as regards the 
provision of auditing and 
accounting and tax services in a 
significant number of industrial 
and commercial sectors. In 
reaching this decision, the 
Commission also took account 
of the fact that two other 
members of the Big Six' - Price 
Waterhouse and Coopers and 
Lybrand, had recently also 
notified their intention to merge 
(see below). However, shortly 
afterwards KPMG and Ernst & 
Young abandoned the merger 
plan. There was then no grounds 
for the Commission to continue 
its investigation, and accordingly 
no final decision on the case has 
been or will be adopted. 
Thyssen Krupp Stahl/ITW 
Signode/Titan 
On 5 May 1998 the Commission 
approved an operation creating a 
joint venture between Thyssen 
Krupp Stahl and ITW Signode. 
The joint venture will produce 
both steel and plastic strapping 
in Germany for sale in Western 
Europe and the rest of the world. 
The approval followed a detailed 
second phase investigation under 
the Merger Regulation (decision 
adopted on 22 December 1997, 
see previous issue). 
Thyssen Krupp Stahl is itself a 
joint venture between Thyssen 
Stahl AG (a subsidiary of 
Thyssen AG) and Krupp Hoesch 
Stahl ( a subsidiary of Fried 
Krupp AG) and was established 
to combine the two groups' 
production and distribution of 
flat carbon steel products. 
ITW Signode is a subsidiary of 
Illinois Tool Works Inc. of the 
United States of America and is 
the worlds largest producer of 
strapping. The joint venture will 
acquire all the shares of Titan 
Umreifungstechnik, currently a 
subsidiary of the Krupp Group 
and Signode System GmbH, 
which produces both steel and 
plastic strapping. Signode 
System GmbH is a subsidiary of 
ITW Signode. Titan 
Umreifungstechnik, which 
produces steel strapping and 
strapping equipment, has entered 
into an agreement to sell the 
equipment manufacturing part of 
its business and its distribution 
operation for both strapping and 
equipment to a privately owned 
German company Ρ W Lenzen. 
This operation will take place 
immediately after the shares in 
Titan Umreifungstechnik have 
been acquired by Thyssen Krupp 
Stahl and ITW Signode. 
The Commission's investigation 
showed that ITW Signode and 
the joint venture would together 
have between 35% and 40% of 
the combined market for steel 
and plastic strapping in Western 
European market. The 
Commission has concluded that 
the operation would not 
strengthen or create a dominant 
position for a number of reasons. 
In particular because while the 
overall (i.e. for both steel and 
plastic strapping) was growing, 
consumption of steel strapping 
the only strapping product made 
by Titan has been falling over 
the long term and will continue 
to decline. On the other hand 
consumption of plastic strapping, 
where the parties are 
comparatively weak, is growing 
rapidly. Thus the parties market 
position will be eroded over time 
by the joint effects of the decline 
of the product sector in which 
they are strong and the growth in 
the plastic sector. Barriers to 
entry in the growing plastic 
sector are low and there are 










On 3 February, 1998 the 
undertakings Schweizerische 
Bankgesellschaft (SBG) and 
Schweizerischer Bankverein 
(SBV), two Swiss based 
companies active in private and 
corporate banking and in the 
financial services business world 
wide, notified their proposal to 
merge their businesses into UBS 
AG (UBS), an entitiy which 
would replace SBG and SBV. 
The concentration has world wide 
scale given the fact that UBS will 
be the largest European bank with 
total assets of around 508,000 
million ECU and will be among 
the leading finance institutions 
world wide in investment banking 
and asset management. The 
merger involves some issues 
concerning retail banking in 
Switzerland which are currently 
dealt with by the Swiss Antitrust 
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authorities. The proposed merger 
has also been notified to the US 
antitrust authorities. 
The affected product markets 
where SBG and SBV have 
overlapping activities in the EU 
are M&A (merger and aquisition), 
equity underwriting and equity 
trading. 
In M&A and equity underwriting 
the parties had market shares of 
42 % and 32% respectively in 
Portugal. However, shares of the 
parties and their competitors 
varied considerably over time. 
The Commission found out that 
the fluctuations were largely due 
to the tendency to carry out 
transactions without the use of an 
external advisor as well as to the 
fact that in smaller economies 
there are usually only a limited 
number of large acquisitions and 
privatisations every year. SBG 
and SBV temporarily succeeded 
in achieving a stronger market 
position in M & A advice and 
equity underwriting in Portugal 
after obtaining a contract to 
privatise the Portuguese 
telecommunications sector. 
However, given the above-
mentioned circumstances, these 
shares were not considered likely 
to establish a long-term or 
permanent dominant position on 
the markets in question. 
As for equity trading, combined 
market shares post merger 
amounted to around 20 % in the 
UK. However, the increment was 
less than 1%. Furthermore, UBS' 
strongest competitor, Merrill 
Lynch & Co., has about 7-15% 
market share in the UK. 
Finally, the Commission took into 
account that there are a number of 
other important competitors active 
in the affected markets, namely 
Merrill Lynch & Co., Goldman, 
Sachs and Co., Morgan Stanley & 
Co., Deutsche Bank, etc. The 
banking services sector is 
characterised by a high degree of 
liberalisation and deregulation 
offering market access to potential 
competitors without significant 
restrictions, which are limited to 
the respective national banking 
and stock exchange control 
regimes. The banking services 
market is a highly innovative and 
competitive market with an 
increasing degree of globalisation. 
For these reasons, the 
Commission concluded that the 
concentration would not create 
any dominant position in the 
common market or in a 
substantial part of it, and decided 
on 4 March 1998 to approve the 
operation. 
Nestlé/Dalgety 
On 2 April 1998 the 
Commission approved Nestlé's 
acquisition of the Spillers pet 
food business from Dalgety. 
Nestlé of Switzerland is engaged 
in a wide range of food 
businesses including pet food. 
Dalgety of Britain is active in 
agribusiness, food distribution 
and food manufacturing 
including pet food. The 
operation was notified on 27 
February 1998. 
The markets affected by the 
operation were the EEA markets 
for prepared dog and cat food. 
Dog and cat food are 
differentiated product markets 
with a large variety of products, 
brands and packages. A 
distinction is normally made 
between food for dogs and that 
for cats, and also between so-
called dry and wet food types 
(dry'foods requring the addition 
of milk or water before serving, 
wet'foods being ready-to-eat). 
In the dog food market, the 
operation created only small 
market share additions, giving the 
parties will a combined market of 
less than 15% . Mars of the US 
will continue to be the clear 
market leader. Consequently, the 
Commission concluded that the 
operation did not lead to the 
creation or strengthening of a 
dominant position in the dog food 
market. 
As far as the cat food market is 
concerned Mars is the market 
leader with almost half of the 
market at the EEA level. Spillers 
is number two and Nestlé number 
three. Following the operation 
Nestlé/Spillers will be a clear 
number two, and together Mars 
and Nestlé/Spillers will have 
more than 70% of the cat food 
market. Furthermore, 
Nestlé/Spillers will be a company 
with a range of brands and a 
breadth of production and 
logistics which is comparable to 
the market leader Mars. The 
Commission, therefore, examined 
whether the operation would give 
rise to the creation of duopolistic 
dominance in the cat food market. 
In past years the cat food market 
has been characterised by a 
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significant degree of competition 
and falling prices. After having 
examined the market structure of 
the cat food market and the 
resulting likely future competitive 
relationship between Mars and 
Nestlé/Spillers, the Commission 
concluded that the competitive 
pressures were likely to continue 
to exist for the foreseeable future, 
despite the highly concentrated 
nature of the market. In particular, 
the Commission noted that the dry 
sector of the market is under-
developed and likely to grow 
rapidly, which should encourage 
competition; furthermore, the 
market will remain subject to 
potential competition. 
Consequently, the Commission 
concluded that the concentration 
did not create or strengthen any 
dominant position in the 
Common Market or in a 
substantial part of it, and, 
therefore, decided to approve the 
operation. 
Owens-Illinois/BTR Packaging 
The Commission decided on 21 
April 1998 to clear the 
acquisition of BTR's Packaging 
Business Group (BTR 
Packaging) by Owens-Illinois, 
Inc (Owens-Illinois), subject to 
commitments submitted to the 
Commission. The decision 
marks the first occasion of the 
use of the Commission's new 
powers regarding formal 
acceptance of commitments at 
the first phase of investigation. 
Owens-Illinois, an American 
corporation, is an international 
manufacturer of glass containers, 
machinery and plastic packaging 
products and a world-wide 
licensor of glass technology. 
BTR is a global engineering 
company and manufactures glass 
containers in the UK through its 
subsidiary BTR Packaging. The 
case was notified on 4 March 
1998. 
The Commission's investigation 
found competition concerns 
arising from the operation in the 
glass container market. The 
Commission concluded that the 
proposed operation, as originally 
notified, would have created or 
reinforced Owens-Illinois s 
dominant position in the glass 
container market in the UK and 
Ireland. This finding was based 
on the high market shares of the 
parties (50-75% depending on 
the end-user segment), the low 
market shares of the remaining 
competitors, and the lack of 
competitive pressure from 
outside the UK due to high 
transport costs. 
Following negotiations with the 
Commission, Owens-Illinois 
gave commitments to address 
these concerns. The 
commitments include 
undertakings to divest the whole 
of the glass container business 
carried on by BTR Packaging 
through its subsidiary Rockware 
Group Limited (Rockware) at its 
four plants in the UK. Owens-
Illinois has also undertaken to 
divest Rockware's 50% interest 
in a glass recycling joint venture, 
British Glass Recycling 
Company Ltd., which is jointly 
owned with Owens-Illinois. 
These remedies, whose 
implementation will be closely 
monitored by the Commission, 
will completely eliminate the 
overlap between Owens-Illinois 
and BTR Packaging in the UK 
glass container market and 
render the operation compatible 
with the common market. 
Modifications to the Merger 
Regulation which came into 
force on 1 March 1998 expressly 
provide for this possibility and 
give the Commission an 
extended period of 6 weeks in 
which to adopt a first phase 
decision if commitments are 
offered. Commitments in the 
first phase of the procedure are 
only accepted where the 
competition problem is readily 
identifiable, and where a clear-
cut remedy is available 
providing a complete and 
effective solution which can be 
implemented without undue 
complication and delay. 
REFERENCE BACK TO 
MEMBER STATES UNDER 
ARTICLE 9 OF THE 
REGULATION 
Promodes/S21/Grupo GS 
On 10 March 1998 the 
Commission decided to refer 
partially to the competent Italian 
authorities ("Autorità Garante 
della Concorrenza e del 
Mercato" ) the examination of 
the acquisition by the French 
retailing group Promodès of joint 
control with Schemaventuno (a 
holding company belonging to 
the Benetton and Del Vecchio 
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families) of GS, a company 
formerly solely controlled by 
Schemaventuno. By a second 
decision adopted the same day 
the Commission declared the rest 
of the operation compatible with 
the common market. 
In its decisions on this case the 
Commission confirmed its 
practice concerning partial 
referral of the examination of a 
merger to a Member State (now 
codified with the latest 
amendments to the Merger 
Regulation). 
The Autorità had asked for the 
partial referral of the case on 16 
February 1998, as in its view the 
creation of the new group would 
threaten to create or reinforce a 
dominant position in certain 
local markets for retail 
distribution within Italy 
specifically, in the provinces of 
Torino, Vercelli and Aosta. 
The Commission decided to 
refer the case to the Autorità as 
regards the effects of the 
operation on each of these local 
areas. The Commission 
considered that an examination 
by the national authority would 
enable the relevant geographic 
markets and the position of the 
retail outlets concerned by the 
operation to be more precisely 
defined, so that a full 
competitive analysis could be 
carried out. 
As far as the rest of the case was 
concerned, the Commission 
considered that the notified 
operation did not raise any 
serious doubts about competition 
at the national level. Irrespective 
of the exact product market 
definition adopted, the combined 
market shares of the parties were 
generally low. The operation 
was most likely to have effects 
in North-Western Italy 
(Piemonte and Lombardia). 
Even there, however, the 
operation did not appear to raise 
serious concerns other than in 
the three provinces mentioned 
above, in view of the locations 
of the sales points, the relatively 
small market shares and 
increments and the presence of a 
number of competitors. In 
consequence, the Commission 
declared the operation 
compatible with the common 
market as regards those aspects 
which were not the subject of the 
referral to the Italian Authority. 
DECISION TO IMPOSE 
FINES FOR LATE FILING 
AND UNLAWFUL 
IMPLEMENTATION OF A 
CONCENTRATION -
ARTICLE 14 OF THE 
REGULATION 
Samsung/AST 
On 11 February 1998 the 
Commission announced that it 
had fined the Korean company 
Samsung ECU 33,000 for 
failing to notify a concentration 
to the Commission in good time 
and for putting into effect the 
concentration without the 
Commission's authorisation. 
This was the first occasion on 
which the powers under the 
Merger Regulation to impose 
fines have been exercised. 
On 22 April 1997, the 
Commission received a 
notification of a proposed 
concentration pursuant to the 
Merger Regulation by which the 
undertaking Samsung 
Electronics Co., L+d (Samsung) 
acquired control of the whole of 
AST Research, Inc. (AST) , an 
American company active in the 
market for personal computers, 
by way of public bid. However, 
the information in the 
Commission's possession 
indicated, beyond doubt, that 
Samsung had already acquired, 
without prior notification, 
control of AST at least in 
January 1996 within the meaning 
of the Merger Regulation. The 
Merger Regulation requires that 
a concentration with a 
Community dimension shall be 
notified to the Commission not 
more than one week after the 
acquisition of a controlling 
interest. In addition, Samsung 
also breached the Merger 
Regulation's requirement that an 
undertaking must not implement 
a proposed merger until it has 
received prior authorisation from 
the Commission. 
In setting the amount of the fine 
the Commission took into 
account that no damage to 
competition had been caused; that 
the parties finally notified the 
operation and the infringement 
appeared not to be intentional; 
and that Samsung recognised the 
breach and cooperated with the 
Commission in its investigations. 
Nevertheless, the absence of 
notification and the 
implementation of the merger 
without the Commission's 
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authorisation continued for a 
significant period of time; 
moreover, Samsung is an 
important company with 
significant activities in Europe 
and must be considered to be 
aware of the Community Merger 
control rules. 
The relatively small amount of 
the fines takes particular account 
of the fact that this is the first 
time a company has been fined 
for non compliance with its 
obligations under the Merger 
Regulation. 
JUDGMENTS 
France ν Commission C­68/94, 
C­30/95 European Court 
Reports 1998 0000 full 
textCelex No. : 694J0068 Date 
of document : 31/03/98 Date of 
application : 18/02/94Judgment 
of the Court of 31 March 1998. 
French Republic and Sodi, 
commerciale des potasses et de 
l'azote (SCPA) and Entreprise 
miniare et chimique (EMC) ν 
Commission of the European 
Communities. Community 
control of concentrations 
between undertakings 
Collective dominant position. 




Commission approves the buy­
out of BTRfc Formica business 
by three investment banks 
ΓΡ/98/389 [1998­04­20] 
Commission approves the GE 
SEACO joint venture between 
GE Capital Services and Sea 
Containers Ltd 
IP/98/371 [1998­04­24] 
Commission clears acquisition 
of AMB, GPA and Próxima by 
Assicurazioni Generali S.p.A. 
IP/98/370 [1998­04­24] 
The Commission clears takeover 
of Royal Nederland 
Verzerkeringsgroep by 
Assurances Générales de France 
IP/98/369 [1998­04­23] 
Commission clears the 
acquisition of BTR 
PACKAGING by OWENS­
ILLINOIS with undertakings 
submitted by OWENS­
ILLINOIS (see p. 70) 
IP/98/366 [1998­04­21] 
Wienerberger and Cremer & 
Breuer withdraw their 
notification of creation of a joint 
venture (see p. 67) 
ΓΡ/98/363 [1998­04­17] 
The Commission approves 
acquisition of Novalis and 
Nyltech by Rhodianyl, 
subsidiary of Rhône­Poulenc 
IP/98/362 [1998­04­17] 
Commission approves the 
formation of a joint venture 
between ARAG and Winterthur 
in Switzerland 
ΓΡ/98/332 [1998­04­06] 
Commission decides that Deutag 
and Ilbau asphalt plant joint 
venture is not a merger 
ΓΡ/98/326 [1998­04­03] 
Commission approves Nestlé's 
acquisition of the Spillers pet 
food business from Dalgety (see 
p. 69) 
IP/98/318 [1998­04­03] 
Commission approves merger 
between ROYAL BANK OF 
CANADA (RBC) and BANK 
OF MONTREAL (BMO) 
IP/98/294 [1998­03­26] 
Commission clears UK music 
and bookshop joint venture 
ΓΡ/98/293 [1998­03­26) 
Commission clears UK plant 
hire joint venture by Tarmac and 
Bovis 
ΓΡ/98/269 [1998­03­24] 
Commission clears hotel groups 
merger 
IP/98/268 [1998­03­24] 
Commission clears acquisition 
of Digital by Compaq 
ΓΡ/98/265 [1998­03­19] 
Commission clears a 
concentration between NORTEL 
and NORWEB in the 
telecommunications sector 
ΓΡ/98/264 [1998­03­19] 
Commission has approved the 
creation of a joint venture 
between Sanofi and Bristol­
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Myers Squibb for two new 
pharmaceuticals 
IP/98/261 [1998-03-18] 
Commission authorises the 
acquisition of a participation in 
ESTAG by EDF 
IP/98/252 [1998-03-13] 
The Commission approves the 
creation of a joint venture 
between CEREOL/EBS and 
SOFIPROTEOL in the sector of 
oilseed crushing and oil 
production 
IP/98/249 [1998-03-12] 
Commission approves joint 
venture in the modern retail 
sector (hard discount) in Italy 
IP/98/248 [1998-03-12] 
The Commission approves 
merger in foundry equipment 
sector 
IP/98/244 [1998-03-11] 
Commission has decided to refer 
partially to the Italian authorities 
the proposed acquisition of GS 
by PROMODES and 
SCHEMAVENTUNO for a 
detailed investigation. 
Commission has also cleared the 
rest of the operation. 
IP/98/243 [1998-03-11] 
Commission clears the take over 




Wolters Kluwer and Reed 
Elsevier have announced that 
following the objections of the 
Commission, they have 
abandoned their 
merger (see p. 67) 
projected 
IP/98/226 [1998-03-10] 
Commission approves joint 
venture TRANSRAPID between 
THYSSEN, ADTRANZ and 
SIEMENS to merge their 
magnetic leviation train 
activities 
IP/98/216 [1998-03-05] 
Commission approves the 
merger between Schweizerische 
Bankgesellschaft (SBG) and 
Schweizerischer Bankverein 
(SBV) (see p. 68) 
IP/98/215 [1998-03-04] 
Commission clears acquisition 
of Dutch real estate bank by the 
German Bayerische Vereinsbank 
IP/98/213 [1998-03-04] 
Commission to carry out detailed 
inquiry into proposed merger 
between WorldCom and MCI 
IP/98/206 [1998-03-02] 
Commission clears the take over 
of Havas Intermédiation by the 
group CLT-UFA 
IP/98/205 [1998-03-02] 
Waste management the UK 
group Shanks & McEwan enters 
the Belgian market by acquiring 
some of the activities of the 
Suez-Lyonnaise des Eaux group 
IP/98/202 [1998-02-27] 
Commission clears acquisition 
of ACTEBIS Holding GmbH by 
OTTO Versand 
IP/98/201 [1998-02-27] 
The Commission authorises the 
acquisition by British Steel of a 
part of the capital of Europipe 
IP/98/181 [1998-02-24] 
The Commission approves 
Caterpillar's acquisition of 
Perkins diesel engine business 
IP/98/166 [1998-02-18] 
The Commission fines Samsung 
for late notification of a 
concentration 
IP/98/159 [1998-02-17] 
Commission clears the 
acquisition of San Pellegrino by 
Nestlé 
IP/98/158 [1998-02-17] 
Commission clears a 
concentration in local and 
regional passenger transport 
sector 
IP/98/157 [1998-02-16] 
Commission clears the merger 
between Zürich and the financial 
services business of B.A.T. 
Industries 
IP/98/156 [1998-02-17] 
Commission clears merger in 
private medical insurance 
IP/98/155 [1998-02-16] 
Commission authorises the 
acquisition of Hüls Styrene 
Business by BP 
IP/98/152 [1998-02-12] 
Commission authorises the 
acquisition of the automotive 
components activities of Philips 
by Mannesmann 
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acquisition by AGFA of 
Dupont^ activities in the graphic 
arts sector, subject for conditions 
(see p. 66) 
IP/98/139 [1998­02­09] 
The Commission approves the 
acquisition of sole control over 
HAMBROS BANK by Société 
Générale 
IP/98/138 [1998­02­09] 
Commission approves the 
acquisition by PROMODES of 
SIMAGO, S.A. in the sector of 
the retail grocery in Spain (see p. 
70) 
IP/98/137 [1998­02­09] 
Commission clears the 
acquisition of Catteau by 
Promodès in the retail 
distribution sector 
IP/98/132 [1998­02­05] 
Commission to carry out detailed 
inquiry into proposed merger 
between KPMG and Ernst & 
Young (see p. 67) 
IP/98/131 [1998­02­05] 
The Commission approves the 
acquisition by Stinnes of BTL 
from Finnlines 
IP/98/130 [1998­02­05] 
Commission clears the 
acquisition of Francorosso by 
Alpi tour under the joint control 
of IFIL and the Isoardi family 
IP/98/129 [1998­02­05] 
The Commission approves the 
acquisition of Fritidsresor by 
Thomson 
IP/98/121 [1998­02­04] 
The Commission clears the 
acquisition of Boehringer 
Mannheim by Hoffmann­La 
Roche under conditions and 
obligations 
IP/98/107 [1998­01­30] 
Commission clears acquisition 
of DEUTSCHE WAGGONBAU 
AG by BOMBARDIER 
IP/98/106 [1998­01­30] 
Commission clears acquisition 
of Klöckner Chemiehandel 
GmbH by Metallgesellschaft AG 
IP/98/105 [1998­01­30] 
Commission clears the computer 
training joint venture 
"Futurekids Deutschland" 
between Burda and Bertelsmann 
ΓΡ/98/104 [1998­01­30] 
Commission clears the take Over 
of Bertrand Faure by Ecia 
IP/98/103 [1998­01­30] 
Commission opens indepth 
investigation in the Deutsche 
Telekom / Beta Research case 
IP/98/102 [1998­01­30] 
The Commission approves the 
acquisition of sole control over 
Banque Paribas Nederland by 
Banque Paribas Belgique 
IP/98/101 [1998­01­30] 
Commission approves joint 
venture between DFO and 
Scadlines to merge their Baltic 
Sea ferry operations 
IP/98/98 [1998­01­29] 
Commission clears the 
acquisition of Matra BAe 
Dynamics of a 30 % interest in 
the missile business of Daimler 
Benz Aerospace 
IP/98/97 [1998­01­28] 
The Commission authorises two 
concentrations affecting the 
situation of control in CABLE I 
TELEVISIO DE CATALUNYA 
(a cable operator in Catalonia) 
IP/98/83 [1998­01­26] 
The Commission approves the 
acquisition of sole control over 
Banque Bruxelles Lambert/Bank 
Brussel Lambert by the ING 
GROEP 
IP/98/78 [1998­01­23] 
Commission clears joint venture 
between Dow Jones and NBC 
IP/98/77 [1998­01­22] 
Commission opens indepth 
investigation in the 
BERTELSMANN / KIRCH / 
PREMIERE case 
ΓΡ/98/74 [1998­01­22] 
Commission to carry out detailed 
inquiry into proposed merger 
between Price Waterhouse and 
Coopers & Lybrand 
IP/98/73 [1998­01­22] 
Commission approves a joint 
venture in the clinical sector 
IP/98/57 [1998­01­20] 
The Commission authorises the 
acquisition by Usinor of control 
of Fabrique de Fer de Charleroi 
IP/98/51 [1998­01­19] 
Commission decides to open 
indepth investigations regarding 
the creation of a joint venture 
between Wienerberger and 
Cremer & Breuer (see p. 67) 
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IP/98/50 [1998-01-19] 
The Commission approves 
merger in information 
technology sector in Denmark 
IP/98/49 [1998-01-19] 
The Commission approves the 
creation of a joint venture 
between Eastman Kodak and 
Sun Chemical in the sector of 
graphic arts 
IP/98/48 [1998-01-19] 
Commission clears the 
acquisition by Mannesmann of a 




Commission clears acquisition 
of PFANNKUCH-Group by 
SPAR Handels AG/ITM-Group 
IP/98/46 [1998-01-19] 
Commission clears acquisition 
of parts of PRO-Group by SPAR 
Handels AG/ITM-Group 
IP/98/38 [1998-01-15] 
The Commission approves the 
acquisition by ARBED / 
ACERALIA of the ARISTRAIN 
STEEL group 
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LIBERALISATION & STATE INTERVENTION 
Application of Article 90 EC 
Main developments between Γ' January and 3(f May 
DØveloppements les plus røcenti 
Angela BARDENHEWER, DG IV-A-1 
Télécommunications 
Cable review 
Deux directives, celle de 1995 
concernant le câblé et celle de 
1996 sur la libéralisation totale 
des télécommunications au 1er 
janvier 1998, imposaient à la 
Commission une révision de la 
directive "câble" sous deux 
aspects particuliers : 
­ l'incidence sur la concurrence 
de la fourniture, par un seul et 
même opérateur, de réseaux 
de télécommunications et de 
réseaux câblés de 
télédistribution, et 
­ les restrictions à l'utilisation 
des réseaux de 
télécommunications pour la 
fourniture de capacité de 
télédistribution par câble. 
A la lumière des conclusions de 
deux études qu'elle a fait 
entreprendre, la Commission a 
adopté, le 17 décembre 1997 une 
Communication concernant le 
réexamen de ces deux 
directives', ensemble avec un 
projet de directive modifiant la 
directive 90/388/CEE en vue de 
garantir que les réseaux de 
1 Directive 95/51/CE de la Commission, JO 
L 256 du 26.10.1995, p. 49. 
2 Directive 96/19/CE de la Commission, JO 
L 74 du 22.3.1996, p. 13. 
3 JO C 71 du 7.3.1998, p. 4­17. 
télécommunications et les 
réseaux câblés de télévision 
appartenant à un seul et même 
opérateur constituent des entités 
juridiques distincts4. La 
Commission compte finaliser 
son texte législatif après avoir 
pris connaissance de 
commentaires éventuels qui 
devront lui parvenu·, dans un 
délai de deux mois environ, 
après la publication au Journal 
Officiel (7.3.1998). 
En vue de conclure la 
consultation publique, la 
Commission a publié une 
invitation d'expression d'intérêt 
pour la réunion de consultation 
qu'elle envisage d'organiser.5 
Internet 
Le 1 janvier 1998, la 
Commission a adopté une 
Communication définissant sa 
politique en matière de 
communications vocales sur 
Internet.6 Il est prévu dans ce 
4 JO C 71 du 7.3.1998, p. 23­26. 
5 J.O. C150 du 16.5.1998, p. 3. Les parties 
intéressées peuvent manifester leur intérêt 
par télécopieur (32­2­2969819) ou par 
courrier électronique (cable­
review@dg4.cec.be). Ces parties seront 
individuellement invitées à la réunion de 
consultation 
6 JO n° C 6 du 10.01.1998, p. 4). Le texte de 
la Communication est également 
disponible sur le site web de la DG IV 
(http://www.europa.eu.int/en/comm/dg04/l 
awliber/libera.htm). 
texte que les communications 
vocales sur Internet ne relèveront 
pas du règlement régissant la 
téléphonie vocale jusquà ce 
qubn certain nombre de 
conditions aient été remplies. 
Dans le cadre du droit 
communautaire, la fourniture de 
communications vocales sur 
Internet ne constitue pas pour 
lheure un "service de téléphonie 
vocale" au sens de la directive 
90/388/CEE ('directive services 
de télécommunication'7· Les 
Etats membres ne peuvent donc 
la soumettre à des procédures de 
licence individuelle, mais tout au 
plus à des procédures de 
déclaration. 
Les communications vocales sur 
Internet ne seront définies 
comme services de téléphonie 
vocale et, partant, ne relèveront 
de la réglementation sur les 
services classiques de téléphonie 
vocale quâ condition que: 
­ ces communications fassent 
l'objet dbne exploitation 
commerciale, 
­ elles soient fournies pour le 
public, 
­ le service soit fourni au 
départ et à destination des 
points de terminaison du 
réseau public 
­ il comporte le transport direct 
et la commutation de la voix 
en temps réel. 
Actuellement, les services de 
communication vocale sur 
Internet ne satisfont pas à tous 
ces critères; ils ne seront donc 
7 Directive de la Commission; JO L 192 du 
24.7.1990, p. 10. 
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pas considérés pour le moment 
comme des services de 
téléphonie vocale. Les marchés 
resteront ainsi ouverts à 
linnovation en ce qui concerne 
Internet, ce qui pourrait 
permettre de proposer des 
services de téléphonie 
multimédia sur Internet. Cela 
signifie également que les 
prestataires d'accès à Internet ne 
peuvent être tenus de contribuer 
au financement du service 
universel. 
Toutefois, compte tenu de la 
sophistication croissante de leur 
offre, certains fournisseurs de 
communications vocales sur 
Internet pourront être considérés 
comme des prestataires de 
services de téléphonie vocale sur 
la base des critères énoncés et 
seront donc soumis à la 
réglementation applicable aux 
fournisseurs de services de 
téléphonie vocale dès qulls 
offriront une qualité de service 
équivalente aux services 
classiques de téléphonie vocale. 
La Communication de la 
Commission concerne également 
les Etats membres qui ont obtenu 
des délais de mise en oeuvre 
supplémentaires pour la 
libéralisation de la téléphonie 
vocale après le 1er janvier 1998. 
Elle précise que, jusquâ la date 
de la libéralisation totale, ces 
pays ne peuvent par exemple 
bloquer la fourniture sur Internet 
dbn service de communications 
vocales fonctionnant par carte, à 
moins qulls ne puissent apporter 
la preuve que le service en cause 
ne constitue qubn simple 
substitut du service universel de 
téléphonie vocale et quii se 
taille à ce titre une part 
importante du marché des 
communications internationales 
et à longue distance. 
Lëtat de la libéralisation du 
marché des télécommunications 
dans lUnion 
Un peu plus dbn mois après 
l'ouverture complète du marché 
des télécommunications dans la 
majeure partie de lUnion, le 18 
février 1998, la Commission a 
adopté un nouveau rapport sur la 
mise en oeuvre par les Etats 
membres des directives en 
matières de télécommu-
nications.8 Ce rapport fournit 
une "photographie" de la 
situation après le 'big bang" du 
premier janvier et confirme que 
dans tous ces Etats membres de 
nouveaux opérateurs ont été 
autorisés à fournir des services 
de téléphonie vocale ou à établir 
et· exploiter des réseaux publics 
de télécommunications en 
concurrence avec l'opérateur en 
place. 
La Commission avait déjà 
adopté, en mai et octobre 1997, 
des rapports sur l'état de la 
transposition de ce paquet 
réglementaire et a ainsi pu 
identifier les Etats dans lesquels 
des efforts étaient encore 
nécessaires pour assurer une 
mise en oeuvre effective du 
cadre réglementaire. En 
novembre 1997, la Commission 
avait lancé des mises en demeure 
à l'encontre de sept Etats 
COM (1998) 80 final. 
membres qui n'avaient pas 
respectés des échéances 
importantes. Ces procédures se 
sont révélées efficaces, et ont, 
comme le démontre le rapport de 
février 1998, poussé les pays 
concernés à prendre les mesures 
appropriées en vue de la 
transposition du cadre 
réglementaire. 
Ce bilan globalement 
encourageant est important 
compte tenu de l'entrée en 
vigueur de l'accord OMC sur les 
services de télécommunications 
de base, début février 1998. 
Il n'en demeure pas moins que le 
rapport identifie un certains 
nombre de problèmes 
subsistants, y compris en ce qui 
concerne la transposition de la 
directive 90/388/CEE de juin 
1990 (cali-back non libéralisé au 
Portugal et en Grèce par 
exemple). En outre des retards 
de transposition de la 
libéralisation des infrastructures 
alternatives ont été observés 
dans certains des Etats membre 
qui bénéficient de dérogations 
(et ceci malgré les périodes 
additionnelles de mise en oeuvre 
accordée à ces Etats membres 
pour l'adoption de ces mesures). 
Certains Etats membres n'ont en 
outre toujours pas totalement mis 
en oeuvre la directive visant à 
libéraliser les services par 
satellite, alors que la troisième 
génération de mobiles (UMTS) 
et les futurs services de 
communications personnelles 
par satellites (S-PCS) sont déjà à 
l'ordre du jour. Cette situation 
est lourde de conséquences pour 
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la préparation et le 
développement des ces services. 
La Commission a depuis 
l'adoption du rapport entamé des 
procédures dinfraction à 
rencontre de certains des Etats 
membres concernés, concernant 
des cas de transposition 
incomplète. En parallèle, elle 
continue l'examen de la 
conformité des mesures 
nationales relatives à lintercon­
nexion, au contour du service 
universel et aux modalités de 
calcul du coût et du financement 
de celui­ci, ainsi qu'aux 
procédures et conditions d'octroi 
des autorisations. Limpact de 
ces mesures nationales sur les 
conditions de concurrence est 
analysé et des actions devront 
être prises sil devait s'avérer 
qu'elles constituent des barrières 
à l'entrée pour les nouveaux 
opérateurs, pour s'assurer que 
l'ouverture des télécommu­
nications à la concurrence profite 
davantage aux citoyens 
européens. 
Dans sa réunion du 6 mai 1998 
la Commission a ainsi décidé 
d'entamer des procédures 
dinfraction formelles à 
rencontre des certains Etats 
membres qui ont imposé des 
obligations aux opérateurs de 
télécommunications d'affecter 
une partie de leurs recettes ou 
investissements à la recherche et 
développement ou à la 
formation. De telles conditions 
ne sont en effet pas prévues dans 
la directive 97/13/CP, qui 
Directive du Parlement et du Conseil du 
10.4.1997 relative à un cadre commun pour 
harmonise de manière 
exhaustive les conditions 
auxquelles l'octroi de licences 
peut être soumis. 
De nouveaux opérateurs dans le 
marché des radiocommuni­
cations mobiles 
La date du 1er janvier 1998, était 
également l'échéance fixée pour 
l'octroi d'autorisations dans 
l'ensemble de la Communauté 
pour l'exploitation de systèmes 
mobiles DCS­1800. Tous les 
Etats membres ayant à cette date 
entamé les procédures 
nécessaires, sauf lltalie. La 
Commission a donc décidé 
d'entamer une procédure 
dinfraction contre lltalie, qui a 
néanmoins été suspendue, suite à 
un accord entre la Gouvernement 
italien et la Commission. Selon 
cet accord, les services de la 
Commission ont été étroitement 
associés aux différentes étapes 
de l'élaboration et du lancement 
de l'appel d'offres pour un 
troisième opérateur mobile en 
Italie. La procédure de sélection 
devrait pouvoir être achevée à la 
fin du mois de mai. 
Compte tenu du temps 
nécessaire pour construire les 
réseaux concernés, les nouveaux 
opérateurs devraient commencer 
d'opérer à la fin de cette année, 
ce qui devrait augmenter le degré 
de concurrence au bénéfice des 
utilisateurs. 
les autorisations générales et les licences 
individuelles dans le secteur des services 
de télécommunication, JO L 117 du 
7.5.1997, p. 15. 
Énergie 
La directive concernant le 
marché intérieur du gaz a été 
adoptée lors du Conseil 
"Energie" du 11 mai 1998. Les 
principales dispositions de cette 
directive, qui n'ont pas été 
modifiées depuis l'adoption de la 
position commune par le Conseil 
en décembre 1997, ont été 
décrites dans le numéro 
précèdent du Newsletter. 
PRESS RELEASES 
IP/98/309 [1998­03­31] 
Commisison adopts Notice on the 
application of the competition rules 
to Access agreements in the 
telecommunications sector 
IP/98/182 [1998­02­25] 
Commission publishes Monitoring 
Report on Universal Service in the 
Telecommunications Sector 
IP/98/165 [1998­02­18] 
Third report on the implementation 
of the EU telecommunications 
regulatory package 
IP/98/39 [1998­01­15] 
Commission defines its position on 
Internet telephony in the context of 
the liberalisation of the EU 
telecommunications markets 
IP/98/32 [1998­01­14] 
An Event marking the liberalisation 
of telecom­munications in Europe, 
Bibliothèque Solvay, Brussels, 19* 
January 
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Main developments between Is' January and 30,h April 1998 
Recent developments 
The Commissions proposal for a 
Regulation on State Aid procedures 
Adinda SINNAEVE, DG IV-G-1 
I. The Commission £ objectives 
At the Industry Council of 14 
November 1996, under the Irish 
Presidency, the Commission 
launched an initiative for the 
reorientation of State aid control 
by the use of Article 94 of the 
Treaty. The modernisation 
programme would focus on the 
implementation of a more 
transparent, coherent and 
efficient policy. The Council 
welcomed these ambitious plans 
and encouraged the Commission 
to make proposals. 
With the adoption of a 
Commission proposal for an 
enabling Regulation on 15 July 
1997, a first step to realise the 
Commission's objectives was 
made. Adopted by the Council 
on 7 May 1998, this Regulation 
empowers the Commission to 
exempt certain categories of aid 
from the notification obligation 
by means of block exemption 
Regulations. This should 
simplify the control system for 
'Routine" cases and allow the 
Commission to concentrate its 
resources on the more complex 
and most distortive cases. 
The proposal for a procedural 
Regulation adopted by the 
Commission on 18 February 
1998 is the second chapter of the 
Commission's initiative under 
Article 94. It has a double goal. 
First, the proposal aims at 
increasing transparency and 
legal certainty by a codification 
and clarification of the 
procedural rules in the State aid 
field. At present, the only legal 
provisions on State aid 
procedures are those of Article 
93 of the Treaty. However, 
during the last 40 years a whole 
set of rules has been developed 
through the Commission's 
practice and the jurisprudence of 
the Court of Justice. This 
fragmentation of rules in case 
law, Commission notices, 
communications, guidelines, etc. 
has reduced the clarity of the 
system provided for in the 
Treaty. Integration of the 
procedural rules in one coherent 
text was thus needed, in order to 
make State aid control 
transparent for Member States, 
enterprises and the public at 
large. 
The proposal should not be 
limited to a codification of the 
existing practice, however. In the 
Commission's view, the 
Regulation should also 
contribute to realise the objective 
of efficiency and a reinforcement 
of State aid control. The 
proposal therefore enlarges the 
control system with some new 
instruments and tightens up the 
rules on those points where the 
need for a more effective system 
arose. 
II. Contents of the proposal 
As the Regulation lays down 
rules for the application of 
Article 93 of the Treaty, it 
confirms first of all the 
cornerstones of the system 
foreseen in this Article: the 
obligation of prior notification 
and the standstill clause. 
Effective State aid control can 
only function if Member States 
notify their aid projects to the 
Commission and do not put them 
into effect before the 
Commission has authorised 
them. Most of the other 
provisions are either 
consequences of these principles 
or instruments to ensure that 
they are respected. 
Concerning the "normal" 
procedure of notification the 
proposal mainly codifies the 
existing practice. According to 
Article 93 of the Treaty two 
phases can be distinguished. 
After a preliminary examination, 
the Commission may decide not 
to raise objections if the notified 
measure does not constitute aid 
or does not raise doubts as to its 
compatibility with the common 
market. If doubts about the 
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compatibility of the notified 
measure exist, the Commission 
has to open a formal 
investigation procedure and 
invite the Member State 
concerned and interested parties 
to submit their comments before 
taking a final decision. The first 
examination phase shall be 
closed within two months from 
the receipt of a complete 
notification. 
Where Member States have 
infringed the rules of prior 
notification and standstill, the 
procedure basically follows the 
same pattern as for notified aid, 
but it is completed with several 
additional instruments, which are 
mainly based on the case law of 
the Court. 
During the examination of the 
compatibility of the illegally 
granted aid, the Commission has 
different kinds of injunctions at 
its disposal: 
• the information injunction, 
which should allow the 
Commission to obtain all 
necessary information on the 
unlawful aid; 
• the suspension injunction by 
which the Commission can 
order a Member State to 
suspend the unlawful aid 
until a decision on its 
compatibility is taken. 
• the recovery injunction by 
which the Commission can 
order provisional recovery of 
the unlawful aid pending its 
final decision. 
The suspension injunction and 
the recovery injunction are 
conservatory measures and a 
logical consequence of the 
standstill clause. They aim at re-
establishing a situation which 
should have prevailed anyway if 
Article 93 (3) had been 
respected. The recovery 
injunction is also an important 
tool for the protection of 
competitors, which may have 
suffered damage from the illegal 
granting of aid, which a final 
recovery decision could not 
repair. 
In cases where the examination 
of the unlawful aid results in a 
final negative decision, meaning 
that the aid is not only unlawful 
on procedural grounds but also 
incompatible with the common 
market, definite recovery of the 
aid from the beneficiary is the 
only way to restore competition. 
Since the middle of the 1980s, 
the Commission has developed a 
policy of systematically asking 
recovery. This practice is 
reinforced in the proposal by the 
obligation for the Commission to 
order recovery of incompatible 
unlawful aid. 
What is even more important, 
however, is the execution of 
recovery decisions. Experience 
has shown that the present 
situation regarding compliance 
with recovery decisions is far 
from being satisfactory. Nearly 
10 % of the recovery decisions 
are not executed 10 years after 
they have been taken, in the 
majority of cases because of 
pending procedures before 
national courts. Such delays 
make restoration of fair 
competition practically 
impossible and diminish the 
effectiveness and credibility of 
competition policy. Moreover, 
there appear to be significant 
differences between Member 
States in this regard. The 
majority of long-pending cases 
of unrecovered aid occur in a 
few states, so that an inequality 
of treatment between 
beneficiaries is created. In order 
to remedy this situation the 
Commission's proposal states 
that national procedures for 
recovery shall only apply, 
'provided that they allow the 
immediate and effective 
execution of the Commission's 
decision" and that 'remedies 
under national law shall not have 
suspensive effect". This last 
sentence could be directly 
applied by national judges and is 
in line with the jurisprudence of 
the Court which has constantly 
rejected the application of 
provisions of national law that 
prevent the effective execution 
of recovery decisions. According 
to the proposal, beneficiaries 
could still use the legal remedies 
existing in their national law 
system, but pending the outcome 
of the proceedings, 
reimbursement should take 
place. 
It should be recalled that the 
whole procedure on unlawful 
aid, including the recovery rules, 
would never have to be applied, 
if Member States respected the 
rules of the Treaty. Figures show 
a high proportion of non-notified 
cases over the years (ca. 21 % 
of all registered cases in 1997). 
Taken account of this situation, a 
stricter policy, including the use 
of suspension and recovery 
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injunctions, and the effective 
enforcement of recovery 
decisions is indispensable. 
An efficient State aid control 
system would not be complete 
without the necessary means to 
monitor compliance with 
Commission decisions. The 
proposal contains three 
instruments that should enable 
the Commission to do this 
follow-up: 
• a general reporting 
obligation on all existing aid 
schemes. Annual reports are 
an important source of 
information in the context of 
the constant review of 
existing aid according to 
Article 93 (1) of the Treaty. 
In addition, they should 
provide information about 
pre-accession aid schemes, 
which would otherwise 
perhaps remain unknown to 
the Commission. 
• on-site monitorin gpowers of 
the Commission. The 
proposal foresees that the 
Commission shall be 
allowed to make on-site 
monitoring visits to the 
beneficiary, in cases where 
serious doubts about 
compliance with conditional 
decisions exist. If, for 
instance, the Commission 
has approved an aid under 
the condition of a capacity 
reduction, such visits may be 
the only way to check 
whether the conditions have 
been respected. 
• Co-operation with national 
independent supervisory 
bodies. The Commission 
proposes that Member States 
designate an independent 
body, such as the 
competition authority or the 
Court of Auditors, which the 
Commission can ask for a 
report when it has doubts 
about compliance with 
certain decisions. This third 
instrument would give 
national bodies a role in the 
monitoring of State aid. 
III. Third party rights 
The Commission proposal 
confirms the bilateral character 
of State aid procedures, which 
are based upon a dialogue 
between the Member State 
concerned and the Commission. 
It chose not to create specific 
new rights for third parties, and 
in particular not to give 
complainants a status similar to 
the one they enjoy in Art. 85-86 
cases. This position was recently 
upheld by the Court of Justice in 
the Sytraval judgment (see 
comment in this Newsletter). 
The Court confirmed that the 
role of competitors in State aid 
procedures is strictly limited to 
the formal investigation 
procedure, where their 
comments on the aid should help 
the Commission to obtain all the 
information necessary to assess 
compatibility. 
The Commission considers that, 
under the present system, the 
rights of third parties are already 
sufficiently protected at every 
stage of the procedure: 
• They may complain to the 
Commission about an 
alleged unlawful aid to a 
competitor. The proposal 
confirms that the 
Commission is obliged to 
examine such information. 
• Every interested party can 
obtain a copy of 
Commission decisions on 
State aid. 
• Where the Commission 
decides not to raise 
objections to an aid, 
competitors have the 
possibility to introduce an 
action for annulment of the 
decision under Article 173 
(4) of the Treaty, in order to 
oblige the Commission to 
open the formal 
investigation procedure. 
• Under the formal 
investigation procedure 
every interested party is 
invited to submit comments. 
• Finally, competitors can 
introduce actions pursuant to 
Article 173 (4) against 
positive or conditional 
decisions closing the formal 
investigation procedure. 
To create additional rights 
similar to those in anti-trust 
procedures would not only be in 
conflict with the objective of 
increasing efficiency, but also 
contradict the concept and logic 
of State aid control, which 
defines third party rights within 
the context of a procedure 
between the Member State and 
the Commission. 
IV. Conclusion 
The Commission's proposals 
under Article 94 are a historical 
step in State aid policy. After the 
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unsuccessful proposals made at 
the end of the Sixties and the 
beginning of the Seventies, no 
initiatives had been taken 
anymore and scepticism about 
the expediency of using Article 
94 had grown. Today, the 
context has changed. The 
adoption of the enabling 
Regulation on 7 May 1998 will 
allow a simplification of 
procedures. The procedural 
Regulation could be another 
important step in the 
modernisation exercise and give 
the Commission the right 
instruments to achieve its 
objectives with regard to State 
aid control. 
Recent important decisions 
Madeleine Tilmans DG IV.G. 1 
ITALIE. La Commission 
autorise un régime daides à 
l emploi en Sicile favorisant la 
transformation demplois pré-
caires en emplois stables. 
La Commission européenne a 
approuvé en décembre 1997 un 
projet de régime d'aide en faveur 
de l'emploi en Sicile (Italie). Ce 
régime prévoit, pour les 
entreprises opérant en Sicile, des 
exonérations de charges sociales 
visant à la création nette de 
nouveaux emplois ainsi que la 
transformation d'emplois 
précaires en emplois stables. 
L'aide moyenne maximale sera 
de 22.000 Ecus par emploi créé 
ou stabilisé. Le budget alloué àce 
régime est de +/- 76,5 millions 
dEcus. 
Lintérêt de ce cas réside dans 
les aides pour la transformation 
des emplois précaires en emplois 
stables. En effet, ce type d'aides 
n'est pas expressément prévu par 
les Lignes directrices 
communautaires pour les aides à 
l'emploi qui se réfèrent 
uniquement à deux catégories : 
création nette d'emplois et 
maintien de l'emploi. 
La mesure approuvée ne 
s'apparente ni à lbne ni à l'autre 
catégorie. Elle présente la 
caractéristique particulière de 
permettre la stabilisation 
d'emplois précaires. Elle 
comporte donc une valeur 
ajoutée constituée par la création 
nette d'emplois stables qui 
n'existaient pas auparavant. 
Or, la Commission a observé que 
les Lignes directrices 
communautaires concernant les 
aides à l'emploi, bien qu'elles ne 
prévoient pas expressément ce 
type d'intervention, font 
référence au concept de stabilité 
en tant que valeur positive, en 
permettant l'octroi d'aides 
uniquement dans les cas où les 
emplois sont créés pour une 
durée suffisamment longue. Le 
concept de stabilité est en outre 
présent dans la conclusion du 
Conseil européen pour l'emploi 
de novembre 1997 qui préconise, 
entre autres, des mesures 'pour 
faire reculer durablement le 
chômage". 
Sur la base de ces considérations, 
la Commission a estimé qu'on ne 
peut pas exclure à priori 
l'approbation de ces mesures 
sous prétexte qu'elles ne sont pas 
expressément prévues par les 
Lignes directrices citées, car elles 
répondent à une valeur qui y est 
inscrite et sont susceptibles 
d'améliorer la situation du 
marché du travail dbne région 
gravement affectée par le 
problème du chômage et eligible 
à la dérogation de l'article 92.3.a) 
du traité. Elle a donc conclu en 
faveur de la compatibilité de ces 
aides. 
De cette manière, la Commission 
a rendu compte du soutien de la 
politique de concurrence aux 
objectifs communautaires de 
lutte contre le chômage. 
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PORTUGAL. Aides à la 
formation. Clôture du dossier. 
The European Commission and 
the Portuguese Government have 
reached agreement on the 
repayment of training aid to 
AutoEuropa, a Ford/Volkswagen 
joint venture, that exceeded the 
applicable ceiling. The 
Commission has therefore 
decided to close the file. 
AutoEuropa is based at Setúbal in 
Portugal and produces the Ford 
Galaxy, VW Snaran and Seat 
Alhambra models. The company 
was created in 1991, on a 
greenfield site, and has been a 
foremost example of successful 
inward investment into Portugal. 
The investment required 
significant resources, some of 
which were provided in the form 
of regional funding (for 
investment) and social funding 
(for training purposes). The 
Commission approved these 
measures in 1991 and has since 
monitored their application. 
During this monitoring process 
the Commission found out that 
AutoEuropa was still receiving 
public funds for training 
purposes after the launch of 
production in 1995. The 
Commission has assessed such 
payments under the rules on 
training contained in the car aid 
framework establishing a ceiling 
of 50% of total cost for basic 
training purposes and 25% for 
job specific training. 
Once the Commission 
established that such ceilings had 
been exceeded the Portuguese 
authorities have co-operated 
fully with the Commission to 
ensure prompt repayment of the 
excessive aid. This allowed the 
Commission to close the file. 
BELGIQUE. La Commision 
décide Ibuverture de la 
procédure de lurticle 93 §2 du 
traité CE en vue dexaminer la 
compatibilité avec le marché 
commun de Ibctroi par les 
autorités régionales flamandes 
dune garantie de crédit en 
faveur de la société de 
télécommunications Hermes 
Europe Railtel N. V. 
On 7 April 1998, the 
Commission decided to open 
Article 93(2) proceedings 
concerning a State guarantee 
covering 50% of a loan of 50 
million ECU which is envisaged 
to be awarded by the Regional 
Flemish authorities to Hermes 
Europe Railtel (HER). 
HER, a joint-venture between 
the American telecommu-
nications service company GTS 
and the Dutch HIT Rail B.V, 
aims to become one of the 
leading pan-European Carrier's 
Carrier. HER intends to supply, 
via its network, a wide range of 
hi-tech transfrontier telecommu-
nications services and will thus 
be acting in a market which has 
only recently been liberalised 
throughout the EU. HER will 
set-up and operate along 
Europe's rail system an optical 
fibre network which, by mid 
1998, will interconnect 6 
countries of the EU and 
Switzerland and, by the end of 
the project, will be acting all 
over Europe. HER's 
management centre is located in 
Hoeilaart and its back-up centre 
is in Antwerp. The project will 
lead, according to the Belgian 
authorities, to the creation of 
more than 200 new jobs. 
The overall investment sum in 
Flanders will be 64 million ECU 
out of which 50 million ECU 
will be financed by private 
banks. The Flemish authorities 
intend to provide a guarantee 
securing 50% of the loans 
provided by the banks. 
The Commission had serious 
doubts as to the compatibility of 
the proposed guarantee with the 
Community rules on State aid. 
First of all, the Commission 
could not exclude that the 
guarantee constitutes State aid 
since there were doubts whether 
the guarantee would be awarded 
under market conditions as 
claimed by the Belgian 
authorities. Secondly, having in 
mind that it is normally 
favourable to investment aid of 
this kind if such an investment is 
carried out by an SME or if the 
investment creates new 
employment in a depressed area 
with high unemployment, it 
concluded that none of these two 
requirements were fulfilled in 
the present case. The 
Commission therefore decided to 
open the procedure in order to 
examen the proposed aid in more 
depth. 
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FRANCE. La Commission 
décide dbuvrir la procédure au 
titre de larticle 93 §2 du traité 
CE à llégard des aides en 
faveur de Gooding Consumer 
Electronics et de Cofidur pour 
la reprise de lancienne usine 
Grundig située à Creutzwald en 
Lorraine. 
Le 25 février 1998, la 
Commission a décidé d'ouvrir la 
procédure prévue à larticle 93 § 2 
du traité CE à l'égard des aides 
octroyées et projetées dans le 
cadre de la reprise de l'ancienne 
usine Grundig de Creutzwald en 
Lorraine en faveur, en premier 
lieu, de la société Gooding 
Consumer Electronics (GCE) et, 
après la faillite de la société créée 
sur le site et dénommée Gooding 
Electronique S.A. (GESA), en 
faveur de la société Cofidur, le 
nouveau repreneur. GCE a 
bénéficié dbne aide à la 
restructuration s'élevant à 36 
millions de FF (5,44 millions 
d'écus). Quant à Cofidur, les 
aides à la restructuration prévues 
en sa faveur pour la reprise de 
l'ancienne usine GESA se 
composent dbne aide 
exceptionnelle à linvestissement 
de 2,25 MFF et de deux aides 
régionales, soit une subvention 
de 1,4 MFF et une avance 
remboursable dont l'élément 
aide est de 0,9 MFF. 
Depuis le 22.6.1995, GESA est 
en redressement judiciaire suite à 
un dépôt de bilan. Les autorités 
judiciaires françaises ont 
maintenu ce redressement 
judiciaire jusqu'au maximum 
légal, c.à.d. février 1997. Elles 
ont, par la suite, prononcé la 
liquidation de GESA et accordé 
les actifs de cette société au 
groupe COFIDUR (le passif 
n'ayant pas été repris, 
conformément à cette procédure 
dite de cession). Par ailleurs, le 
25 juin 1997, les autorités 
françaises ont notifié à la 
Commission un projet de 
nouvelles aides à la 
restructuration en faveur de la 
société COFIDUR qui, selon les 
autorités françaises, est une 
nouvelle société. 
Dans l'ouverture de la procédure 
concernant Gooding, la 
Commission a examiné la 
conformité de l'opération 
proposée par CGE avec les 
lignes directrices 
communautaires pour les aides 
au sauvetage et à la 
restructuration des entreprises en 
difficulté qui subordonnent la 
compatibilité de l'aide au respect 
dbn certain nombre de 
conditions. Or, le retour dans un 
délai raisonnable à la viabilité à 
long terme de Gooding n'était 
pas assuré puisque l'on peut 
douter du caractère réaliste de 
certaines hypothèses concernant 
les conditions d'exploitation 
futures. La prévention de 
distorsions de concurrence 
indues n'était pas assurée 
puisque la production était 
amenée à doubler avant la fin du 
plan de restructuration. Le fait 
que l'entreprise GESA ait cessé 
d'exister peut également être un 
indice qu'elle n'avait pas la 
solidité financière nécessaire. 
En ce qui concerne l'ouverture 
de la procédure relative à 
Cofidur, celle-ci se justifie par 
l'alternative suivante : 
• soit, Cofidur est une société 
qui ne reprend pas 
l'intégralité des actifs et du 
passif de l'entreprise faillie 
(GESA). Dans ce cas, 
Cofidur ne semble a priori 
ni être responsable des aides 
versées antérieurement, ni 
être eligible à des aides à la 
restructuration; 
• soit, Cofidur reprend 
l'intégralité des actifs et du 
passif, auquel cas elle 
pourrait être eligible aux 
aides à la restructuration si 
les conditions requises par 
les lignes directrices en la 
matière sont réunies. Dans 
ce cas, elle pourrait 
également être tenue pour 
responsable du rembour-
sement des aides précédentes 
à GESA si la Commission 
devait décider qu'elles sont 
incompatibles avec le Traité. 
Une aide à la restructuration en 
faveur de Cofidur ne pourrait 
être autorisée que si ladite 
société assumait le passif de 
l'ancienne (GESA), y compris le 
remboursement des aides 
incompatibles perçues par cette 
dernière. Si, par contre, ces aides 
étaient considérées comme aides 
régionales à linvestissement, 
elles pourraient être autorisées 
au titre du régime régional 
français PAT. 
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ROYAUME-UNI. Feu vert de 
la Commission à Ibctroi d aides 
à la R&D en faveur de Rolls-
Royce. 
The Commission has authorised 
the proposed R&D aid by the 
UK authorities to Rolls-Royce 
for the development of a new 
generation of three high thrust 
aero-engines. The new engines 
will be derivatives of the 
existing Trent engines. The aid is 
in the form of a reimbursable 
advance of £200m to be granted 
over 4 years (1988-2001). The 
total cost of the R&D 
programmes is £736m. 
A pre-condition to obtain the 
Government funds is 
achievement by the company of 
a number of performance 
milestones Significant failures 
in key parts of the R&D 
programme could result in the 
withdrawal of further 
Government funding. 
The Commission found that the 
terms of the planned investment 
will be as commercial as 
possible. On the other hand, it 
recognised that given the risk of 
partial failure of the R&D 
programmes the investment 
cannot be consider as fully 
commercial. In the absence of 
the Government support the 
company would be unable to 
raise the moneys on the capital 
markets and proceed with the 
R&D programme. 
After a thorough examination of 
the case the Commission found 
that the aid complies with the 
provisions of the Community 
framework for State aid for 
R&D. In particular, the 
programme costs for which aid 
will be granted pertain to the 
stage of precompetitive 
development activity. The aid 
intensity as a proportion of the 
eligible costs is in conformity 
with the R&D framework and 
the Commission practice in the 
field of reimbursable advances. 
The Commission has verified the 
incentive effect of the aid. It has 
found that if the notified aid was 
not authorised, the Rolls Royce 
programmes could not be carried 
out because of the not 
availability of finance from 
alternative sources. 
The Community framework on 
R&D aid recognises that one aim 
of competition policy is to 
improve the international 
competitiveness of Community 
industry and thereby contribute 
to the achievement of the 
objectives set out in Article 
130(A) of the Treaty. The 
Commission considers that Rolls 
Royce is the only European 
company which has the ability to 
design and develop aero-engines 
for large civil aircraft. If the 
Commission did not authorise 
the notified aid Rolls Royce 
could not carry out the R&D 
programmes. The aid is aimed, 
inter alia, at redressing such a 
market failure and as such has an 
incentive effect. 
The Commission has examined 
the situation of the world wide 
large aero-engine industry and 
arrived at the conclusion that the 




Nevertheless, the UK 
Government has been required to 
submit an annual report to the 
Commission on the 
implementation of the aid and to 
notify in conformity with Article 
93(3) of the Treaty any 
modification to the modalities of 
the aid. 
AUTRICHE. La Commission 
a décidé dbuvrir la procédure 
au titre de larticle 93 §2 du 
traité CE à lëgard dune aide 
prévue en faveur de KNP 
Leykani au titre de la R&D 
On 25 March 1998, the 
Commission decided to open a 
procedure with respect to the 
Austrian government's proposal 
to give aid of ECU 3.5 million to 
KNP Leykam (Gratkom) for the 
development of a "mill 
information and control system" 
relating specifically to the 
construction of a new paper 
machine at Gratkorn, Austria. 
KNP Leykam is Europe's 
leading producer of coated 
woodfree paper. In 1995, it 
began an investment programme 
at their Gratkorn site which 
included investing of more than 
ECU 400 million in a new paper 
machine including production 
hall. 
The aid would contribute to the 
development of a "Mill 
Information and Control 
System" for the new paper 
machine and was notified as 
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being aid for research and 
development, falling in the 
R&D-stage of precompetitive 
development. The eligible R&D-
costs are given as ECU 8.86 
million, the proposed aid 
amounts to ECU 3.53 million. 
For the most part, these costs 
will not be incurred by KNP 
Leykam directly, but by its 
subcontractors. 
The Commission has opened the 
procedure given its doubts as to 
whether the aid proposal fulfils 
the conditions of the EU 
Framework for State Aid for 
Research and Development. In 
particular, these doubts relate to 
the R&D-character of the project 
and the "incentive effect" of the 
aid, i.e.whether the aid presents 
an inducement for the company 
to carry out research which it 
would not otherwise have 
pursued. 
THE NETHERLANDS. Dutch 
Government drops State aid to 
Philips for R&D: the 
Commission closes its 
investigation 
On 22 April 1998, the 
Commission decided to close an 
investigation into the Dutch 
government's proposal to give 
research and development aid to 
Philips Semiconductors, an 
international semiconductor 
manufacturer. Funding of ECU 4 
million was proposed for 1995, 
with further financing foreseen 
from 1996 to 1998 for a project 
on Semiconductor Systems for 
Multimedia'. The proposed 
public funding corresponded to 
operating aid for the company. 
The decision to close the 
investigation was taken after the 
withdrawal of the proposal by the 
Dutch authorities who undertook 
not to grant the aid. 
ALLEMAGNE. La Commis-
sion ouvre la procédure au titre 
de larticle 93 §2 du traité CE à 
lëgard des aides qui ont été 
octroyées au titre de la R&D au 
groupe SICAN et à ses associés. 
On 11 March 1998, the 
Commission decided to open a 
procedure with respect to aid 
given to SICAN-group. SICAN-
group, situated in Hannover, 
Niedersachsen, has been set up 
in the early 90th to undertake 
research in the area of 
microelectronics. It has carried 
out research projects together 
with and under contract to 
enterprises in Niedersachsen. 
Since 1990, the group is said to 
have received several million 
ECU in state funding. 
It seems that a total of more than 
ECU 100 mio state funding had 
never been approved by the 
Commission and the 
Commission has not been able to 
ascertain the beneficiaries, the 
precise amount of aid granted to 
them, the incentive effect and the 
necessity for such aid. 
ALLEMAGNE. Décision finale 
négative de la Commission à 
lëgard des aides à la 
restructuration octroyées à la 
Stahl- und Hartgußwerke 
Bösdorf AG. 
La Commission a décidé de 
clore par une décision négative 
la procédure de l'article 93 
paragraphe 2 du traité CE qu'elle 
avait ouverte à l'égard des aides 
à la restructuration octroyées à la 
Stahl- und Hartgußwerke 
Bösdorf AG (SHB). Cette 
société opérait dans le secteur de 
la fonte d'acier. En juin 1996, la 
Commission avait approuvé des 
aides à la restructuration en sa 
faveur pour un montant de 5 
millions de DM (2,5 MECU) 
sous forme dbne prise de 
participation par le fonds de 
consolidation du Land de 
Sachsen. Avant que cette 
décision n'ait été prise par la 
Commission, les autorités 
allemandes ont octroyé des aides 
supplémentaires qui n'ont fait 
l'objet dbne notification qu'en 
août 1996. Il s'agissait dbne 
subvention non remboursable 
dbn montant de 4,5 Millions de 
DM (2,25 MECU) et du 
prolongement du délai de 
remboursement dbn crédit 
s'élevant à 1,5 Millions de DM 
(0,75 MECU). En octobre 1996, 
la SHB a néanmoins dû 
demander l'ouverture dbne 
procédure de faillite. 
En raison des doutes quant à la 
compatibilité des nouvelles aides 
avec le marché commun et quant 
à la réalisation du plan de 
restructuration qui accompagnait 
la première aide, la Commission, 
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le 5 février 1997, a ouvert la 
procédure de l'article 93 
paragraphe 2 CE. En raison du 
défaut d informations de la part 
des autorités allemandes, la 
Commission, par décision du 15 
juillet 1997, a enjoint 
formellement à l'Allemagne de 
lui fournir les informations utiles 
à l'examen du dossier. 
La Commission a appris, dans le 
cadre de cette procédure et suite 
à l'injonction, que le plan de 
restructuration de l'entreprise 
n'avait pas été mis en oeuvre 
dbne manière conséquente. Le 
plan présenté n'avait pas été 
adapté aux difficultés de 
l'entreprise et n'était pas de 
nature à permettre le 
rétablissement de la viabilité de 
l'entreprise à long terme. De 
plus, après examen des aides à la 
lumière des lignes directrices 
communautaires pour les aides 
dEtat au sauvetage et à la 
restructuration des entreprises en 
difficulté, elle a dû conclure que 
les aides en question ne 
pouvaient pas être considérées 
comme compatibles avec le 
marché commun. 
La Commission a donc pris une 
décision négative concernant 
toutes les aides octroyées en 
faveur de SHB [DM 11 millions 
(5,5 MECU) au total] et a 
demandé le remboursement de 
ces aides. 
ALLEMAGNE. La Commis-
sion prend une décision finale 
négative à llégard des aides 
octroyées à la manufacture de 
porcelaine Triptis Porzellan 
GmbH. 
La Commission a pris une 
décision finale négative à l'égard 
des aides dont la manufacture de 
porcelaine Triptis Porzellan 
GmbH, installée dans le Land de 
Thüringen et privatisée en 1993, 
a bénéficié illégalement et qui 
consistent en l'abandon de 
créances pour un montant de 8 
millions de DEM (4 MECU) et 
en garanties du Land de 
Thüringen à concurrence de 
90 % de crédits s élevant à 26,75 
millions de DEM, l'élément aide 
représentant 24,075 millions de 
DEM (12 MECU). La 
Commission a conclu à 
l'incompatibilité de celles-ci et 
en a imposé la récupération. 
Fin 1996, les autorités 
allemandes notifièrent à la 
Commission l'octroi dbne aide 
à Triptis Porzellan sous forme 
dbn abandon de créances 
relatives à des crédits publics 
octroyés en 1995, en vue de la 
restructuration de l'entreprise, 
pour un montant de 8 millions de 
DEM, crédits qui auraient déjà 
dû être notifiés préalablement à 
leur octroi en 1995. Dans le 
cadre de cette restructuration, la 
Hessische Landesbank 
(HeLaBa), banque publique, 
avait également abandonné une 
créance de 10 millions de DEM. 
Une procédure au titre de 
l'article 93 § 2 CE fut ouverte en 
mai 1997 par la Commission en 
vue, notamment, de déterminer 
si l'abandon de créance de la 
part de la HeLaBa constituait ou 
non une aide dEtat. Au cours de 
cette procédure, il est apparu que 
non seulement la créance de 10 
millions de DEM abandonnée 
par HeLaBa était en réalité 
garantie à concurrence de 90% 
par le Land, ce qui constituait 
clairement une aide dEtat, mais 
que, de plus, au cours des années 
1993 et 1994, le Land avait 
garanti, toujours à 90 %, des 
prêts de la part de HeLaBa pour 
un total de 26,75 millions de 
DEM (les 10 millions précités 
inclus), sans qu'aucune 
notification n'en ait été faite à la 
Commission. 
Entretemps, en avril 1997, 
Triptis Porzellan a été déclarée 
en faillite. Etant donné que 
l'abandon de créance de 10 
millions de DEM datait de 1996, 
seul le solde de 16,75 millions a 
été réclamé par HeLaBa dans le 
cadre de la procédure de faillite. 
Il est pratiquement certain que 
seule une part infime de cette 
créance pourra être récupérée et 
que la garantie du Land en 
couvrira donc pratiquement 
l'intégralité. C'est pourquoi, la 
Commission, dans sa décision 
finale, a imposé la récupération 
de l'intégralité de l'aide (24,075 
millions de DEM) liée à la 
garantie accordée illégalement 
sur les 26,75 millions de DEM. 
En juin 1997, les installations de 
Triptis ont été cédées par la 
curatelle, pour un prix de 2,5 
millions de DEM (1,25 MECU), 
à l'entreprise Winterling 
Porzellan AG Kirchenlamitz qui, 
selon les autorités allemandes, 
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ne bénéficiera d'aucne aide à la 
restructuration. 
ALLEMAGNE. Décision finale 
négative concernant le régime 
d'allégement fiscal en vertu de 
larticle 52 § 8 de la Loi 
allemande relative à l'impôt sur 
le revenu 
En janvier 1998, la Commission 
a pris une décision négative à 
l'égard du régime d'allégement 
fiscal instauré par l'article 52, 
paragraphe 8, de la loi allemande 
relative à 1 impôt sur le revenu et 
prévoyant, pour les exercices 
1996 à 1998 un allégement fiscal 
particulier destiné à stimuler le 
marché des participations dans 
les entreprises situées dans les 
nouveaux Länder et à Berlin-
Ouest et, en conséquence, à 
augmenter les fonds propres de 
ces entreprises. Elle en a interdit 
l'application après avoir conclu à 
son incompatibilité avec les 
règles du traité CE pour les 
motifs qui sont exposés ci-après. 
Selon le droit fiscal allemand, les 
bénéfices résultant de la vente de 
certains biens économiques sont 
assujettis à limpôt sur les 
revenus ou à celui sur les 
sociétés. En vertu de l'article 6 b 
de cette loi, les personnes 
physiques ou morales qui 
réalisent des bénéfices par la 
cession de certains biens 
mobiliers ou immobiliers ou 
encore de participations dans des 
sociétés de capitaux et qui 
réinvestissent ces bénéfices par 
l'acquisition, entre autres, de 
participations dans des sociétés 
de capitaux peuvent déduire de 
leur base imposable 50% des 
bénéfices réinvestis dans ces 
acquisitions 
L'article 52, paragraphe 8, entré 
en vigueur le 1er janvier 1996, 
prévoit pour les exercices 1996 à 
1998 une extension de cet 
allégement fiscal. Sur la base de 
cette disposition, les assujettis 
peuvent déduire de leur base 
imposable 100% des bénéfices 
réinvestis lorsqu'il s'agit 
d'acquisition de parts liées à une 
augmentation de capital ou à la 
constitution de nouvelles 
sociétés de capitaux, et que ces 
sociétés de capitaux comptent au 
plus 250 salariés et ont leur siège 
social, ainsi que leur direction, 
dans les nouveaux Länder ou à 
Berlin-Ouest. 
Ce régime constitue donc un 
avantage direct pour les 
investisseurs bénéficiant de 
l'allégement fiscal mais il 
procure également un avantage 
indirect aux entreprises 
bénéficiant des investissements 
réalisés grâce à cet incitant 
fiscal. 
En ce qui concerne les 
bénéficiaires directs, la 
Commission a estimé que cet 
allégement fiscal constitue une 
mesure générale. Celle-ci ne 
comporte pas d'élément d'aide 
étant donné que tous les 
assujettis peuvent en bénéficier 
indépendamment de leur taille, 
leur secteur d'activité ou la 
localisation de leur siège social, 
ce pour autant que les bénéfices 
soient investis dbne manière 
déterminée. 
Par contre, ce régime constitue 
une aide dEtat en faveur des 
bénéficiaires indirects, soit les 
entreprises est-allemandes et 
berlinoises comptant maximum 
250 employés. En effet, du fait 
de l'entrée en vigueur de 
l'article 52, paragraphe 8, ces 
dernières ont bénéficié dbn 
double avantage résultant, dbne 
part, dbn accroissement de la 
demande de participations et, 
d'autre part, du fait que cette 
augmentation de la demande a 
permis à ces entreprises 
d'imposer aux investisseurs 
l'acceptation de conditions 
contractuelles plus intéressantes 
pour elles-mêmes. Ensuite, cet 
allégement entraînant une 
diminution des recettes fiscales, 
il est bien accordé au moyen de 
ressources dEtat et la 
concurrence intracommunau-
taire risque dBtre faussée car les 
entreprises qui ont leur siège 
social et leur direction dans la 
région en question seront 
favorisées par rapport à celles 
qui sont situées dans d'autres 
régions d'Allemagne et dans 
d'autres Etats membres. Même 
si l'intensité d'aide de cette 
mesure est faible, ce régime doit 
être considéré comme une aide 
dEtat conformément à la 
jurisprudence de la Cour de 
Justice selon laquelle la faible 
importance dbne aide n'exclut 
pas a priori que les échanges 
entre Etats membres soient 
affectés. 
Par ailleurs, étant donné que la 
prise de participation n'est pas 
liée à la réalisation dinvestis-
sements initiaux, ce régime 
comporte des aides au 
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fonctionnement qui ne peuvent 
pas être considérées comme 
compatibles avec le traité CE 
étant donné qu'elles sont 
également d'application à Berlin­
Ouest, région non eligible à une 
telle forme d'aide. De plus, les 
règles spécifiques afférentes à 
l'octroi d'aides dans les secteurs 
sensibles ne sont pas respectées. 
Enfin, le régime prévoit comme 
condition pour la déduction 
fiscale le fait que les entreprises 
bénéficiaires des participations 
aient leur siège et leur direction 
dans les nouveaux Länder 
allemands ou à Berlin­Ouest. 
Cette disposition est contraire à 
l'interdiction de discrimination 
prévue aux articles 52 et suivants 
du traité CE relatifs à la liberté 
d'établissement. 
PAYS-BAS. La Commission 
prend une décision finale 
négative à lëgard dime aide à 
linvestissement en faveur de la 
construction dline usine de 
peroxyde dhydrogène à 
Delfzijl. 
Le 21 janvier 1998, la 
Commission a adopté une 
décision finale négative estimant 
qubne partie des aides accordées 
en 1994 par les autorités 
néerlandaises à la société FMC 
Industrial Chemicals 
(Netherlands) B.V. pour la 
construction dbne usine de 
peroxyde dhydrogène à Delfzijl 
était incompatible avec le marché 
commun. 
Cette décision concerne 
uniquement les aides dépassant le 
plafond maximum autorisé par le 
régime d'aide régional à 
linvestissement applicable à la 
région où se situe Delfzijl. En 
effet, les aides perçues par FMC 
s'élèvent à 29,09 MHFL alors 
que compte tenu de l'importance 
de linvestissement réalisé, elle 
ne pouvait en recevoir que 22,79 
MHFL, soit 20% brut des coûts 
éligibles. 
La Commission a demandé aux 
autorités néerlandaises de prendre 
les mesures nécessaires afin de 
procéder à la récupération des 
aides, pour la partie dépassant 
ledit plafond régional autorisé. En 
effet, une acceptation par la 
Commission dbn dépassement 
des plafonds d'aides régionales 
constituerait un précédent 
dangereux, remettant en cause sa 
politique en la matière. 
Par ailleurs, dans le cadre du 
dossier, les autorités néerlandaises 
avaient affirmé que FMC avait 
supporté d importants 
investissements à caractère 
environnemental, pour lesquels un 
dépassement de l'intensité 
maximum d'aide régionale 
pouvait être admis. La 
Commission a constaté que le site 
où lbsine est implantée fait partie 
dbne réserve naturelle où la 
réglementation en matière 
environnementale est très stricte et 
que la compagnie n'a fait que ce 
conformer à ladite réglementation. 
Par conséquent un supplément 
d'aide n'a pu être accepté. 
JUDGMENTS 
Judgment of the Court of 2 April 
1998, Case C­367/95 P : 
Commission of the European 
Communities ν Chambre 
syndicale nationale des 
entreprises de transport de fonds 
et valeurs (Sytraval) and Brink's 
France SARL. Appeal. Case C­
367/95 P. 
Order of the Court (Fourth 
Chamber) of 25 March 1998, 
Case C­174/97 Ρ : Fédération 
française des sociétés 
d'assurances, Union des sociétés 
étrangères d'assurances, Groupe 
des assurances mutuelles 
agricoles, Fédération nationale 
des syndicats d'agents généraux 
d'assurances, Fédération 
française des courtiers 
d'assurances et de réassurances 
et Bureau international des 
producteurs d'assurances et de 
réassurances ν Commission of 
the European Communities. 
Appeal. 
Judgment of the Court (Sixth 
Chamber) of 19 February 1998, 
Case C­309/95 : Commission of 
the European Communities ν 
Council of the European Union. 
Exceptional aid to producers of 
table wine in France. 
Judgment of the Court (Sixth 
Chamber) of 29 January 1998, 
Case C­280/95 : Commission of 
the European Communities ν 
Italian Republic. State aid ­
Fiscal bonus on certain taxes ­
Recovery of aid ­ Not absolutely 
impossible 






** c^= 1998 Number 2 June 89 
» STATE AID 
PRESS RELEASES 
IP/98/380 [1998­04­22] 
The Commission investigates the 
opening of two new Italian 
shipyards 
IP/98/379 [1998­04­22] 
Dutch Governement drops State 
aid to Philips for R&D: the 
Commission closes its file (see p. 
86) 
IP/98/378 [1998­04­22] 
Commission adopts a negative 
decision on aid to Stahl­ und 
Hargußwerke Bôsdord AG 
IP/98/377 [1998­04­22] 
Commission takes a final 
negative decision against Triptis 
Pozellan GmbH (see p. 87) 
IP/98/347 [1998­04­14] 
Commission opens procedure 
into aid to Wildauer Kurbelwelle 
GmbH 
IP/98/349 [1998­04­08] 
Commission examines State 
guaranteed loan to Hermes 
Europe Railtel (see p. 83) 
IP/98/348 [1998­04­08] 
Commission approves aid for 




prolongation of aid scheme for 
the Land of Thuringia for the 
years 1997­2001 
IP/98/338 [1998­04­07] 
Commission opens procedure 
into aid to the French maritime 
company Brittany Ferries 
IP/98/336 [1998­04­07] 
Aid for debt settlement and 
consolidation for agricultural co­
operatives and other entreprises 
in Greece 
IP/98/302 [1998­03­31] 
Commission inquiry into State 
aid to Centrale del Latte di 
Roma' 
IP/98/288 [1998­03­25] 
Commission closes its 
investigation over transport aid to 
Volvo Truck Corporation in 
Umeå (northern Sweden) 
IP/98/287 [1998­03­25] 
Commission decides to 




environmental aid to Belgian 
steel company SIDMAR 
IP/98/285 [1998­03­25] 
Commission opens investigation 
into aid to Spanish synthetic 
fibres producer BRILEN S.A. 
JP/98/284 [1998­03­25] 
Hoogovens Staal : Commission 
raises no objections to proposed 
aid in favour of the «Cyclone 
Converter Furnace » R&D 
project 
IP/98/283 [1998­03­25] 
Commission authorises R&D aid 
to Rolls­Royce large engine 
programmes in the United 
Kingdom. 
IP/98/282 [1998­03­25] 
Commission approves regional 
aid to Opel for two projects in 
Bochum 
IP/98/281 [1998­03­25] 
Commission opens procedure 
regarding State aid to Draiswerke 
GmbH in Mannheim 
IP/98/280 [1998­03­25] 
Commission opens enquiry 
against Italian state aid for road 
sector and intermodal transport 
IP/98/278 [1998­03­25] 
Approval for aid to the RISO 
2000 project in Italy 
ΓΡ/98/260 [1998­03­18] 
Land purchases in the new 
Länder 
IP/98/241 [1998­03­11] 
The Commission decides to 
investigate state aid to Océ N.V. 
IP/98/240 [1998­03­11] 
Banco di Sicilia and Sicilcassa: 
Commission requsts further 
information on support measures 
for two Sicilian banks 
IP/98/239 [1998­03­11] 
Commission opens procedure 
regarding State aid th the SICAN 
group for R&D in 
microelectronics 
IP/98/236 [1998­03­11] 
Autoeuropa : closure of file after 
satisfactory cooperation between 
the Commision and Portuguese 
authorities 
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5- STATE AID 
IP/98/192 [1998­02­26] 
Commission opens procedure 
against investment aid to Tubos 
Europa (Extramadura, Spain) 
IP/98/186 [1998­02­26] 
Restructuring of the Volkswerft 




Commission declares German 
development aid to Indonesia in 
breach of the shipbuilding 
Directive 
IP/98/189 [1998­02­25] 
La Commission ouvre une 
procédure à l'égard d'aides en 
faveur d'Addinol Mineralölwerke 
GmbH 
IP/98/188 [1998­02­25] 
Commission approves proposed 
employment aid scheme in Sicily 
(see p. 82) 
IP/98/187 [1998­02­25] 
Commisison declares aid to 
Bremer Vulkan incompatible 
with the Treaty 
IP/98/171 [1998­02­18] 
Commission opens procedure 
against aid to Lürssen in relation 
to take­over of Bremer Vulkan 
Marine Schiffbau GmbH 
IP/98/170 [1998­02­18] 
Improved transparency in state­
aid monitoring procedures 
IP/98/169 [1998­02­18] 
Commission gives go­ahead for 
regional aid scheme for research 
and development in the region of 
Castile­leon (Spain) 
IP/98/168 [1998­02­18] 
Commission approves aid 
scheme for SMEs in the tourism 
sector in Doñana (Andalusia, 
Spain) 
IP/98/167 [1998­02­18] 
Commission opens investigation 




Commisison approves training 
aid to Opel Belgium 
IP/98/68 [1998­01­21] 
Commisison terminates 
proceeding concerning aid of 
FRF 2.5 billion to Société 
Française de Production (SFP) 
IP/98/67 [1998­01­21] 
Commission takes note of 
unconditional acceptance by 
Sweden of new state aid 
framework for motor vehicle 
industry 
IP/98/66 [1998­01­21] 
Guidelines of the Wirtschafts­
service Burgenland Aktien­
gesellschaft (WIBAG) on 




The Commission approves a 
budget increase ot the 
consolidation fund of 
Mecklenburg­Vorpommern 
IP/98/64 [1998­01­21] 
The Commisison finds that no 
state aid elements are involved in 
the privatisation of the Spanish 
Aluminium Group INESPAL 
IP/98/63 [1998­01­21] 
Green light for aid for 
employment in Berlin and North 
Rhine­Westphalia 
IP/98/13 [1998­01­09] 
The European Commission 
approves an aid programme for 
defence industry conversion in 
Spain 
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INTERNATIONAL 
ConfØrence sur le droit et la politique 
de concurrence Tunis les 1 et 2 avril 
1998 
Jean-Fran ois PONS, Directeur GØnØral Adjoint 
Le Conseil de la Concurrence de 
Tunisie, présidé par M. 
CHATTI, a organisé les 1er et 
2 avril 1998 une conférence de 
haut niveau sur la concurrence, 
ouverte à de nombreux experts et 
praticiens tunisiens et étrangers, 
qui était la première du genre sur 
la rive Sud de la Méditerranée. 
Elle a permis de faire le point sur 
la mise en oeuvre du droit de la 
concurrence en Tunisie ­ qui est 
un droit jeune, puisque la 
création du Conseil de la 
Concurrence ne remonte qua 
1995 ­, ainsi que sur les 
développements récents de la 
politique de concurrence en 
Europe, sur la base d'exposés 
introductifs de Mesdames 
SCHIRMANS (Présidente du 
Conseil de la Concurrence de 
Belgique) et PICARD 
(Rapporteur Général du Conseil 
de la Concurrence français), 
MM. JENNY (Vice­Président du 
Conseil de la Concurrence en 
France, Président du Comité de 
lO.C.D.E. sur la concurrence, 
ainsi que du Groupe de travail ad 
hoc de 10.M.C), PONS 
(Directeur Général adjoint de la 
D.G. IV) et SOUTOU (Conseil 
de la Concurrence français). 
Cette comparaison internationale 
a aussi été complétée par deux 
exposés de M. BOUFAMA, 
Président de l'autorité de 
Concurrence algérienne, et de M. 
DHANJEE, représentant de la 
CNUCED. 
Cette conférence, ouverte par M. 
BOUAZIS, Ministre du 
Domaine de lEtat et clôturée par 
M. ZNEIDI, Ministre du 
Commerce, a été l'occasion, 
pour le Gouvernement tunisien, 
de confirmer sa volonté de voir 
mise en oeuvre une réelle 
politique de concurrence en 
Tunisie. Elle a été suivie par un 
nombreux public, qui est 
largement intervenu à lissue des 
exposés. 
Cette volonté exprimée par les 
autorités tunisiennes est d'autant 
plus importante que l'accord 
d'association entre la Tunisie et 
lUnion européenne est entré en 
vigueur le 1er mars 1998 et que, 
aux termes de cet accord, la 
Tunisie devra appliquer les 
règles de concurrence du Traité 
de lUnion européenne, dès lors 
que les pratiques en cause 
affectent le commerce entre les 
deux parties à l'Accord. 
Les intervenants européens ont 
assuré les Autorités tunisiennes 
de leur disponibilité pour leur 
fournir la coopération nécessaire. 
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INFORMATION SECTION 
DG IV staff list 
Directeur general 
Directeur general adjoint 
plus particulièrement chargé des Directions C et D 
Directeur général adjoint 
plus particulièrement chargé des Directions E et F 
Conseiller auditeur 
Conseiller pour les réformes 
Assistants du Directeur général 
directement rattachés au Directeur général : 
1. Personnel, Budget, Administration, Information 
2. Questions informatiques 
DIRECTION A 
Politique de concurrence, Coordination, Affaires 
Internationales et relations avec les autres Institutions 
Conseiller 
Conseiller 
1. Politique générale de la concurrence et coordination 
Chef adjoint d'unité 
2. Affaires juridiques et législation 
Chef adjoint d'unité 
3. Affaires internationales 
Chef adjoint d'unité 
DIRECTION B 
Task Force "Contrôle des opérations 
de concentration entre entreprises" 















Götz DRA UZ 
1. Unité opérationnelle I 
2. Unité opérationnelle II 
3. Unité opérationnelle III 
4. Unité opérationnelle IV 
DIRECTION C 
Information, communication, multimédias 
1. Télécommunications et Postes 
Coordination Société d'information 
- Cas relevant de l'Article 85/86 
- Directives de libéralisation, cas article 90 
2. Médias, éditions musicales 
Télécopieur du Greffe Concentrations 
Claude RAKOVSKY 
Wolfgang MEDERER 2953584 
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1. Services financiers (banques, assurances) 
2. Transports et infrastructures des transports 










Industries de base et énergie 
1. Acier, métaux non ferreux, produits minéraux non 
métalliques, bâtiment, bois, papier, verre 
2. Produits chimiques de base et transformés, 
caoutchouc 
3. Energie et eau 
4. Cartels et Inspections 










Industries des biens d'équipement et de consommation 
1. Industries mécaniques etélectriques et industries diverses 
2. Automobiles, autres moyens de transport 
et construction mécanique connexe 
3. Produits agricoles, alimentaires, pharmaceutiques, 












Task Force "Aides dans les nouveaux Länder" 
1. Politique des aides d'Etat 
Chef adjoint d'unité 
2. Aides horizontales 
3. Aides à finalité régionale 
Chef adjoint d'unité 
4. Acier, métaux non ferreux, nines, construction 
navale, automobiles et fibres synthétiques 
Chef adjoint d'unité 
5. Textiles, papier, industrie chimique, pharmaceutique, 
électronique, construction méanique et autres 
secteurs manufacturiers 
Chef adjoint d'unité 
6. Entreprises publiques et services 
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> INFORMATION SECTION 
Documentation 
This section contains details of recent speeches or articles given by 
Community officials that may be of interest. Copies of these are available 
from DG IVs Home Page on the World Wide Web. Future issues of the 
Newsletter will contain details of confernces on Comteition policy which 
have been brughi to our attention. Organisere of conferences that wish to 
make use of this facility shoul refer to page 1 for the address ofDG IVs 
Information Officer. 
Catalogue No: CM­29­93­A01­xx­C 
(xx=language code: ES, DA, DE, 
GR, EN, FR, IT, NL, PT 
Competition law in the European 
Communities­Addendum to Volume 
ΙΑ­Rules applicable to undertakings 
­ Situation at 1 March 1995. 
Catalogue No: CM­88­95­436­xx­C 
(xx=language code: ES, DA, DE, 
GR, EN, FR, IT, NL, PT 
S P E E C H E S A N D A R T I C L E S 
EC Competition Policy and its 
Implications for the Sports Sector ­
SCHAUB ­ World Sports Forum ­
St Moritz ­ 8/03/ 
Entwicklung der Breitband­
kabelnetze aus Europäischer sieht ­
UNGERER ­ ONLINE'98 Congress 
II. Symposium II.4 ­ Düsseldorf ­
18/02/98 
The Impact of European 
Liberalisation and the WTO ­
UNGERER ­ CommEd Conference 
: Pricing '98 ­ Brussels ­11/02/98 
International co­operation in 
antitrust matters: making the point 
in the wake of the Boeing/MDD 
proceedings ­ SCHAUB 
Newsletter­February 1998 ­ 1/02/98 
Innovation and Competition ­ PONS 
Newsletter­February 1998 
1/02/98 
Competing for the Internet ­
COATES ­ Newsletter­February 
1998 ­ 1/02/98 
Commentaire des arrets de la Cour 
du 23.10.97 relatifs aux monopoles 
d'importation et d'exportation de gaz 
et d'électricité ­ LEVASSEUR ­
Newsletter­February 1998 ­ 1/02/ 
Dominance sur un marché de 
produits secondaires 
CHEVALIER ­ Newsletter­
February 1998 ­ 1/02/98 
Ports maritimes et concurrence ­
ARMANI ­ Newsletter­February 
1998 ­ 1/02/98 
State aid policy enforcement in the 
new Länder of Germany ­ Status in 
1997 ­ DEPYPERE ­ Newsletter­
February 1998 ­ 1/02/98 
Probleme der Buchpreisbindung 
nach europäischem Kartellrecht ­
KAUFMANN ­ Venise ­ 29/01/98 
C O M M U N I T Y P U B L I C A T I O N S O N 
COMPETITION 
Unless otherwise indicated, 
these publications may be 
purchased from the sales agents 
of the European Communities 
(see last page) ; use ISBN or 
Catalogue Number to order. 
Legislation 
Competition law in the European 
Communities­Volume IA­Rules 
applicable to undertakings 
Situation at 30 june 1994; this 
publication contains the text of all 
legislative acts relevant to Articles 
85, 86 and 90. " 
Competition law in the European 
Communities­Volume IIA­Rules 
applicable to State aid ­ Situation at 
31 December 1994; this publication 
contains the text of all legislative 
acts relevant to Articles 42, 77, 90, 
92 to 94. 
Catalogue No: CM­29­93­A02­xx­C 
(xx=language code: ES, DA, DE, 
GR, EN, FR, IT, NL, PT 
Competition law in the EC­Volume 
II B­Explanation of rules applicable 
to state aid ­ Situation at December 
1996 
Catalogue No: CM­03­97­296­xx­C 
(xx=language code= FR; les autres 
versions suivront 
Competition law in the European 
Communities­Volume IIIA­Rules in 
the international field ­ Situation at 
31 December 1996 (Edition 1997) 
Catalogue No: CM­89­95­858­xx­C 
xx= language code: ES, DA, DE, 
GR, EN, FR, IT, NL, PT, SV, FI 
Merger control in the European 
Union 
Catalogue No: CV­88­95­428­xx­C 
(xx=language code: ES, DA, DE, 
GR, EN, FR, IT, NL, PT 
concerning the 




as contained in the EEA agreement 
and their implementation by the EC 
Commission and the EFTA 
surveillance authority. 
Catalogue No: CV­77­92­118­EN­C 
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Official documents 
Dealing with the Commission 
(Edition 1997)­Notifications, 
complaints, inspections and fact­
finding, powers under Articles 85 
and 86 of the EEC Treaty 
Catalogue No: CV­95­96­552­xx­C 
(xx= FR, ES, EN, DE, NL, IT, PT, 
SV, DA 
Green paper on vertical restraints in 
EC competition policy ­COM (96) 
721­ (Ed. 1997) 
Catalogue No: CB­CO­96­742­xx­C 
(xx= ES DA DE GR EN FR IT NL 
PT SV Π) 
Final report of the multimodal 
group ­ Presented to Commissioner 
Van Miert by Sir Bryan Carsberg, 
Chairman of the Group (Ed. 1997). 
Catalogue No: CV­11­98­803­EN­C 
The institutional framework for the 
regulation of telecommunications 
and the application of EC 
competition rules ­ Final Report 
(Forrester Norall & Sutton). 
Catalogue No: CM­94­96­590­EN­C 
Competition aspects of access 
pricing­Report to the European 
Commission 
December 1995 (M. Cave, P. 
Crowther, L. Hancher). 
Catalogue No: CM­94­96­582­EN­C 
Community Competition Policy in 
the Telecommunications Sector 
(Vol. I: July 1995; Vol. II: March 
1997)­volume II Β ­ a compedium 
prepared by DG IV­C­1; it contains 
Directives under art 90, Decisions 
under Regulation 17 and under the 
Merger Regulation as well as 
relevant Judgments of the Court of 
Justice. ­ Copies available through 
DG IV­C­1 (tel. +322­2968623, 
2968622, fax +322­2969819). 
Brochure explicative sur les 
modalités d'application du 
Règlement (CE) Nø 1475/95 de la 
Commission concernant certaines 
catégories daccords de distribution 
et de service de vente et d'après 
vente de véhicules automobiles ­
Copies available through DG IV­F­
2 (tel. +322­2951880, 2950479, fax. 
+322­2969800) 
Competition decisions 
Recueil des décisions de la 
Commission en matière d'aides 
d'Etat ­Article 93, paragraphe 2 
(Décisions finales négatives)­ 1964­
1995 
Catalogue No: CM­96­96­465­xx­C 
[xx=FR, NL, DE et IT (1964­1995); 
EN et DA (73­95); GR (81­95); (ES 
et PT (86­95); SV et FI (95)] 
Reports of Commission Decisions 
relating to competition ­Articles 
85,86 and 90 of the EC Treaty.­
93/94 
Catalogue No: CV­90­95­946­xx­C 
(xx=ES, DA, DE, GR, EN, FR, IT, 
NL, PT) 
Reports of Commission Decisions 
relating to competition ­Articles 
85,86 and 90 of the EC Treaty.­
90/92 
Catalogue No: CV­84­94­387­xx­C 
(xx=ES, DA, DE, GR, EN, FR, IT, 
NL, PT) 
Reports of Commission Decisions 
relating to competition ­Articles 
85,86 and 90 of the EC Treaty.­
89/90 
Catalogue No: CV­73­92­772­xx­C 
(xx=ES, DA, DE, GR, EN, FR, IT, 
NL, PT) 
Reports of Commission Decisions 
relating to competition ­Articles 
85,86 and 90 of the EC Treaty.­
86/88 
Catalogue No: CM­80­93­290­xx­C 
(xx=ES, DA, DE, GR, EN, FR, IT, 
NL, PT) 
Reports of Commission Decisions 
relating to competition ­Articles 
85,86 and 90 of the EC Treaty.­
81/85 
Catalogue No: CM­79­93­792­xx­C 
(xx=DA, DE, GR, EN, FR, IT, NL.) 
Reports of Commission Decisions 
relating to competition ­Articles 
85,86 and 90 of the EC Treaty.­
73/80 
Catalogue No: CM­76­92­988­xx­C 
(xx=DA, DE, EN, FR, IT, NL.) 
Recueil des décisions de la 
Commission en matièrre de 
concurrence ­ Articles 85, 86 et 90 
du traité CEE­64/72 
Catalogue No: CM­76­92­996­xx­C 
(xx=DE, FR, IT, NL.) 
Competition reports 
European Community Competition 
Policy 1997 
Catalogue No: CV­12­98­263­XX­C 
(xx= ES, DA, DE, GR, EN, FR, IT, 
NL, PT, FI, SV) 
XXVI Report on Competition 
Policy 1996 
Catalogue No: CM­04­97­242­xx­C 
European Community Competition 
Policy 1996 
Catalogue No: CM­03­97­967­xx­C 
(xx= ES*, DA*, DE*, GR*, EN*, 
FR*, IT*, NL*, PT*, Π*, SV*) 
XXV Report on Competition Policy 
1995 
Catalogue No: CM­94­96­429­xx­C 
European Community Competition 
Policy 1995 
Catalogue No: CM­94­96­421­xx­C 
(xx= ES*, DA*, DE*, GR*, EN*, 
FR*, IT*, NL*, PT*, FI*, SV*) 
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XXIV Report on competition policy 
1994 
Catalogue No: CM­90­95­283­xx­C 
(xx=ES, DA, DE, GR, EN, FR, IT, 
NL, PT, SV, FI) 
European Community compe­tition 
policy 1994 (xx=ES, DA, DE, GR, 
EN, FR, IT, NL, PT, SV, FI ). 
Copies available through Cellule 
Information DG IV 
XXIIIe Report on competition 
policy 1993 
Catalogue No: CM­82­94­650­xx­C 
(xx=ES, DA, DE, GR, EN, FR, IT, 
NL, PT) 
XXIIe Report on competition policy 
1992 
Catalogue No: CM­76­93­689­xx­C 
(xx=ES, DA, DE, GR, EN, FR, IT, 
NL, PT 
XXIe Report on competition policy 
1991 
Catalogue No: CM­73­92­247­xx­C 
(xx= ES, DA, DE, GR, EN, FR, IT, 
NL, PT) 
Fifth survey on State aid in the 
European Union in the 
manufacturing and certain other 
sectors (Edition 1997) 
Catalogue No: CV­06­97­901­xx­C 
(xx= ES, DA, DE, GR, EN, FR, IT, 
NL, PT, SV, FI ) 
4ième rapport sur les aides d'Etat 
dans l'Union Européenne dans le 
secteur des produits manufacturés et 
certains autres secteurs 
Catalogue No: CM­92­95­368­xx­C 
(xx=ES, DA, DE, GR, EN, FR, ΓΤ, 
NL, PT, SV, FI) 
Other documents and studies 
The application of articles 85 & 86 
of the EC Treaty by national courts 
in the Member States 
Catalogue No: CV­06­97­812­xx­C 
(xx= FR, DE, EN, NL) 
Examination of current and future 
excess capacity in the European 
automobyle industry ­ Ed. 1997 
Catalogue No: CV­06­97­036­EN­C 
Video : Fair Competition in Europe­
Examination of current 
Catalogue No: CV­ZV­97­002­xx­V 
(xx= ES, DA, DE, GR, EN, FR, IT, 
NL, PT, FI, SV) 
Communication de la Commission: 
Les services d'intérêt général en 
Europe (Ed. 1996) 
Catalogue No: CM­98­96­897­xx­C 
xx= DE, NL, GR, SV 
Study of exchange of confidential 
information agreements and treaties 
between the US and Member States 
of EU in areas of securities, 
criminal, tax and customs (Ed. 
1996) 
Catalogue No: CM­98­96­865­EN­C 
Survey of the Member State 
National Laws governing vertical 
distribution agreements (Ed. 1996) 
Catalogue No: CM­95­96­996­EN­C 
Services de télécomunication en 
Europe: statistiques en bref, 
Commerce, services et transports, 
1/1996 
Catalogue No: CA­NP­96­OOl­xx­C 
xx=EN, FR, DE 
Report by the group of experts on 
competition policy in the new trade 
order [COM(96)284 fin.] 
Catalogue No: CM­92­95­853­EN­C 
New industrial economics and 
experiences from European merger 
control: New lessons about 
collective dominance ? (Ed. 1995) 
Catalogue No: CM­89­95­737­EN­C 
Proceedings of the European 
Competition Forum (coédition with 
J. Wiley) ­Ed. 1996 
Catalogue No: CV­88­95­985­EN­C 
Competition Aspects of 
Interconnection Agreements in the 
Telecommunications Sector (Ed. 
1995) 
Catalogue No: CM­90­95­801­EN­C 
Proceedings of the 2nd EU/Japan 
Seminar on competition (Ed. 1995) 
Catalogue No: CV­87­95­321­ EN­C 
Bierlieferungsverträge in den neuen 
EU­Mitgliedstaaten Österreich, 
Schweden und Finnland ­ Ed. 1996 
Catalogue No: CV­01­96­074­DE­C 
DE 
Surveys of the Member States' 
powers to investigate and sanction 
violations of national competition 
laws (Ed. 1995) 
Catalogue No: CM­90­ 95­089­EN­C 
Statistiques audiovisuelles: rapport 
1995 
Catalogue No: CA­99­56­948­EN­C 
Information exchanges among firms 
and their impact on competition 
(Ed. 1995) 
Catalogue No: CV­89­95­026­EN­C 
Impact of EC funded R&D 
programmes on human resource 
development and long term 
competitiveness (Ed. 1995) 
Catalogue No: CG­NA­15­920­EN­C 
Competition policy in the new trade 
order: strengthening international 
cooperation and rules (Ed. 1995) 
Catalogue No: CM­91­95­124­EN­C 
Forum consultatif de la 
comptabilité: subventions publiques 
(Ed. 1995) 
Catalogue No: C 184 94 735 FR C 
Les investissements dans les 
industries du charbon et de l'acier de 
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la Communauté Rapport sur 
l'enquête 1993 (Ed. 1995) 
Catalogue No: CM 83 94 2963 A C 
Study on the impact of liberalization 
of inward cross border mail on the 
provision of the universal postal 
service and the options for 
progressive liberalization (Ed. 1995) 
Final report, 
Catalogue No: CV-89-95-018-EN-C 
Meeting universal service 
obligations in a competitive 
telecommunications sector (Ed. 
1994) 
Catalogue No: CV-83-94-757-EN-C 
Competition and integration: 
Community merger control policy 
(Ed. 1994) 
Catalogue No: CM-AR-94-057-EN-C 
Growth, competitiveness, 
employment: The challenges and 
ways forward into the 21st century: 
White paper (Ed. 1994) 
Catalogue No: CM 82 94 529 xx C 
(xx=ES, DA, DE, GR, EN, FR, IT, 
NL, PT) 
Growth, competitiveness, 
employment: The challenges and 
ways forward into the 21st century: 
White paper (Ed. 1993)-Volume 2 
PartC 
Catalogue No: CM-NF-93-0629 A C 
The geographical dimension of 
competition in the European single 
market (Ed. 1993) 
Catalogue No: CV-78-93-136-EN-C 
International transport by air, 1993 
Catalogue No: CA-28-96-001-xx-C 
xx=EN, FR, DE<Picture>Les 
investissements dans les industries 
du charbon et de l'acier de la 
Communauté: Enquête 1992 (Ed. 
1993) -9 languages 
Catalogue No: CM 76 93 6733 A C 
EG Wettbewerbsrecht und 
Zulieferbeziehungen der 
Automobilindustrie (Ed. 1992) 
Catalogue No: CV-73-92-788-DE-C 
Green Paper on the development of 
the single market for postal services, 
9 languages 
Catalogue No: CD-NA-14- 858-EN-C 
The effect of different state aid 
measures on intra Community 
competition (Ed. 1990) 
Catalogue No: CM 59 90 702 EN C 
The effect of conglomerate mergers 
on competition (Ed. 1990) 
Catalogue No: CM-59-90-039-EN-C 
PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL 
JOURNAL 
Γ' January to 30,h April 1998 
ARTICLES 85, 86 (RESTRICTIONS 
AND DISORTIONS OF COMPETITION 
BY UNDERTAKINGS) 
30/04/98 
C 133 Notice pursuant to Article 
19(3) of Regulation No 17 
concerning notifications No 
IV/36.456/F3 - Inntrepreneur and 
IV/36.492/F3 - Spring P. 23 
25/04/98 
L 124 Commission Decision 
98/273/EC of 28 January 1998 
relating to a proceeding under 
Article 85 of the EC Treaty (Case 
IV/35.733 - VW) (Only the German 
text is authentic) (Text with EEA 
relevance) P. 60 
18/04/98 
C 120 Draft Notice pursuant to 
Article 19(3) of Council Regulation 
No 17 concerning Case 
IV/36.533/F-3 - Yves Saint Laurent 
Parfums P. 2 
9/04/98 
C 111 Notification of an agreement 
(Case No IV/36.896 - TNN 
Network) 
1/04/98 
L 100 Commission Decision 
98/247/ECSC of 21 January 1998 
relating to a proceeding pursuant to 
Article 65 of the ECSC Treaty 
(Case IV/35.814 - Alloy surcharge) 
(Only the Dutch, French, German, 
Italian, Spanish and Swedish texts 
are authentic) (Text with EEA 
relevance) P. 55 
31/03/98 
C 97 Notification of a joint venture 
(Case No IV/E-2/36.966: 
BAYER+GEC) P. 7 
17/03/98 
C 81 Notification of a joint venture 
(Case No IV/E-2/36.949 - KGS) P. 4 
12/03/98 
C 77 Notice pursuant to Article 5(2) 
of Council Regulation (EEC) No 
3975/87 concerning case IV/36.563 
- IATA Cargo Tariff Conference P. 5 
11/03/98 
L 72 Commission Decision of 14 
January 1998 relating to a 
proceeding under Article 86 of the 
EC Treaty (IV/34.801 FAG -
Flughafen Frankfurt/Main AG) 
(Only the German text is authentic) 
(Text with EEA relevance) P. 30 
28/02/98 
C 65 Notice published pursuant to 
Article 19(3) of Council Regulation 
No 17 concerning an application for 
negative clearance or an individual 
decision to grant an exemption 
pursuant to Article 85(3) of the EC 
Treaty (Case No IV/36.327 - TPS) 
P. 5 
26/02/98 
C 61 Notice pursuant to Article 
19(3) of Regulation No 17 
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concerning notification 
IV/36.492/F3 ­ Spring P. 3 
20/02/98 
C 53 Renewed Notification of an 
Agreement on Terminal Dues 
(REIMS II) between Postal 
Operators" (Caso No IV/36.748 ­
REIMS II) 
10/02/98 
C 44 Notification of joint venture 
agreements (Case No IV/E­
2/36.831) P. 7 
C 44 Notification of agreements 
(Case No IV/36.832 ­ Energis) P. 6 
7/02/98 
C 40 Notification of agreements 
(Case No IV/36.409 ­ DBKom II) P. 
11 
6/02/98 
C 39 Commission notice pursuant to 
Article 23(3) of Regulation (EEC) 
No 4056/86 concerning Case 
IV/MAR/36.253 ­ P& O Stena Line 
P. 21 
4/02/98 
C 37 Notification of an agreement 
(Case No IV/36.858 ­ ACMA) P. 6 
C 37 Prior notification of a joint 
venture (Case No IV/36.848/F­2 ­
Renault/ZF) P. 5 
3/02/98 
C 36 Notice pursuant to Article 19 
(3) of Regulation No 17 concerning 
notification No IV/36.081/F3 ­ Bass 
24/01/98 
C 25 Notification of a cooperative 
joint venture agreement (Case No 
IV/36.213/F­2 ­ GEAE/P& W) P. 17 
21/01/98 
C 18 Notification of a joint venture 
(Case No IV/36.530/F3) P. 7 
20/01/98 
C 16 Notification of a joint venture 
(Case No IV/36.836/F3) P. 4 
16/01/98 
C 12 Notice pursuant to Article 19 
(3) of Council Regulation No 17/62 
concerning Case No IV/C­3/36.494 
EACEM energy saving 
commitment P. 2 
14/01/98 
C 9 Guidelines on the method of 
setting fines imposed pursuant to 
Article 15 (2) of Regulation No 17 
and Article 65 (5) of the ECSC 
Treaty P. 3 
13/01/98 
C 8 Notice pursuant to Article 19 
(3) of Regulation No 17 
Notification No IV/35.992/F3 ­
Scottish and Newcastle pic P. 4 
3/01/98 
L 1 COMMISSION DECISION of 
26 November 1997 relating to a 
proceeding pursuant to Article 65 of 
the ECSC Treaty (Case IV/36.069 
Wirtschaftsvereinigung Stahl) (Only 
the German text is authentic) P. 10 
Control of Concentrations / Merger 
Procedure 
7/05/98 
C 142 Non­opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case No IV/M.1107 
­ EDFI/ESTAG) P. 15 
6/05/98 
C 141 Prior notification of a 
concentration (Case No IV/M.1158 
­ Elf Atochem/Atohaas) P. 8 
C 141 Prior notification of a 
concentration (Case No IV/M.1175 
­ Magna/Steyr) P. 7 
C 141 Prior notification of a 
concentration (Case No IV/M.1179 
­ Tech Data/Computer 2000) P. 6 
C 141 Prior notification of a 
concentration (Case No IV/M.1161 
­ Alcoa/Alumax) P. 5 
1/05/98 
C 136 Non­opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case No IV/M.1089 
Paribas Belgique/Paribas 
Nederland) 
C 136 Prior notification of a 
concentration (Case No IV/M.1140 
­ Halliburton/Dresser) 
C 136 Re­notification of a 
previously notified concentration 
(Case No IV/M.1146 ­ SHV 
Energy/Thyssen Klöckner 
Recycling) 
C 136 Prior notification of a 
concentration (Case No IV/M.1170 
­ Dan Transport/Inter Forward) P. 
16 
30/04/98 
C 133 Prior notification of a 
concentration (Case No IV/M.1148 
­ STET/GET/Madrid Cable) P. 25 
28/04/98 
C 130 Prior notification of a 
concentration (Case No IV/M.1177 
­ Belgacom/Tele Danmark/Tulip) P. 3 
C 130 Prior notification of a 
concentration (Case No IV/M.1160 
­ GKN/Brambles/SKP) 
C 130 Prior notification of a 
previously notified concentration 
(Case No IV/M.1101 
Hermes/Sampo/FGB­FCIC) 
25/04/98 
C 128 Non­opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case No IV/M.1120 
­ Compaq/Digital) 
C 128 Prior notification of a 
concentration (Case No IV/JV.l ­
Telia/Telenor/Schibsted) 
C 128 Prior notification of a 
concentration (Case No IV/M.1132 
­ BT/ESB/AIG) 
23/04/98 
C 125 Prior notification of a 
concentration (Case Nò 
IV/ECSC.1278 ­ Thyssen/Krupp) P. 5 
C 125 Prior notification of a 
concentration (Case No IV/M.1110 
­ VAW/Reynolds Metals) 
C 125 Non­opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case No IV/M.1009 
­ Georg Fischer/DISA) 
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C 125 Non-opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case No IV/M.1054 
- LGV/BTR) 
22/04/98 
C 123 Prior notification of a 
concentration (Case No IV/M.1080 
- Thyssen/Krupp) 
C 123 Non-opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case No IV/M.1113 
- Nortel/Norweb) P. 3 
21/04/98 
C 122 Prior notification of a 
concentration (Case No IV/M.1178 
- Koch/Eurosplitter & J. Aron) 
C 122 Prior notification of a 
concentration (Case No IV/M.1164 
- GEC Alsthom/Cegelec) 
17/04/98 
C 118 Non-opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case No IV/M.1037 
- Nomura/Blueslate) P. 4 
16/04/98 
C 116 Non-opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case No IV/M.958 -
Watt AG (II)) P. 2 
C 116 Prior notification of a 
concentration (Case No IV/M.1157 
- Skanska/Scancem) 
C 116 Non-opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case No IV/M.1031 
- Jardine/Appleyard) 
C 116 Non-opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case No IV/M.1106 
Bayerische Vereinsbank/FGH 
Bank) 
C 116 Non-opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case No IV/M.1072 
- Bertelsmann/Burda/Futurekids) 
9/04/98 
C 111 Re-notification of a 
previously notified concentration 
(Case No IV/M.1060 
Vendex/KBB) 
8/04/98 
C 109 Prior notification of a 
concentration (Case No IV/M.1143 
- DSM/GB) 
4/04/98 
C 103 Prior notification of a 
concentration (Case No IV/M.1146 
- SHV Energy/Thyssen Klöckner 
Recycling) 
3/04/98 
C 101 Non-opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case No IV/M.1022 
- Cable i Televisio de Catalunya 
(CTC)) 
C 101 Prior notification of a 
concentration (Case No IV/M.1142 
Commercial Union/General 
Accident) 
C 101 Prior notification of a 
concentration (Case No IV/M.1102 
- BBL/American Express) 
C 101 Prior notification of a 
concentration (Case No IV/M.1020 
- GE Capital/Sea Containers) 
C 101 Prior notification of a 
concentration (Case No IV/M.1167 
- ICI/Williams) P. 27 
31/03/98 
C 97 Non-opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case No IV/M.1125 
- Céréol/Sofiprotéol - Saipol) 
C 97 Non-opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case No IV/M.1096 
- Société générale/Hambros Bank) 
C 97 Non-opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case No IV/M.1091 
- Cableuropa/Spainco/CTC) P. 8 
28/03/98 
C 93 Prior notification of a 
concentration (Case No IV/M.1098 
- Generali/AMB/Athena) 
C 93 Withdrawal of notification of a 
concentration (Case No IV/M.1047 
- Wienerberger/Cremer & Breuer) 
P. 23 
C 93 Prior notification of a 
concentration (Case No IV/M.1139 
- DLJ/FM Holdings) 
C 93 Prior notification of a 
concentration (Case No IV/M.1155 
- Cendant Corporation/NPC) 
C 93 Prior notification of a 
concentration (Case No IV/M.1131 
- AGF/Royal) 
C 93 Prior notification of a 
concentration (Case No IV/M.1060 
- Vendex/KBB) 
C 93 Non-opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case No IV/M.1094 
- Caterpillar/Perkins Engines) 
27/03/98 
C 92 Prior notification of a 
concentration (Case No IV/M.1082 
- Allianz/AGF) 
C 92 Non-opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case No IV/M.1043 
- BAT/Zurich) 
C 92 Non-opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case No IV/M.987 -
Adtranz/Siemens/Thyssen-
Transrapid Int.) 
C 92 Non-opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case No IV/M.1088 
- Thomson Corporation/Fritidsresor) 
C 92 Non-opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case No IV/M.1045 
- DFO/Scandlines) P. 16 
24/03/98 
C 88 Prior notification of a 
concentration (Case No IV/M.1144 
- Winterthur/ARAG) P. 5 
C 88 Prior notification of a 
concentration (Case No IV/M.1006 
- UPM-Kymmene/April) P. 4 
20/03/98 
C 85 Non-opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case No IV/M.999 -
CLT - UFA/Havas Intermédiation) 
P. 2 
C 85 Non-opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case No IV/M.1117 
- Pinault/Guilbert) P. 2 
18/03/98 
C 83 Prior notification of a 
concentration (Case No IV/M.1083 
- Rhône-Poulenc/Novalis/Nyltech) 
P. 3 
C 83 Non-opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case No IV/M.1081 
- Dow Jones/NBC - CNBC Europe) 
P. 4 
C 83 Non-opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case No IV/M.1025 
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C 81 Non-opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case No IV/M.1065 
- Nestlé/San Pellegrino) P. 5 
C 81 Non-opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case No IV/M.1041 
- BASF/Shell (II)) P. 5 
14/03/98 
C 79 Non-opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case No IV/M.1099 
- Otto Versand/Actebis) P. 3 
C 79 Non-opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case No IV/M.1036 
- Chrysler/Distributors (Benelux 
and Germany)) 
C 79 Non-opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case No IV/M.1033 
- Axa-UAP/Axa Aurora) P. 2 
13/03/98 
C 78 Non-opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case No IV/M.1030 
- Lafarge/Redland) P. 6 
C 78 Prior notification of a 
concentration (Case No IV/M.1109 
- Owens-Illinois/BTR Packaging) 
P. 5 
11/03/98 
C 75 Prior notification of a 
concentration (Case No IV/M.1079 
- Deutag/Ilbau/Sächsische Asphalt-
mischwerke) P. 3 
10/03/98 
C 74 Prior notification of a 
concentration (Case No IV/M.1138 
- Royal Bank of Canada/Bank of 
Montreal) P. 32 
7/03/98 
C 71 Prior notification of a 
concentration (Case No IV/M.1134 
- Tarmac/Bovis) P. 27 
C 71 Non-opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case No IV/M.1078 
- BP/Hüls) P. 26 
6/03/98 
L 66 Corrigendum to Commission 
Regulation (EC) No 447/98 of 1 
March 1998 on the notifications, 
time limits and hearings provided 
for in Council Regulation (EEC) No 
4064/89 on the control of 
concentrations between underta-
kings (Official Journal of the 
European Communities No L 61 of 
2 March 1998) P. 25 
C 70 Non-opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case No IV/M.1087 
- Promodès/Simago) 
C 70 Prior notification of a 
concentration (Case No IV/M.1127 
- Nestlé/Dalgety) 
C 70 Prior wnotification of a 
concentration (Case No IV/M.1133 -
Bass plc/Saison Holdings BV) P. 12 
5/03/98 
C 69 Prior notification of a 
concentration (Case No IV/M.1112 
- Advent International/EMI/WH 
Smith) P. 15 
2/03/98 
L 61 COMMISSION REGU-
LATION (EC) No 447/98 of 1 
March 1998 on the notifications, 
time limits and hearings provided 
for in Council Regulation (EEC) No 
4064/89 on the control of 
concentrations between underta-
kings (Text with EEA relevance) P. 
1 
C 66 Information on the assessment 
of full-function joint ventures 
pursuant to the competition rules of 
the European Community 
C 66 COMMISSION NOTICE 
concerning alignment of procedures 
for processing mergers under the 
ECSC and EC Treaties 
C 66 COMMISSION NOTICE on 
calculation of turnover under 
Council Regulation (EEC) No 
4064/89 on the control of 
concentrations between underta-
kings 
C 66 COMMISSION NOTICE on 
the concept of undertakings 
concerned under Council Regulation 
(EEC) No 4064/89 on the control of 
concentrations between underta-
kings 
C 66 COMMISSION NOTICE on 
the concept of concentration under 
Council Regulation (EEC) No 
4064/89 on the control of 
concentrations between underta-
kings 
C 66 COMMISSION NOTICE on 
the concept of full-function joint 
ventures under Council Regulation 
(EEC) No 4064/89 on the control of 
concentrations between undert-
akings P. 1 
28/02/98 
C 65 Non-opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case No IV/M.1085 
- Promodès/Catteau) P. 11 
C 65 Prior notification of a 
concentration (Case No IV/M.1120 
- Compaq/Digital) P. 10 
26/02/98 
C 61 Non-opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case No IV/M.1035 
- Hochtief/Aer Rianta/Diisseldorf 
Airport) P. 5 
24/02/98 
C 58 Prior notification of a 
concentration (Case No IV/M.1113 
- Nortel/Norweb) P. 9 
C 58 Non-opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case No IV/M.1056 
- Stinnes/BTL) P. 6 
C 58 Non-opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case No IV/M.1068 
Crédit Suisse First 
Boston/Barclays) 
21/02/98 
C 54 Prior notification of a 
concentration (Case No IV/M.1107 
- Edfi/Estag) P. 2 
20/02/98 
C 53 Inapplicability of the 
Regulation to a notified operation 
(Case No IV/M.1095 
NEC/BulI/PBN) P. 7 
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C 53 Non-opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case No IV/M.1073 
Metallgesellschaft/Klöckner 
Chemiehandel) P. 7 
18/02/98 
C 51 Prior notification of a 
concentration (Case No IV/M.1105 
- Tengelmann/Gruppo PAM) P. 11 
17/02/98 
C 50 Prior notification of a 
concentration (Case No IV/M.1101 
- Hermes/Sampo/PGB - FCIC) P. 3 
C 50 Prior notification of a 
concentration (Case No IV/M.1125 
- Cereol/Sofiproteol - Saipol) P. 4 
14/02/98 
C 49 Non-opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case No IV/M.1064 
- Bombardier/Deutsche Waggon-
bau) 
C 49 Prior notification of a 
concentration (Case No IV/M.1009 
- Georg Fischer/DISA) P. 11 
C 49 Non-opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case No IV/M.1071 
-Spar/Pro) P. 13 
C 49 Non-opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case No IV/M.1070 
- Spar/Pfannkuch) 
C 49 Non-opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case No IV/M.1018 
- GE Capital/Woodchester) 
C 49 Prior notification of a 




C 48 Non-opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case No IV/M.997 -
Swedish Match/KAV) P. 5 
C 48 Non-opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case No IV/M.1093 
- ECIA/Bertrand Faure) 
C 48 Prior notification of a 
concentration (Case No IV/M.1117 
- Pinault/Guilbert) P. 6 
C 48 Prior notification of a 
concentration (Case No IV/M.1108 
- SBG/SBV) 
12/02/98 
C 47 Prior notification of a 
concentration (Case No IV/M.1106 
Bayerische Vereinsbank/FGH 
Bank) P. 5 
C 47 Non-opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case No IV/M.980 -
Arbed/Aceralia (see also ECSC 
1237)) P. 6 
10/02/98 
C 44 Re-notification of a previously 
notified concentration (Case No 
IV/M.1069 - WorldCom/MCI) P. 8 
C 44 Non-opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case No IV/M.1029) 
7/02/98 
C 40 Non-opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case No IV/M.1007 
- Shell/Montell) P. 10 
C 40 Non-opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case No TV/M. 1061 
- ING/BBL) P. 10 
6/02/98 
C 39 Non-opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case No IV/M.1049 
- AKZO/PLV-EPL) P. 19 
C 39 Non-opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case No IV/M.1059 -
Suez Lyonnaise des Eaux/BFI) P. 22 
C 39 Prior notification of a 
concentration (Case No IV/M.999 -
CLT-UFA/Havas Intermédiation) P. 
20 
C 39 Non-opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case No IV/M.1075 
Nordic Capital/Mölnlycke 
Clinical/Kolmi) P. 19 
5/02/98 
C 38 Non-opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case No IV/M.998 -
OBS! Danmark) P. 4 
4/02/98 
C 37 Prior notification of a 
concentration (Case No IV/M.1086 
- Promodès/S21/Gruppo GS) P. 7 
C 37 Initiation of proceedings (Case 
No IV/M.1027 - Deutsche 
Telekom/BetaResearch) P. 4 
3/02/98 
C 36 Prior notification of a 
concentration (Case No IV/M.1099 
- Otto Versand/Actebis) P. 4 
31/01/98 
C 33 Prior notification of a 
concentration (Case No IV/M.1014 
- British Steel/Europipe) P. 2 
30/01/98 
C 32 Initiation of proceedings (Case 
No IV/M.993 Bertels-
mann/Kirch/Premiere) P. 6 
C 32 Non-opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case No IV/M.1057 
- Terra/ICI) P. 6 
C 32 Non-opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case No IV/M.1042 -
Eastman Kodak/Sun Chemical) P. 5 
C 32 Non-opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case No IV/M.1017 
- Hannover RE/Skandia) P. 5 
27/01/98 
C 29 Non-opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case No IV/M.1058 
- Unichem/Alliance Santé) P. 7 
C 29 Non-opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case No IV/M.1003 
- Alcoa/Inespal) P. 7 
C 29 Non-opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case No IV/M.1013 
- Shell UK/Gulf Oil (Great Britain)) 
P. 6 
C 29 Non-opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case No IV/M.1021 
Compagnie nationale de 
navigation/Sogelfa-CIM) P. 8 
24/01/98 
C 25 Re-notification of a previously 
notified concentration (Case No 
IV/M.1094 - Caterpillar/Perkins 
Engines) P. 16 
C 25 Non-opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case No IV/M.1046 
- Ameritech/Tele Danmark) P. 18 
23/01/98 
C 22 Non-opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case No IV/M.954 -
Bain/Hoechst - Dade Behring) P. 22 
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C 22 Corrigendum to prior 
notification of a concentration (Case 
No IV/M.1085 - Promodès/Catteau) 
(Official Journal of the European 
Communities C 12 of 16 January 
1998) P. 24 
C 22 Corrigendum to prior 
notification of a concentration (Case 
No IV/M.1087 - Promodès/Simago) 
(Official Journal of the European 
Communities C 12 of 16 January 
1998) P. 24 
C 22 Prior notification of a 
concentration (Case No IV/M.1100 
- CGEA/Linjebuss) P. 23 
C 22 Re-notification of a previously 
notified concentration (Case No 
IV/M.1065 - Nestlé/San Pellegrino) 
P. 22 
22/01/98 
C 20 Prior notification of a 
concentration (Case No IV/M.1090 
- GREA/PPP) P. 15 
C 20 Non-opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case No IV/M.1023 
- IFIL/Worms & Cie) P. 14 
21/01/98 
C 18 Initiation of proceedings (Case 
No IV/M.1047 
Wienerberger/Cremer & Breuer) P. 9 
C 18 Prior notification of a 
concentration (Case No IV/M.1043 
- BAT/Zürich) P. 8 C 18 Prior 
notification of a concentration (Case 
No IV/M.1053 
Mannesmann/Philips) P. 6 
C 18 Prior notification of a 
concentration (Case No IV/M.1078 
- BP/Hüls) P. 5 
20/01/98 
C 16 Non-opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case No IV/M.1055 
- Cegetel/Vodafone - SFR) P. 13 
17/01/98 
C 13 Initiation of proceedings (Case 
No IV/M.1040 - Wolters 
Kluwer/Reed Elsevier) P. 5 
16/01/98 
C 12 Prior notification of a 
concentration (Case No IV/M.1085 
- Promodès/Catteau) P. 15 
C 12 Prior notification of a 
concentration (Case No IV/M.1087 
- Promodès/Simago) P. 14 
15/01/98 
C 10 Non-opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case No IV/M.1026 
- Nordic Capital/Apax Industri) P. 9 
C 10 Non-opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case No IV/M.971 -
Klöckner/Comercial de Laminados) 
P. 8 
C 10 Non-opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case No IV/M.988 -
M irsk/DFDS Travel) P. 8 
C 10 Prior notification of a 
concentration (Case No IV/M.1095 
- NEC/Bull/PBN) P. 7 
C 10 Prior notification of a 
concentration (Case No IV/M.1062 
- Alpitour/Francorosso) P. 6 
C 10 New effective date of 
notification of a previously notified 
concentration (Case No IV/M.1022 -
Cable I Televisio de Catalunya) P. 5 
C 10 Prior notification of a 
concentration (Case No IV/M.1096 -
Société générale/Hambros Bank) P. 4 
C 10 Non-opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case No IV/M.917 -
Valinox/Timet) P. 3 
C 10 Non-opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case No IV/M.918 -
Klöckner/ODS (see also 
IV/ECSC.1244))P. 3 
14/01/98 
C 9 Initiation of proceedings (Case 
No IV/M.970 - TKS/ITW 
Signode/Titan) P. 5 
13/01/98 
C 8 Prior notification of a 
concentration (Case No IV/M.1091 
- Cableuropa/SpainCom/CTC) P. 2 
10/01/98 
C 6 Prior notification of a 
concentration (Case No IV/M.1056 
- Stinnes/BTL) P. 3 
C 6 Non-opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case No IV/M.994 -
Dupont/Hitachi) P. 2 
9/01/98 
C 5 Prior notification of a 
concentration (Case No IV/M.1044 
- KPMG/Ernst & Young) P. 3 
8/01/98 
C 4 Non-opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case No IV/M.984 -
Dupont/ICI) P. 4 
7/01/98 
L 3 Corrigendum to Council 
Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 of 21 
December 1989 on the control of 
concentrations between 
undertakings (Official Journal of the 
European Communities L 257 of 21 
September 1990) P. 16 
ARTICLE 90 (LIBERALISATION) 
1/04/98 
L 101 Directive 98/10/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the 
Council of 26 February 1998 on the 
application of open network 
provision (ONP) to voice telephony 
and on universal service for 
telecommunications in a 
competitive environment P. 24 
19/03/98 
C 84 Commission Communication 
on interconnection pricing in a 
liberalised telecommunications 
market P. 3 
7/03/98 
C 71 Draft Commission Directive 
amending Directive 90/388/EEC in 
order to ensure that 
telecommunications networks and 
cable TV networks owned by a 
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single operator are separate legal 
entities P. 23 
C 71 Commission communication 
concerning the review under 
competition rules of the joint 
provision of telecommunications 
and cable TV networks by a single 
operator and the abolition of 
restrictions on the provision of cable 
TV capacity over 
telecommunications networks P. 4 
C 71 Notice by the Commission 
concerning a draft Directive 
amending Commission Directive 
90/388/EEC in order to ensure that 
telecommunications networks and 
cable TV networks owned by a 
single operator are separate legal 
entities P. 3 
6/02/98 
C 39 Notice from the Commission 
on the application of the 
competition rules to the postal 
sector and on the assessment of 
certain State measures relating to 
postal services 
10/01/98 
C 6 Status of voice communications 
on Internet under Community law 
and, in particular, pursuant to 
Directive 90/388/EEC P. 4 
STATE AID 
28/04/98 
C 130 STATE AID C 51/97 (ex N 
753/96) Italy P. 6 
C 130 Authorisation for State aid 
pursuant to Articles 92 and 93 of the 
EC Treaty Cases where the 
Commission raises no objections 
C 130 Authorisation for State aid 
pursuant to Articles 92 and 93 of the 
EC Treaty Cases where the 
Commission raises no objections 
C 130 Authorisation for State aid 
pursuant to Articles 92 and 93 of the 
EC Treaty Cases where the 
Commission raises no objections 
25/04/98 
C 128 STATE AID C 83/97 (ex NN 
153/97) Germany 
23/04/98 
C 125 STATE ATD C 36/97 
Luxembourg 
C 125 Review of production aid 
ceiling for shipbuilding P. 4 
21/04/98 
C 122 STATE AID C 66/97 Sweden 
17/04/98 
C 118 STATE ATD C 70/97 (ex NN 
123/97) Germany P. 5 
16/04/98 
C 116 Proposal for a Council 
Regulation (EC) laying down 
detailed rules for the application of 
Article 93 of the EC Treaty P. 13 
C 109 STATE AID C 40/95 
Germany 
C 109 STATE AID C 77/97 (ex N 
99/97) Austria 
4/04/98 
C 103 Authorisation for State aid 
pursuant to Articles 92 and 93 of the 
EC Treaty Cases where the 
Commission raises no objections 
C 103 STATE AID C 86/97 (ex N 
322/97) Ireland 
C 103 STATE AID C 76/97 (ex NN 
115/97) Spain 
3/04/98 
C 101 STATE AID C 87/97 (ex N 
527/97) Italy P. 2 
2/04/98 
C 100 Authorisation for State aid 
pursuant to Articles 92 and 93 of the 
EC Treaty Cases where the 
Commission raises no objections P. 
19 
C 100 STATE AID C 4/98 (ex N 
659/B/97) Italy 
C 100 STATE AID C 78/97 (ex NN 
33/96) Greece P. 7 
1/04/98 
C 99 STATE AID C 61/97 (N 
771/96, NN 128/96) Germany P. 9 
C 99 Authorisation for State aid 
pursuant to Articles 92 and 93 of the 
EC Treaty Cases where the 
Commission raises no objection 
7/05/98 
C 142 STATE AID C 7/98 (ex NN 
1/98) P. 8 
5/05/98 
C 140 STATE AID C 64/97 (ex NN 
175/95) Germany 
1/05/98 
C 136 Authorisation for State aid 
pursuant to Articles 92 and 93 of the 
EC Treaty Cases where the 
Commission raises no objections P. 
13 
9/04/98 
C 111 Authorisation for State aid 
pursuant to Articles 92 and 93 of the 
EC Treaty Cases where the 
Commission raises no objections 
C 111 STATE AID C 73/97 (NN 
146/97) France 
C 111 Authorisation for State aid 
pursuant to Articles 92 and 93 of the 
EC Treaty Cases where the 
Commission raises no objections 
8/04/98 
C 109 STATE AID C 41/97 (ex N 
914/95) Italy 
25/03/98 
C 89 Authorisation for State aid 
pursuant to Articles 92 and 93 of the 
EC Treaty Cases where the 
Commission raises no objections 
C 89 STATE AID C 67/97 (ex NN 
109/B/96) Italy P. 3 
21/03/98 
C 86 STATE AID C 1/98 (ex N 
750/B/95) Italy P. 3 
20/03/98 
C 85 STATE AID C 2/98 (ex N 
27/B/97) Italy P. 9 
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18/03/98 
L 80 Commission Decision 
98/212/EC of 16 April 1997 on the 
aid granted by Italy to Enirisorse 
SpA (Only the Italian text is 
authentic) (Text with EEA 
relevance) P. 32 
C 83 STATE AID C 72/97 (ex NN 
124/97) Germany P. 10 
C 83 STATE AID C 65/97 (ex NN 
65/97) Portugal P. 5 
16/03/98 
L 78 Commission Decision 
98/204/EC of 30 July 1997 
conditionally approving aid granted 
by France to the GAN group (Only 
the French text is authentic) (Text 
with EEA relevance) P. 1 
14/03/98 
C 79 STATE AID C 5/96 France P. 
10 
C 79 STATE AID C 69/97 (ex NN 
122/97) Germany P. 4 
11/03/98 
C 75 Authorisation for State aid 
pursuant to Articles 92 and 93 of the 
EC Treaty Cases where the 
Commission raises no objections P. 4 
10/03/98 
C 74 Commission communication 
concerning extension of the 
guidelines on State aid for rescuing 
and restructuring firms in difficulty 
P. 31 
C 74 GUIDELINES ON 
NATIONAL REGIONAL AID P. 9 
7/03/98 
L 67 Commission Decision 
98/183/EC of 1 October 1997 
concerning aid granted by France to 
Thomson SA and Thomson 
Multimedia (Only the French text is 
authentic) (Text with EEA 
relevance) P. 31 
6/03/98 
C 70 Authorisation for State aid 
pursuant to Articles 92 and 93 of the 
EC Treaty Cases where the 
Commission raises no objections 
C 70 Authorisation for State aid 
pursuant to Articles 92 and 93 of the 
EC Treaty Cases where the 
Commission raises no objections 
C 70 STATE AIDS C 90/97 (ex NN 
180/97) Italy P. 5 
3/03/98 
C 67 Authorisation for State aid 
pursuant to Articles 92 and 93 of the 
EC Treaty Cases where the 
Commission raises no objections P. 5 
28/02/98 
C 65 Authorisation for State aid 
pursuant to Articles 92 and 93 of the 
EC Treaty Cases where the 
Commission raises no objections P. 2 
27/02/98 
C 63 Authorisation for State aid 
pursuant to Articles 92 and 93 of the 
EC Treaty Cases where the 
Commission raises no objections P. 6 
24/02/98 
C 58 Authorisation for State aid 
pursuant to Articles 92 and 93 of the 
EC Treaty Cases where the 
Commission raises no objections P. 7 
19/02/98 
C 52 STATE AID C 79/97 (ex NN 
137/96) Italy P. 5 
18/02/98 
C 51 STATE AID C 81/97 (ex NN 
167/97) Italy 
C 51 Authorisation for State aid 
pursuant to Articles 92 and 93 of the 
EC Treaty Cases where the 
Commission raises no objections 
C 51 STATE AID C 75/97 (ex NN 
108/97) Germany P. 3 
17/02/98 
C 50 Authorisation for State aid 
pursuant to Articles 92 and 93 of the 
EC Treaty Cases where the 
Commission raises no objections 
14/02/98 
C 49 STATE AID C 68/97 (NN 
118/97) Spain P. 2 
12/02/98 
C 47 Authorisation for State aid 
pursuant to Articles 92 and 93 of the 
EC Treaty Cases where the 
Commission raises no objections 
5/02/98 
C 38 STATE AID (95-010 Norway) 
P. 6 
C 38 Authorisation for State aid 
pursuant to Articles 92 and 93 of the 
EC Treaty Cases where the 
Commission raises no objections P. 3 
4/02/98 
C 37 STATE AID C 42/97 (ex NN 
121/96) Germany P. 8 
31/01/98 
C 33 Authorization for State aid 
pursuant to Articles 92 and 93 of the 
EC Treaty Cases where the 
Commission raises no objections 
30/01/98 
C 32 Authorization for State aid 
pursuant to Articles 92 and 93 of the 
EC Treaty Cases where the 
Commission raises no objections 
27/01/98 
L 20 COMMISSION DECISION 
98/95/EC of 21 October 1997 
concerning aid granted by the 
Region of Sardinia (Italy) to 
shipping companies in Sardinia 
(Only the Italian text is authentic) 
(Text with EEA relevance) P. 30 
24/01/98 
C 25 Authorization for State aid 
pursuant to Articles 92 and 93 of the 
EC Treaty Cases where the 
Commission raises no objections p. 14 
C 25 Authorization for State aid 
pursuant to Articles 92 and 93 of the 
EC Treaty Cases where the 
Commission raises no objections p. 11 
C 25 STATE AID C 56/97 (ex NN 
78/96) Germany P. 2 
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22/01/98 
C 20 STATE AID N 680/97 
Belgium P. 3 
17/01/98 
C 13 STATE AID C 58/94 
Germany P. 2 
16/01/98 
C 12 Approval of State aid pursuant 
to Articles 92 and 93 of the EC 
Treaty Cases where the Commission 
raises no objections N 475/96 ­
Austria P. 5 
7/01/98 
C 3 Authorization for State aid 
pursuant to Articles 92 and 93 of the 
EC Treaty Cases where the 
Commission raises no objections P. 3 
3/01/98 
C 1 Authorization for State aid 
Measures not constituting aid in the 
meaning of Article 4 (c) of the 
ECSC Treaty P. 9 
COURT OF JUSTICE / COURT 
OF FIRST INSTANCE 
Affaires introduites devant la 
Cour 
Aff. C­57/98 Ρ 
Asociación Telefónica de Espanña 
SA (ATM) / Commission: Pourvoi 
contre l'arrêt du Tribunal (première 
chambre élargie), rendu le 18 
décembre 1997, dans l'affaire Τ­
Ι 78/94 opposant ATM à la 
Commission, ayant rejeté comme 
irrecevable le recours en annulation 
contre le classement d'une plainte 
relative à des aides publiques dont 
aurait bénéficié Telefónica de 
España SA ­ Intérêt pour agir ­
Poursuite du recours T­178/94 ­
Aide d'Etat prétendument consistant 
dans le fait qu'une entreprise 
chargée de la gestion de services 
d'intérêt général était soumise à un 
régime de sécurité sociale 
particulier et, de ce fait, à des 
cotisations inférieures à celles du 
régime général 
Aff. C­436/97 Ρ 
Deutsche Bahn AG / Commission: 
Pourvoi contre l'arrêt du Tribunal 
(première chambre élargie), rendu le 
21 octobre 1997, dans l'affaire T­
229/94 opposant Deutsche Bahn AG 
à la Commission ­ Poursuite du 
recours en annulation en ce qui 
concerne la constatation d'un abus 
de position dominante sur le marché 
allemand des transports ferroviaires 
par la fixation de tarifs 
discriminatoires pour le transport 
terrestre de conteneurs maritimes et 
la fixation d'une amende ­ Règles de 
preuve 
Aff. C­441/97 Ρ 
Wirtschaftsvereinigung Stahl e.a. / 
Commission: Pourvoi contre l'arrêt 
du Tribunal (première chambre 
élargie), rendu le 24 octobre 1997, 
dans l'affaire T­244/94 opposant 
Wirtschaftsvereinigung Stahl e.a. à 
la Commission ­ Poursuite du 
recours en annulation de la décision 
94/259/CECA autorisant des aides 
d'Etat aux entreprises sidérurgiques 
du secteur public italien 
Détournement de pouvoir 
Confiance légitime ­ Discrimination 
­ Défaut de motivation ­ Violation 
des droits de la défense 
Aff. C­1/98 
British Steel pic / Commission: 
Pourvoi contre l'arrêt du Tribunal 
(première chambre élargie), du 24 
octobre 1997, dans l'affaire T­
243/94 opposant British Steel à la 
Commission ­ Annulation de la 
décision 94/258/CECA de la 
Commission, du 12 avril 1994, 
concernant les aides que l'Espagne 
envisage d'accorder à l'entreprise 
publique de sidérurgie intégrée 
Corporación de la Siderurgia 
Integral (CSI) et de la décision 
94/259/CECA de la Commission, 
du 12 avril 1994, concernant l'octroi 
par l'Italie d'aides d'Etat aux 
entreprises sidérurgiques du secteur 
public (groupe sidérurgique Ilva) 
Aff. C­15/98 
Italie / Commission : Annulation de 
la décision n° 98/95/CE de la 
Commission, du 21 octobre 1997, 
concernant une aide octroyée par la 
région de Sardaigne (Italie) au 
secteur de la navigation en 
Sardaigne et de la lettre de la 
Commission relative à l'engagement 
d'une procédure concernant la loi n° 
9 de la région de Sardaigne du 15 
février 1996 
Aff. C­404/97 
Commission / Portugal: Man­
quement d'Etat ­ Défaut d'avoir 
supprimé et récupéré, dans les délais 
prévus, les aides à l'entreprise 
EPAC visées par la décision 
C(97)2130 
Aff. C­422/97 
Société Anonyme de Traverses en 
Béton Armé (Sateba) / 
Commission: Pourvoi contre 
l'ordonnance du Tribunal (première 
chambre), rendue le 29 septembre 
1997, dans l'affaire T­83/97 
opposant Sateba à la Commission ­
Recevabilité d'un recours visant à 
l'annulation d'une décision de 
classement d'une plainte contre le 
comportement d'un pouvoir 
adjudicataire national ­ Plainte 
fondée sur la violation de la 
directive 93/38/CEE du Conseil, du 
14 juin 1993, portant coordination 
des procédures de passation des 
marchés dans les secteurs de l'eau, 
de l'énergie, des transports et des 
télécommunications (JO L 199, p. 
84) ainsi que sur la violation des 
règles sur la libre circulation et des 
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règles de concurrence - Non-
engagement de la procédure au titre 
du règlement n. 17 - Détournement 
de procédure consistant dans le 
classement d'une plainte visant à 
l'ouverture d'une procédure de 
l'article 169 du traité CE 
Affaires introduites devant le 
Tribunal 
Aff. T-596/97 
Dalmine SpA / Commission: 
L'annulation des articles 2 et 4 de la 
décision de la Commission, du 6 
octobre 1997, C(97) 3036, relative à 
une procédure d'application des 
articles 85 et 86 du traité CE 
(IV/35.860 - tubes d'acier) 
Aff. T-600/97 
Ditta Pietro Stagno / Commission: 
l'annulation de la décision n. 
C(97)2735 de la Commission, du 30 
juillet 1997, relative aux aides 
accordées par la Regione Friuli-
Venezia Giulia aux transporteurs 
routiers 
Aff. T-601/97 
Ditta Fabrizio Cernecca / 
Commission : Voir aff. T-600/97 
Aff. T-602/97 
Trasporti e Spedizioni Internazionali 
Cossutta Sne / Commission: Voir 
aff. T-600/97 
Aff. T-603/97 
Ditta Giuseppe Camaur / 
Commission: Voir aff. T-600/97 
Aff. T-604/97 
Cointra Transport and Trade Co. Sri 
/ Commission: Voir aff. T-600/97 
Aff. T-605/97 
Ditta Autotrasporti Silvano Zottich / 
Commission: Voir aff. T-600/97 
Aff. T-606/97 
Zootrans Sne / Commission: 
Voir aff. T-600/97 
Aff. T-607/97 
Pauletic Antonio Suce, di Pauletic 
Igor / Commission: Voir aff. T-
600/97 
Aff. T-613/97 
Union française de l'express (Ufex) 
e.a. / Commission: L'annulation de 
la décision de la Commission, du 
1er octobre 1997, statuant que 
l'assitance logistique et commerciale 
fournie par La Poste à sa filiale, la 
Société française de messagerie 
internationale (SFMI-Chronopost), 
ainsi que les autres mesures 
dénoncées ne constituent pas des 
aides d'Etat en faveur de cette 
société 
Aff. T-1/98 
Ditta Fabris Carlo & C. Sne / 
Commission: L'annulation partielle 
de la décision n. C(97)2735 de la 
Commission, du 30 juillet 1997, 
relative aux aides accordées par la 
Regione Friuli-Venezia Giulia aux 
transporteurs routiers 
Aff. T-3/98 
Ditta D'Odorico Franco / 
Commission: Voir aff. T-l/98 
Aff. T-4/98 
Ditta Birri Fiorindo / Commission: 
Voir aff. T-l/98 
Aff. T-5/98 
Ditta Framalicco Maria Cecilia / 
Commission: Voir aff. T-l/98 
Aff. T-6/98 
Autotrasporti Di Viola Claudio & C. 
Snc / Commission: Voir aff. T-l/98 
Aff. T-8/98 
Siderca SAIC / Commission: 
L'annulation de la décision de la 
Commission, du 6 octobre 1997, 
C(97) 3036, relative à une 
procédure d'application des articles 
85 et 86 du traité CE (IV/35.860 -
tubes d'acier) 
Aff. T-16/98 
Wirtschaftsvereinigung Stahl e.a. / 
Commission: l'annulation de la 
décision de la Commission 
98/4/CECA, du 26 novembre 1997, 
relative à une procédure 
d'application de l'article 65 du traité 
CECA concernant un accord 
d'échange d'informations conclu 
entre seize producteurs 
sidérurgiques allemands membres 
de l'association Wirtschafts-
vereinigung Stahl (affaire 
IV/36.069) 
Aff. T-296/97 
Alitalia - Linee Aeree Italiane SpA / 
Commission: L'annulation de la 
décision de la Commission CE 
C(97) 2616, du 15 juillet 1997, 
d'autoriser, à certaines conditions, 
l'aide accordée par les autorités 
italiennes à la société Alitalia, sous 
forme d'un apport de capital à 
effectuer par le holding d'Etat IRI 
Aff. T-298/97 
Mauro Alzetta e.a. / Commission: 
L'annulation de la décision n° 
C(98)2735 de la Commission, du 30 
juillet 1997, relative aux aides 
accordées par la Regione Friuli-
Venezia Giulia aux transporteurs 
routiers 
Aff. T-312/97 
Masotti Sri e.a. / Commission : 
L'annulation de la décision n. 
C(97)2735 de la Commission, du 30 
juillet 1997, relative aux aides 
accordées par la Regione Friuli-
Venezia Giulia aux transporteurs 
routiers 
Aff. T-313/97 
Impresa Baldo Anna Maria e.a. / 
Commission: L'annulation de la 
décision n. C(97)2735 de la 
Commission, du 30 juillet 1997, 
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relative aux aides accordées par la 
Regione Friuli-Venezia Giulia aux 
transporteurs routiers 
Aff. T-315/97 
SUTES SpA e.a. / Commission : 
L'annulation de la décision n. 
C(97)2735 de la Commission, du 30 
juillet 1997, relative aux aides 
accordées par la Regione Friuli-
Venezia Giulia aux transporteurs 
routiers 
D G I V O N T H E 
W O R L D W I D E W E B 
COMING UP 
DG IV has a home page on the 
Europa server available on the 
World Wide Web. Our address is: 
http://europa.eu.int/en/comm/ 
dg04/ 
EC - Competition Policy 
Newsletter, N0 3-1998 
XXVII Report on Competition 
Policy - 1997 
Competition law in the EC- Volume 
IIA - Rules applicable to State aid -
Edition 1998 
Merger control in the European 
Union - Edition 1998 
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Cases covered in this issue 
Court Judgments 
















Wolters Kluwer/Reed Elsevier 
Wienerberger/Cremer&Breuer 






















Owens Illinois/BTR Packaging 
Promodes/SZI/Grupo GS 
Samsung/AST 









Italie : Emploi en Sicile 
Portugal : Aides à la formation 
Belgique : Hermès Europe Railtel 
France : Gooding Consumer 
Electronics + Cofidur 
Royaume-Uni : Rolls-Royce 
Autriche : KNP Leykam 









Allemagne : Triptis Pozellan 
Allemagne: Régime 
d'allégement fiscal 
Pays-Bas : Peroxyde dhydrogène 
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LI ( D O C ) Professional Associât./Ministry/Research Center 
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